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I. INTRODUCTION: A STUDY AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW, POLITICS,
MORALITY AND ECONOMICS
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, in many respects our society would
be astounding to those who watched the last century turn. Technological and
scientific developments have changed the face of life in ways unimaginable a
hundred years ago. But in at least one respect, the turning of this century would
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seem almost eerily familiar to people like F.B. Hubachek, who became General
Counsel to Household Finance in 1930 and a well-known name in the new
consumer finance industry.' What we today call the "prime" consumer credit
market-purchase money home mortgages and the secondary mortgage
market,2 home equity loans, credit cards, automobile loans and leases that
finance the American Dream for most of the middle- and upper-economic
quintiles-is a world away from that of 1900. But for parts of what is now
called the "subprime" consumer credit market, the century is ending much as
it began. After interim decades of reform, some of the credit products in the
small-dollar end of this market are throwbacks to that earlier era, and the debate
they generated then echoes today.
Known as the "alternative financial services" (AFS) or "fringe banking"
sector,3 this market has become a major source of traditional banking services
for low-income and working poor consumers, residents of minority
neighborhoods, and people with blemished credit histories. Those who have no
concerns about the emergence of this market consider it simply part of a trend
toward niche marketing offering a needed and desired service to people
previously unable to participate in the credit society-in short, the
"democratization of credit."4 Critics of the phenomenon, on the other hand,
call the trend "financial apartheid 5 or the "second-class" marketplace.
This Article does not attempt to trace the rise of the fringe banking market
over the course of this century. One factor in its development, however, has
undoubtedly been the emergence of consumer credit as a driving force in the
economy. By one gross measure, aggregate household debt6 rose from $653.9
1. See generally F. B. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAWS (1938)
[hereinafter HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS]; F.B.HUBACHEK, TheDevelopmentofRegulatorySmall
Loan Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1941) [hereinafter Hubachek, Development].
2. The thirty-year amortizing mortgage is a twentieth century creation, as are the
secondary market for mortgages and the more recent mortgage-backed security. Today, in fact,
mostpurchase money mortgages are sold by their originators to investors on a secondary market,
rather than being held for the life of the loan. This sale gives the direct lenders a constant
infusion of new money, enabling them to originate more loans.
3. See, e.g., JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS,ANDTHEPOOR 1, (1994) [hereinafter CASKEY,FRINGEBANKING]; John Burton et al.,
The Alternative Financial Sector: Policy Implications for Poor Households, 42 CONSUMER
INTERESTS ANN. 279, 279 (1996); Roger Swagler et al., The Alternative Financial Sector: An
Overview, 7 ADVANCING THE CONSUMER INTEREST 7, 7 (1995) [hereinafter AFS Overview].
4. HenryJL Sommer, Causes ofthe ConsumerBankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse
or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFsTRA L. REV. 33, 37 (1998).
5. See e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Banks Infringe on "Fringe Bank" Specialties, CHI.
TRIB., June 13, 1999, at 3.
6. As used here, "household debt" combines two debt figures reported monthly by
the Federal Reserve Board: (I) outstanding mortgages on one- to four-family residences, and
"consumer installment debt," which includes auto loans, student loans, credit card debt, personal
loans and other nonmortgage credit.
3
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billion in 19757 to $4.7 trillion in 19958 and $5.6 trillion in 1998.' Comparing
those figures to aggregate annual household income, the 1975 ratio was 24%;
in 1995 and 1998, the ratios were an astounding 104%.'
This growth is a two-edged sword, reflecting the dual character of debt.
7. Financial and Business Statistics, 62 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A42 (1976) (one- to
four-family mortgages: $491.7 billion); Id. at A46 (consumer installment credit: $162.2billion).
8. Financial and Business Statistics, 82 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A35 tbl.l.54 (1996)
(one-to four-family mortgages: $3.6 trillion); id. atA36 tbl.l.55 (consumer installment credit:
$1.1 trillion).
9. Financial and Business Statistics, 85 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A35 tbl.l.54 (1999)
(one- to four-family mortgages: $4.3 trillion); id. at A36 tbl.1.55 (consumer installment credit:
$1.3 trillion).
While household debt figures are imprecise, the comparison ofconsistentbenchmarks
over time is telling. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) mortgage figures do not distinguish
mortgages taken out for personal, family, or household purposes-i.e. "consumer" debt, as
defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1994)-from mortgages oninvestmentproperty. OtherFRB data
indicates that about 15% of American households borrowed for real estate investment purposes
in 1995. Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the
Survey of ConsumerFinances, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 20 tbl.12 (1997) [hereinafter Kennickell,
et al., Family Finances].
On the other hand, these household debt figures may be understated, as they do not
appear to include the type of household debt from the credit markets described in this Article,
nor some of the nontraditional financing used to purchase homes, such as seller-held contracts.
Also, auto leases are not included. Indeed, increases in auto leasing would actually show up as
a decrease in consumer installment debt, id. at 17, though the impact on the household budget
is the same.
10. Income figures were obtained from the Census Bureau's Current Population
Reports: Consumer Income, by multiplying the mean household income by the number of
households. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CuRRENTPOPULATIONREPORTs: CONSUMER INCOME tbls.
B.2 (1975-S2.7 trillion), 2 (1995-$4.5 trillion and 1998-$5.4 trillion) (Mar. 1999).
This ratio is not a "debt-to-income" ratio as that term is commonly used. Debt-to-
income measures monthly debt service payments in relation to monthly income. Among families
with debt, that figure has gone fromjust 15.9% in 1989 to 17.6% in 1998. Arthur B. Kennickell
et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1,26 (2000) [hereinafter Kennickell et al, Recent Changes 2000].
The aboveratios nonetheless show aremarkable shift in the attitude and economics ofAmerica's
households. And unlike the monthly debt-service figures, the outstanding balance figures hint
at the longer time horizons facing the indebted household-longer horizons that limit the
flexibility ofthe household to adjustto changing economic conditions orpersonal circumstances.
For example, paying off a vehicle takes longer: in 1975, FRB figures used thirty-six months as
the standard auto loan term; the average term for a new car loan in 1998 was fifty-two months.
Compare Financial Business Statistics, 62 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A45 (1975) (Finance Rates on
Selected Type of Instalment Credit) with Financial Business Statistics 85 FED. RES. BULL. Al,
A36 tbl.1.56 (1999). If credit card payments are kept constant-for example, at $100 per month
on 15% balances-the time necessary to pay off the growing outstanding credit card balances
is far more dramatic. According to estimates prepared by the Consumer Federation of America,
the average 1989 balance was $2100, compared to $6500 in 1996. Stephen Brobeck, The
Consumer Impacts of Expanding Credit CardDebt, 1997 CONSUMERFED'NOFAM. REP., 5. This
report shows higher balance figures higher than FRB data, but the FRB debt data is obtained
from self-reporting surveys, which may understate debt. Id. Keeping the monthly payments
constant expands that time horizon to pay offthose balances from two years to over eleven years.
Vol. 51: 589
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Even the two names we give to this product reflect this dual character: "credit"
has a positive connotation, but "debt" still rings with a negative one." Credit
can be used for productive investment for the household. Without question, a
large portion of the increased ratio of aggregate annual income to debt load
from 1975 is positive. The level of homeownership in this country has risen to
historic highs-66% in 1998'-a fact reflected in of the higher level of
mortgage debt. 3 It also reflects a rapid acceleration in attitude changes about
debt.'4 There is an increasing willingness to "hock" the home through home
equity lending, sometimes for long-term investmentpurposes such as education
or home improvements, and sometimes for consumption-vacations or
consolidation of credit card debt. 5 Credit card debt, which grew from $19.5
billion in 197516 to $586.5 billion in 1998,'17 is now used partly for asset
building (such as financing the purchase of consumer durables), partly for
convenience (such as avoiding carrying cash), and partly to finance
consumption (such as groceries, vacations, andrestaurant meals). Longer terms
on auto loans and the advent of auto leases have encouraged us to buy more
expensive vehicles more often.'8 However, debt can also be destructive, as
11. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 297 (10th ed. 1993) (listing
the first meaning for "debt' as "sin, trespass").
12. Kennickell et al, Recent Changes 2000, supra note 10 at 15-18.
13. In addition to more families holding purchase money mortgages, the increased
mortgage debt also reflects higher home prices. Overall, increased debt reflects acquisition of
an asset of greater worth, though that worth is subject to the vagaries of the economy. The
principal balance ofa purchase money home loan does not decline ifa regional recession lowers
the value of the home.
14. Some of those changing attitudes may be driven by more aggressive marketing
for debt and credit, as well.
15. The FRB estimates $420 billion in home equity loans in 1997. Glenn B. Canner
et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. REs. BuLL. 241,242 (1998). The
portion ofhouseholds with equity loans rose from 5% in 1977 to 13% in 1997. Id. at 243. One
commentator has suggested that government policies on using home equity to leverage debt
should be neutral, rather than encouraging the practice through a variety of laws. Julia Patterson
Forrester, MortgagingtheAmerican Dream: A Critical Evaluation ofthe Federal Government's
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TULANE L. Rv. 373, 375 (1994).
16. Financial and Business Statistics, 62 FED. REs. BULL. Al, A46 (1976).
17. Financial and Business Statistics, 85 FED. REs. BULL. Al, A36 tbl.1.55 (1999).
18. Ana Azicorbe & Martha Stoor-McCluer, Vehicle Ownership, Purchases, and
Leasing: Consumer Survey Data, 120 MONTHLY LAB. REv.34, 34, (1997). As with homes, the
degree to which the indebtedness level relates to the acquired asset's value varies. The
phenomenal growth of auto leases, of course, reflects an indebtedness that only buys the use of
transportation, not the asset itself. Moreover, principal loan balances on automobile loans may
be much higher than the value of the asset. Vehicles and mobile homes depreciate very rapidly,
at apace that often moves faster than the loan's declining principal balance. Consumers may thus
be "upside down" on the loan (i.e. they may have debt exceeding the collateral's value) Such a
circumstance can also arise for reasons unrelated to depreciation. For example, whether they
understand it or not, many Americans have financed the purchase of new cars with loans that
also refinanced remaining debt on the vehicle they traded in. This "negative equity" means that
the debt exceeds the value of the asset acquired with it from the outset, totally apart from the
matter of depreciation.
5
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those who have lost theirhomes to foreclosure from "equity skimming" loans,19
or those whose use of a high-rate, short-term lender has led to bankruptcy, can
attest.20
For good and bad, the increasing willingness of Americans to go into debt
has been part of the engine driving economic growth in the 1990s. But the
rising debt load creates some challenges for credit providers as well. Growth
is a goal of many businesses, and unless a credit provider diversifies, 2t growth
comes by keeping its customers in debt, getting them deeper in debt, or getting
more people in debt. Though the saturation point for debt-from a
macroeconomic perspective-is unknown, the higher debt loads go, the more
of a challenge it is for businesses that "sell debt" to grow.
All of these strategies have played a role in the development of the
subprime consumer credit market, both directly and indirectly. As the "prime"
market for creditbecame increasingly saturated, the "subprime" credit industry
developed to move into markets previously considered to be high risk due to
lack of credit histories, bad credit histories, inadequate income, or excessive
demands on income. In the early part of this new wave, opportunities in this
market were created by the absence of traditional lenders. Even the finance
company industry, which historically had focused on the theoretically higher-
risk, lower-balance loans, moved into higher-balance home equity loans and
moved upscale in the process,' leaving the small loan territory open.
19. "Equity-skimming" loans are home-secured loans that are typically very
expensive (often in ways not reflected by the loan's price tag) and out of proportion to the value
given. They are all too often made without regard to whether there is a realistic probability that
the borrower can repay. For a general discussion of "equity skimming" loans and the threat to
homeownership, see Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending
Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993); Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act: Hearing on S. 924 Before the Senate Banking Comm., 103d Cong.
(1993); The Home Equity Protection Act of.1993: Hearings on H.R. 3153 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Credit andIns. ofthe House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong. (1994); Community Development Institutions: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Ins. of the Comm on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993); Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their
Way to Profits: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998);
MICHAEL HUDSON, AMERICAN ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, PREDATORY FINANCIAL PRACTICES:
How CAN CONSUMERS BE PROTECTED? (1998); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
"HEL " Was Paved With Good CongressionalIntentions: UsuryDeregulation andtheSubprime
Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000). [hereinafter Mansfield].
20. See infra Part H.B.3.
21. The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, sought long and hard by the banking
industry, permits their entry into the insurance and securities industries, avenues closed to them
since the Great Depression. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999). The credit card industry's increasing use of cross-marketing to sell a variety of other
products is undoubtedly part of this strategy as well.
22. See infra Part II.B. However, finance companies still hold a considerable share
of the subprime mortgage market. As to the risk factor, some studies around the 1970s failed to
find evidence to support the notion of risk segmentation. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CrtR., THE
Vol. 51: 589
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The subprime credit market runs the gamut from very small "micro" loans,
through auto financing, and into high-dollar home equity lending.' Each
segment of the subprime market-auto financing, home equity lending, and the
relatively unexplored territory ofsubprime home purchase credit-couldbe the
subject of its own study.24 This Article, however, focuses solely on the small-
sum, short-term segment of the subprime credit market (the "fringe" market).
Part II will first describe the credit products offered in the fringe banking
market: payday loans, refund anticipation loans, pawns and title pawns for
cash advances, and rent-to-own products for retail sale. Part III will discuss
their historical antecedents, and Part IV will discuss their market demographics.
Litigation and legislative campaigns surrounding some of the products offered
in the fringe market are discussed in Parts V and VI. Part VII examines the
multiple purposes behind usury laws, which historically have been moral and
social as well as economic. Part VII also analyzes the fringe banking
marketplace in light of those purposes and notes some of the questions that
have arisen about that segment of the market. Finally, Part VIII briefly surveys
some possible alternatives to fringe credit products. This Article also asks
whether fringe lenders genuinely price for risk, or instead create risk and take
advantage of imperfect market conditions. These are questions that must be
asked and examined by disinterested parties, not taken on faith.'
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PLAYERS IN THE FRINGE BANKING SECTOR
The fringe banking system encompasses most of the functions of the
mainstream banking system. This marketplace offers check cashing and
payment services that parallel checking accounts in the mainstream system. It
also offers the option to obtain cash and defer repayment or purchase goods and
defer repayment-in short, credit capacity.26 Significantly, however, the system
does not offer a savings function27 or the opportunity to create a positive credit
COSTOFCREDIT: REGULATIONSANDLEGALCHALLENGES, § 11.1.1.2n.14 (1995 and Supp. 1997)
[hereinafter COST OF CREDrr] (citing numerous sources).
23. See generally Mansfield, supra note 19 (discussing the subprime home equity
market).
24. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 11.2 (discussing some of the issues in the
subprime auto finance market). Generally speaking, purchase money home lending does not see
the level of abuses that home equity lending does, but some devices that can be misused, such
as the sale/leaseback, occasionally surface.
25. There is another question: how well does the market channel customers into the
"appropriate" category? This Article touches on that question only incidentally, but the question
also arises in the subprime mortgage context, and is generally discussed in Mansfield, supra note
19; FREDDIE MAC, OPENING DOORs: SERVING MORE OF AMERICA'S FAmILIES (1998).
26. "Credit" is defined by the Truth in Lending Act as "the right granted by a creditor
to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e)
(1994); See also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14) (1999) (containing an almost identical
definition). As used in this section, "credif is given this functional definition.
27. See infra Part VIII.
7
Drysdale and Keest: The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fring
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
history.
The products in this sector share some common characteristics, the most
immediately obvious one being that they are all very expensive. A particularly
important characteristic of the credit-providing segments is that their product
designs are rooted in an effort to enable the provider to argue that they are not
extending "credit."2 This strategy may allow fringe lenders to avoid several
consumerprotection and "market-perfecting" laws that protect otherborrowing
consumers, such as the federal Truth in Lending Act. Further, this strategy may
allow fringe lenders to avoid price limits imposed by a state's interest rate
ceiling on loans or credit sales; other regulation, including licensing and
bonding, can be evaded as well. Finally, such a strategy may successfully
dodge regulations that require the disclosure of annual percentage rates
(APRs)-rates that may reach triple or quadruple digits on fringe loans.
A. Check Cashers and Currency Exchanges
The fringe banking financial system offers a rough parallel to mainstream
checking accounts through check cashing outlets (CCOs) or currency
exchanges (CEs). These businesses cash checks, including paychecks and
benefit checks, for a per-check fee. They also sell money orders or wire
transfers that customers can use to pay their bills. Banking services obtained
through these outlets often cost around four times as much as those obtained
from mainstream banks.29
28. Whilemuchofthe consumer creditmarketplacewas deregulated in the 1980s and
1990s, particularly mortgage lending and credit cards, in many states usury ceilings were
retained on small loans and retail installment credit. Even in states like Illinois, where ceilings
were removed completely, use of an evasive design enabled the creditor to argue that the Truth
in Lending Act disclosure rules did not apply. Much of the rationale for deregulation is that
disclosure will suffice and the market will decide the proper price. The First Circuit has noted
that accurate disclosures take on even greater importance in a deregulated market. Chroniak v.
Golden Inv. Corp., 983 F. 2d 1140, 1147 (1st Cir. 1993).
29. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 3, at 7. A study by the Chicago-based
Woodstock Institute modeled costs for households of three different income levels; all paid
more, and two of the three model households paid "nearly four times as much " for currency
exchange services. WOODSTOCK INsT., REINVESTMENT ALERT: CURRENCY EXCHANGES ADD TO
POVERTY SURCHARGE FOR Low-INCOME RESIDENTS 7 (No. 10, 1997) [hereinafter WOODSTOCK
INST., CURRENCYEXCHANGES]. A Boston study's model found thata family with $1050 after-tax
monthly income would pay $219 a year at a check casher in a state where basic banking account
fees would cost approximately $36 per year. Lesly Jean-Paul &Luxman Nathan, Check Cashers:
Moving from the Fringe to the Financial Mainstream, COMMUNITIES AND BANKING (Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston) Summer 1999 at 2, 10.
A Consumer Federation of America (CFA) study noted that the average cost of
cashing a social security check at a CCO rose 37% between 1987 and 1997. The High Cost of
Banking at the Corner Check Casher: Check Cashing Outlet Fees and Payday Loans, 1997
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. REP. This occurred despite the increased "competition" that the
proliferation should have brought, which highlights one of the problems the AFS sector presents
for economists-that competition has not worked to lower prices for customers in this sector for
a wide variety of reasons. See infra Part VII.
Vol. 51: 589
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Some CCOs and CEs now offer fringe credit products as well. Trade
association figures indicate that one-half of CCOs currently offer payday loan
services, a figure which should increase to two-thirds in 2000.30
B. Cash Advance Providers3
The credit function is currently divided among four basic models. Three
types of fringe market providers focus on short-term cash advances in small
amounts, while a fourth, rent-to-own, serves as the fringe market's version of
retail installment sales credit. The advantages stressed by these providers are
easy and quick access, even for those with blemished credit histories.32 Some
claim not to pull credit reports, though some fringe lenders do use a
specialized fringe credit reporting system.33
1. Pawns, "Auto-Title Pawns, " and "Title Loans"
While pawnbroking is certainly not a new source of credit for the
economically marginalized, the latter part of the twentieth century saw both a
resurgence of the model and the emergence of a few new twists. A 1994 study
ofpawnbrokers notes thatthe number ofpawnshops listed inAmerica's Yellow
Pages jumped from 4849 in 1985 to 8787 in 1992.34 The nature of the pawn
business also changed. The comer pawnbroker was joined by a corporate
presence, and the industry began to look for "merchandising respect."'3 Most
significantly for the two-tier marketplace, the industry added a new twist-the
auto-pawn, in which the consumer "pawns the title, keeps the car." In all
practical respects, such title-pawns offer a species of small loans secured by a
nonpurchase money interest in the borrower's car.
30. Forum on Short-Term High-Interest Paycheck Advances, convened by Sen.
Joseph Lieberman, ranking minority member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs
(Dec. 15, 1999) (written testimony of Robert E. Rochford, Dep. Gen. Counsel for the Financial
Sere. Ctrs. of Am.), at 4 [hereinafter Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony)]; id. (written
testimony of Leslie J. Pettijohn, Comm'r, Office of Tex. Consumer Credit Comm'n), at 1.
[hereinafter Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony)].
31. As used in these descriptions, credit is used in its functional sense. See infra Part
V for a separate discussion of legal characterization of the products.
32. A typical ad may read: "CASH LOANS FOR YOUR CAR TITLE, $$
IMMEDIATE CASH $$, BRING YOUR TITLE, KEEP YOUR CAR, NO CREDIT CHECK,"or
"CASH FOR CAR TITLES, CASH INSTANTLY, BORROW $450 to $10,000." One of the
downsides ofsuch quick and easy access is that the transaction's terms may be presented without
meaningful disclosure.
33. See infra Part VII.B (regarding credit reporting in the AFS); see also ILLINOIS
DEPT. OF FIN. INST., SHORT-TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT, available at
<http://wvwv.state.il.us.dfie/publications.htm>(visited Feb. 18, 2000) 28 [hereinafter DFI
REPORT].
34. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 3, at 46.
35. Michael Hudson, The New Loan Sharks, DOLLARS & SENSE, July 17,1997, at 14,
9
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Traditional pawns are structured as pledges, "sales," or "conditional sales"
of the borrower's property to the pawnbroker, subject to the right of
redemption. The pawnbroker takes physicalpossession of the pledgedproperty,
paying the customer for it. The consumer may redeem the property by paying
a higher amount later, usually in one month. In theory, there is no legal
obligation to pay the redemption amount. Pawnbrokers generally are not treated
as lenders for purposes of the statutes governing small loans. 6 In some states
pawnbrokers are totally exempt from usury ceilings, while in others special rate
ceilings apply to them.37
The auto and auto-title pawn loans were designed to take advantage of this
special treatment afforded pawn transactions while enjoying the security
afforded by taking the consumer's transportation as collateral for a very small
cash loan. While a few auto pawnbrokers demand physical possession of the
vehicle, such practice obviously creates greater sales resistance. Thus was born
the auto-title pawn, or "title loan." The first incarnation echoed the
sale/leaseback schemes that have long been used to dodge usury laws.38 The
borrower pledges the title, and the pawnbroker "leases" the vehicle back to the
consumer. Some lenders require the customer to turn over a key to the car to
facilitate repossession.39 They commonly limit the loan amount to one-third of
the book value of the car, making the loans more than fully secured.4" While
some transactions may involve weekly installments, the typical title loan is a
one month, single payment loan.
The APR price tag for such a transaction is typically in the triple digits. For
example, in Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, Inc.,43 the consumer took out
an auto-title loan and received two advances for $10 0 and $400. Her pawn/loan
36. Though they are generally exempt from state loan licensing requirements,
pawnbrokers are commonly licensed at the municipal level instead. In Florida, this practice led
to a shift of legislative focus from the state legislature to city councils. See infra Part VI.C.
37. See, e.g., COLO REv. STAT. § 5-1-202(4) (1999) (providing that the Colorado
Consumer Credit Code rates, charges, and disclosure requirements do not apply to pawnbrokers);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 539.001 (West 1994) (subjecting pawnbrokers to special rules and rate
ceilings); GA.CODE ANN. §44-12-131 (1982) (providing special pawnbroker rates).
38. Sale/leaseback schemes involve borrowers (debtors) "selling" theirproperty (their
home or personal property) to a "buyer," who then offers either to "sell" it back to or "lease" it
to the borrowerwith a repurchase option. For example, in Bantuelle v. Williams, 667 S.W.2d 810
(Tex. App. 1983), the borrowers "sold" their home for $1342 (coincidentally the amount
delinquent on their first mortgage) and received an option to repurchase it for $2342 within two
months-an effective APR of 444%. Courts review such transactions carefully, looking to a
variety of factors to determine when a sale/leaseback or sale/repurchase agreement is
functionally a secured loan, disguised in order to evade credit regulation. See generally COST OF
CREDIT, supra note 22, at §§ 7.5.2.1-.2 (collecting cases involving challenges to sale/repurchase
and sale/leaseback schemes).
39. Some fringe auto sales and finance companies reportedly keep a key to the
vehicles they sell for the same reason.
40. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 4; Joseph B. Cahill, License to Owe: Title-Loan
Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution That Often Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1.
41. 754 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
Vol. 51:589
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contract made the loans repayable with interest in weekly installments. She also
signed attached leaseback agreements by which the pawnbroker leased back
her vehicle under a concurrently running contract. The weekly rental amount
equaled 10% of the loan, along with credit insurance and other fees. When all
the incidental credit-related charges were tallied, the transactions carried
effective APRs of 902% and 977%.42
The more typical rates on these secured loans are in the 200% to 300%
range. The Illinois Department of Financial Institutions recently completed a
survey of short-term lending, reporting an average APR of 290% among its
licensed title loan companies.4 3 A 1998 Florida Public Interest Research Group
(PIRG) survey of title lenders found an average APR of 273%. The most
common charge for a $400 loan was $88 a month, or 264% APR.44 Fees are
typically a percentage of the amount borrowed for the one-month loan term. In
Florida, where title loans are legal, the percentage is capped at 22%--that is,
22% a month, which translates to 264% a year.45 Borrowers, however, may
believe that their annual rate is capped at 22%.' The industry-drafted law may
encourage this misperception by requiring that the borrower initial the 22% fee
language, but not the language disclosing the APR.
Because auto-title loans routinely require repayment soon after the
transaction is completed, many customers cannot make the full principal and
interest payment when it comes due. As a result, the loan is often extended for
another fee (some contracts allow the lender to do so unilaterally). This cycle
of renewals can create a "debt treadmill" or downward spiral effect that is at the
root of much of the concern about cash lending in the fringe market.47 Such a
practice also complicates objective assessment of the industry'sjustification for
42. Id. at 862. The ten-week repayment term for the $100 loan at $22.88 weekly
yields an effective APR of 977%. Weekly charges on the $400 loan worked out to $87, which
yields an effective 902% APR for a ten-week term. Id.
43. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 26; see also Cahill, supra note 40 (citing a 260%
APR). The latter figure of 260% may understate the cost of the loan featured in that report. One
of the authors, who represented the consumer, calculated a 450% APR. Amended Complaint,
Churchwell v. National Title Loan, Inc., No. 96-5098-CA (4th Cir., Fla. Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 27,
1996).
An Illinois attorney who represents AFS borrowers in a number of class actions
indicates a typical title loan range of 200% to 300%, as well. Payday and Title Loans: Hearing
Before the Illinois Senate Fin. Comm. (1999) (prepared testimony of Daniel A. Edelman, et al.
on behalf of the llinois Consumer Justice Council, Inc.) [hereinafter Edelman testimony].
44. New Survey Shows Outrageous Interest Rates Charged by Florida Title Loan
Companies (visited Feb. 18,2000) <http://www.igc.org/pirg/floridapirg/consumer/loan98.htm>.
45. FLA. STAT. ch. 538.06(e) (1995).
46. In fact, the legislature that enacted the law may have thought the same thing. See
infra Part VI.
The CBS news magazine 60Minutes investigated title lending in Florida. 60Minutes:
Need Cash? (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 2,2000), available in LEXIS, Burelle's Information
Services, CBS News Transcripts. One of the customers interviewed explained she believed the
rate was 22% a year. Id.
47. See infra Part II.B.3.
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pricing based on "risk" and default rates."
Some title lenders obtain used car dealer licenses in order to sell the
repossessed cars to other consumers on the retail market. Otherwise, vehicles
may be disposed of through wholesale auto auctions. "Pawn" laws may not
require that surpluses from the sale of a pawned item be returned to the
customer, but even if they do, return of a surplus is rare.49
While pawnbroking is an ancient form of lending, many people believe that
title loans (by whatever name) are qualitatively different. Except in a few cities
with good mass transit systems, most people need cars to get to work, take their
children to day care, or to go to school. For this reason, there is a schism even
between traditional pawnbrokers and the title loan industry. "'Somebody
forfeits their VCR-life goes on. But you lose your car-that's a different
ballgame. Now you're talking about somebody's livelihood."''5 Florida's
Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth, an outspoken critic of title loans, has
also commented on the high stakes involved in the title loan industry. In
reference to Florida's legalized 264% rate, he told a national television
audience "We've legalized loan sharking. We've made even the Mafia look
good."
52
The title pawn industry has grown immensely in the relatively short time
it has been around, though it is legally sanctioned in only a few states." Illinois
currently has ninety licensed title lenders, most located in the Chicago area.54
In Florida, one of the states where title lending is most entrenched, title lenders
write approximately $225 million in loans annually." It is impossible to know
how much title lending is going on illegally.
2. Payday Jheck, or "Deferred Deposit Services" Loans
Payday lenders make short-term cash loans-generally by taking a post-
dated check from which they withhold a fee, and advance the remainder in
48. See infra Part II.D.
49. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 3, at 40-41. Keep in mind that most auto
title loan amounts are limited to one-third of the value of the car. But see Part V (discussing a
recent decision of the Florida Attorney General on surpluses under Florida's title loan law).
50. See infra Part VI.
51. Cahill, supra note 40 (quoting an official of a large pawn chain). Florida
pawnbrokers lobbied to prevent auto title lenders from using the pawn name. See infra Part VI.C.
52. 60 Minutes, supra note 50, at 2.
53. Some of these state laws include FLA. STAT ch. 538.03, 538.06(5) (1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-12-130(5) (Supp. 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 368.200-368.285, 368.991
(Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. § 325J.095 (Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §75-67-401 to -433
(Supp. 1999); Mo. REv. STAT. § 367.500-533; TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-101 to -120 (Supp.
1999); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1781-1808 (West Supp. 2000) (defining "pav"
broadly); State ofNevada-Attorney General/1995AG Opinions: Opinion (visited Feb 13,2000)
<http:llwww.state.nv.us/ag>.
54. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-12.
55. Cahill, supra note 40.
Vol. 51: 589
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cash. Some transactions use delayed automatic debit agreements instead of
checks. Deposit of the check or automatic debit is deferred for an agreed-upon
time, which may be tied to the next payday (even if only a matter of days), or
for a scheduled period of time up to a month. The process works like this: If
you want to borrow $100 and the fee is $15, you give the lender a check for
$115, postdated to the end of the loan term. The lender gives you back $100 in
cash.56 When the loan comes due, you can go back and give the lender $115 in
cash or money order to redeem the check, or you can let the lender deposit your
check to pay it off. If you cannot pay it back in the short turnaround time, you
can pay another $15 fee to extend it. 7 To avoid appearing to roll over the debt,
the lender may ask you to take out a "new loan," in which case you pay the $15
fee, but write another check for $115. In a practice called "touch and go,""5
lenders may take a cash "payoff' for the old loan that they immediately reloan
with new loan funds. Irrespective of whether the repeat transactions are cast as
"renewals," "extensions," or "new loans," the result is a continuous flow of
interest-only payments at very short intervals that never reduces the principal.
For customers who "borrow from Peter to pay Paul" by going to another lender
to get the cash to pay off the first loan, this can result in a pyramid effect. To
keep Lender Paul's $115 check from bouncing, the borrower may end up
writing a new check to Lender Peter for over $130. The new loan principal is
now $115 ($100 principal plus $15 interest on Paul's loan), plus Lender Peter's
new fee for a $115 loan (which may be higher than the $15 fee for a $100
loan). This refinancing cycle can snowball the original debt.59 Upon default,
some lenders deposit the check, generating bounced check fees and perhaps a
civil bad check penalty, which can be three times the amount of the check
56. One Florida ad observed by the authors explains these requirements: "MUST
SHOW YOU HAVE A FULL TIME JOB, OPEN CHECKING ACCOUNT, WITH LAST TWO
RECENT STATEMENTS, WORKING HOME TELEPHONE, LAST TWO PAY STUBS,
VALID FLORIDA DRIVER'S LICENSE OR STATE I.D." See also DFIREPORT, supra note 33,
at 28.
57. The Illinois Department of Financial Institutions reports that the checks are rarely
cashed, as many bounce. Customers are instead asked to bring cash payments every two weeks,
though this violates Illinois law. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 8. But see infra, Part ll.B.3.
58. Forum on Short-Term High-Interest Paycheck Advances, convened by Sen.
Joseph Lieberman, ranking minority member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affaris
(Dec. 15, 1999) (written testimony of Edward J. Gallagly, Pres., Fla. Cent. Credit Union), at 2
[hereinafter Lieberman Forum (Gallagly testimony)].
59. Iowa's Delayed Deposit Services Licensing Act authorizes a $15 fee for the first
$100 and $10 per $100, pro rata, thereafter. IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.9 (West 1999).
On the recycling of debt, see, for example, Forum on Short-Term High-Interest
PaycheckAdvances, convenedby Sen. JosephLieberman, ranking minority member, U.S. Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs (Dec. 15, 1999) (written testimony of Capt. Robert W.
Andersen, Commanding Officer, U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron 30), at 2 [hereinafter Lieberman
Forum(Anderson testimony)]; id. (written testimony of Mark Tarpey, Ind. Dept. of Fin.
Institutions) [hereinafter Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony)]; Lieberman Forum (Gallagly
testimony) supra note 62, at 1-2. See generally infra Part II.B.3 on the debt treadmill.
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under some state laws.60 According to an attorney who has represented Texas
payday loan customers, some payday lenders compound the bad check fees by
having the customers break one loan into several small checks, so that several
bounced check fees can be charged if the customer defaults.6 '
The most common term for a payday loan is two weeks, and loan amounts
are generally under $1000. In states that have authorized payday lending, the
maximum loan amounts permitted range from $300 to $1000, with $500 being
a common cap.62 A survey by the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions,
which regulates payday lending in that state, found an average loan amount of
$165.63 Fees may be a percentage of the loan amount, as with title loans, or they
may be a flat fee. A few states, such as Indiana, do not have legislation
explicitly addressing payday lending, but may have a statutory minimum
finance charge comparable to other payday loan fees. Payday lenders in
Indiana have been operating under the assumption that a $33 minimum finance
charge permissible under the Indiana Consumer Credit Code sanctioned their
business." A recent Attorney General's opinion disagrees.65 In states that have
no usury ceilings on small loans, payday lenders can operate under existing
lending law without need for special authorizing legislation, as is the case with
Illinois.' The fees for a $100 loan range from $15 to $33.50.67 For the most
common two-week loan term, those APRs range from 390% to 871%.
6
1
Surveys by regulators in Illinois and Indiana found average payday loan APRs
of 533% and 499%, respectively.
69
Because most of these are flat fees, making the loan term shorter than two
weeks will raise the APR. The highest-priced payday loan the Indiana
60. See infra Part II.B.4.
61. According to this attorney, one lender made the borrowers write a check for each
$100 increment of the loan, plus a separate one for the fee. Thus, a $400 loan consisted of four
$100 checks, plus a fifth for $132 in fees ($33 in fees per $100 of loan). If the debtor defaulted,
the lender would charge $125 in NSF fees-$25 for each check.
62. The status of payday lending under state law is currently highly fluid, as each
legislative session brings efforts in several states. The Consumer Federation of America, which
monitors the payday lending industry, has published annual reports since 1997 which include
surveys of state laws applicable to payday lending. See Jean Ann Fox, Safe Harbor for Usury:
Recent Developments in Payday Lending, 1999 CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. REP. 1, 11, app. A,
available at <http://www.consumerfed.org/safeharbor.pdf> (visited Sept. 1999); see also COST
OFCREDrr, supra note 22, at app. A (including citations to state laws regulating consumer credit).
This article also provides a list current through the 1999 legislative season. See infra note 410.
63. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, exhibit B, at 1.
64. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(7) (Michie 1996); see infra Part V.
65. Ind. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-1 (Jan. 19, 2000).
66. Illinois Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 670/1-24.5
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999). Payday lenders are "regulated" and must be licensed, DFI REPORT,
supra note 33, at 3, but there is no legal cap on interest, id. at 19.
67. Fox, supra note 62, at 11.
68. Id.
69. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 26; Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra
note 59, exhibit B, at 1.
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regulators found was $20 on a one-day $100 loan-a 7300% APR.70 This
element of an APR price tag leads some in the industry (and outside) to argue
that APR disclosure is "inappropriate" for short-term loans: 71 "The consumer
wouldn't pay 1,800 percent a year to borrow $100. But if you tell the consumer
that it costs $18 to borrow that $100 for a period of fourteen days, then it seems
fair to them."7 2 There are a number of responses to that criticism. First, it
ignores the fact that the Truth in Lending Act was enacted to establish a
standardized price tag that consumers could use to comparison shop. '3 People
think of credit rates in "per year" terms, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
requires that all lenders use this standard unit pricing to prevent some lenders
from using low-ball quotes to make their higher-priced debt look cheaper.74
Second, disclosing a loan's APR is important in order to fully inform
consumers about the price they pay to rent money. Consider an analogous
hypothetical: an apartment renting for $500 a month is clearly cheaper than
one renting for $500 a night. A place to sleep for the whole month of April
costs $500 from the first landlord, but $15,000 from the second.7" Thus,
disclosing the long-term cost of the transaction enables the consumer to readily
compare its relative advantages against other available alternatives.76
However, even with accurate APR disclosure, the already short loan terms
of most fringe loans can be manipulated to make these transactions more
costly to the consumer than the APR would reflect. This is possible because
while over half of the states authorizing payday loans have maximum loan
terms, only four have minimum loan terms.77 Thus, lenders can usually truncate
loan terms to maximize costs. For example, a $20 flat fee for a $100 loan with
70. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, exhibit B, at 1. Illinois
attorneys who represent AFS borrowers in a number of class actions report 2000% APRs. See
Edelman testimony, supra note 43.
71. See, e.g., Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 15
(suggesting that applying APR analysis to payday loans is "quite inappropriate").
72. Jean-Paul & Nathan, supra note 29, at 12 (quoting Abby Hans, an official of the
National Check Cashers Association (NaCCA), now renamed Financial Service Centers of
America (FiSCA)).
73. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1973)
(noting the "divergent, and at times fraudulent, practices by which consumers were informed of
the terms of the credit extended to them" as the reason for TILA).
74. Prior to TILA, lenders quoted rates in different measures. For example, a "6%"
loan could actually be considerably more expensive than a "10%" loan if the former was a
discount rate and the latter an actuarial rate. NATIONAL CONSUMERLAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING
§ 1.1.1 (4th ed. 1999).
75. And those who take the one-night $500 apartment have to come up with another
$500 twenty-four hours later, not thirty days later-which comes full circle back to the debt-
treadmill problem, an insidious feature of short-term lending. See infra Part II.B.3. It also
illustrates the importance of the demographics of the customerbase. A Los Angeles lawyer may
not mind a $500 per night hotel while he is in New York for one night, but a trucker who
regularly needs a place to stay in New York will soon find that rate a significant drain on his
resources.
76. This includes the consumer's option to enter into no transaction at all.
77. Fox, supra note 62, app. A.
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a one-month fixed term would cost $20. But if the lender writes the same loan
for a two week term and then renews it, the debtor will use the same $100 for
the same length of time, but at a price of $40.78 This may help explain why two
weeks is the most common term for payday loans. The Indiana DFI found
evidence of this abusive practice when it found loans with initial fourteen-day
terms being reduced to seven-day terms upon renewal. Some lenders reduce
loan terms even when the borrower's pay period is bi-weekly, making it less
likely the borrower will pay it off when due. 9
As with auto-title pawns, payday lenders initially took the position that
credit regulatory and disclosure laws did not apply to them. Their argument
was (and, in some cases, still is) that their fee is for "cashing a check," not for
extending credit. As the legal and regulatory response to this stance has been
almost universally unfavorable," some other "new" variations in form are
surfacing (or resurfacing, to be more precise). Texas, in particular, is home to
payday lenders eager to avoid credit laws through artful dodges. One example
involves an ad that reads "Cash in Minutes-Checking Account Required. Not
a Loan. 15 Min. approval. No credit check. No hassle." Consumers who
respond to the ad pay $33 per $100 borrowed for two weeks. The fee is
purportedly applied toward the "purchase" of one twenty-character "ad." They
get to choose the "ad" from a laundry list, including "Go Cowboys" and "Jesus
Loves You." The ad is supposed to be placed in a publication distributed by the
lender to its customers. After six "cashback ad" purchases, the lender
magnanimously guarantees no further adpurchases will be necessary. The APR
on these "ad" loans is 860%.81 A similar scheme ties the loan to the required
purchase of a "gift certificate" that must be used to order something of
"questionable value" from the lender's catalog."
This segment of the fringe credit market has grown quickly. Payday
lending was authorized in Iowa in 1995, and by 1999 had eighty licensees.83 In
the decade or so since the postdated check loan business first appeared
78. Truth in Lending is not a help in this regard. If handled as an extension or
deferral, it does not trigger new TILA disclosures, Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.20(a)(1) (1998). If
a "new loan" is written for two weeks, it will still disclose a price tag based on the two-week
term.
79. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at 3
80. See infra Part V.
81. Details are from Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, Rodriguez et al v. Cash Today, Inc., No. C-99-305 (S.D. Tex., filed ****). The
Texas Attorney General sued this lender. Texas v. Cash Today, Tex. Dist. Ct. No. 99-02673
(Dec. 17, 1999); see infra Part V.
82. Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 3.
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(illegally)" it has become a growth industry, complete with national chains."
About half the states now authorize payday loan services,86 and the number of
licensees nationwide is estimated to be between 6000 and 9000.87 The industry
reported $810 million in fee income for 1998 and it projects $2 billion in
2000.88
As noted earlier, in addition to the nationwide chains of payday lenders,
check-cashing outlets are expanding into the business. Such lending is even
expanding into states in which payday lending has not been legislatively
authorized, or under terms that would not be legal under state payday lending
laws. Some payday lenders have teamed up with depository institutions based
in states with low (or no) interest rate regulation. Because federal law gives
national banks and some other depository institutions the right to "export" the
law of their home state nationwide, lenders argue that these loans may be made
in states in which their terms would be illegal if made directly. Such so-called
"rent-a-bank" or "rent-a-charter" payday lending may become a significant
barrier to state regulation of fringe market lending.89
3. The "Debt-Treadmill": Roll Overs and Renewals
Many readers maybe too young to remember the old Tennessee Ernie Ford
song, "Sixteen Tons," with the lyrics "another day older and deeper in debt."9
Much of the concern about short-term fringe lending arises over the question
of whether it is, at best, a "debt treadmill" or at worst, a downward spiral. The
industry argues that it is neither, instead viewing such lending as a bridge
enabling passage through temporary setbacks, and these lenders deny that roll
84. Joe Stephens, Postdated CheckFirms May Violate Usury Laws, KAN. CITY STAR,
Oct. 23, 1988, at Al. It also took hold in other states before it was legal. See infra Part V.
85. Peter T. Kilbom, Lenders With Huge Fees Thrive on Workers With Debts, N.Y.
Times, June 18, 1999, at Al; Jean Ann Fox, CONSUMERFEDERATIONOFAMERICA, THE GROwTH
OF LEGAL LOAN SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY, (1998) [hereinafter
LEGAL LOAN SHARKING].
86. See infra, Part VI; see also Fox, supra note 62, at 5 (citing twenty-three states that
permit payday loans).
87. Forum on Short-Term High-Interest Paycheck Advances, convened by Sen.
Joseph Lieberman, ranking minority member. U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs
(Dec. 15,1999) (transcript), available at 1999WL 1242421, at62 [hereinafter Lieberman Forum
Transcript]; id. at 2(written testimony of Billy Webster, President-Elect, Community Fin. Servs.
Ass'n (CFSA)) [hereinafter Lieberman Forum (Webster testimony)].
88. Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 12.
89. See e.g., Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 3-4.
Exportation is a factor in the Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) market, as well, see infra Part
II.B.5, and there are concerns it may crop up in the title loan market, too. For more discussion
on the legal aspects of exportion, see infra Part V.
90. Tennessee Ernie Ford, Sixteen Tons, on SIXrEENTONS (Capitol Nashville Records
1960).
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overs are a significant problem.9 The lenders focus on the convenience of
short-term lending: it is handy, quick, and hassle-free; there are no obstacles
such as bad credit records.Y Moreover, payday lenders deny targeting lower-
income customers, pointing to the increase in such lending in the suburbs and
among higher-income groups.93
Another justification advanced by the industry is that these loans enable
people to avoid the high costs of bounced checks. Both trade association
spokesmen testifying at the Lieberman Forum argued that the cost of payday
lending is cheaper than bouncing checks. Their position: against the potential
insufficient fund fees for bouncing a $100 check, which could total $50 (one
from the merchant and one from the bank), a $20 payday loan fee is a bargain.
Compared to bouncing four checks to four merchants, the resulting $100 to
$150 insufficient fund fees would dwarf the $15 to $20 payday loan fee.
Furthermore, lenders argue that a bank may close a bank account as a result of
bounced checks. Bounced checks and closed accounts "will affect adversely
the consumer's credit-worthiness and can create a snowball effect of negative
economic impacts." 94 Critics find this argument unpersuasive because most
people do not write bad checks when they are strapped for cash. Moreover, the
comparison is misleading because resorting to a payday lender often only
defers the bounced check charges. In fact, it can compound the problem
because some of these lenders use threats of criminal prosecution as a
collection tactic or seek treble-damage bad check penalties when these loans
default. 95
But whatever weight such arguments bear for the occasional customer,
they do not suffice for the repeat customer. Critics of the fringe lending
industry fear that it is the industry itself that is likely to create a "snowball
effect of negative economic impacts" from servicing high cost, short-term
debt.96 Several egregious examples of abuse illustrate the snowball effect:
91. "I look at us like the last rung on the ladder.... They can use it to go up or
down." Cahill, supra note 40. One of the trade association spokesmen told the Lieberman Forum
that "only a tiny number of transactions result in more than one rollover, of the perhaps 10% of
transactions that result in any rollovers at all." Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra
note 31, at 18.
92. See, e.g., National Check Cashers Association, Inc., Freedom of Choice for
Consumers: The Truth About Deferred Deposit Services-A Reasoned Response to the CFA 's
Misrepresentations (visited May 1999) <http://www.nacca.org/ddresponse.htm>.
93. Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 3.
94. Id. at 11-12; Lieberman Forum (Webster testimony), supra note 87, at 7.
95. See infra Part II.B.4. Not surprisingly, legal services attorneys working with
payday loan borrowers report thatbanks close accounts for those who have defaulted on payday
loans. Since many banks will not open accounts for those who have had accounts closed
elsewhere, the payday loan experience may turn a "banked" customer into one of the
"unbanked."
96. See, e.g., Lieberman Forum (Andersen testimony), supra note 59, at 2 ("[T]he
[borrower] living payday to payday will be short for normal bills due to his previously written
cash advance check and the fees associated with the advances. So now he will go to another cash
advance or the same one (as the lender hopes) to cover the next bills for more than the previous
Vol. 51:589
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* A Wall StreetJournal article ontitle pawns reported on awomanwho
lost her car to repossession after paying $400 in interest on a $250
loan.97
* The 60 Minutes segment on title lending featured a customer who had
borrowed $400 for legal fees in a custody matter and had paid $88 a
month for fourteen months, totaling $1246, to service that $400
debt-and still owed $330.98
* Another customer with an income of only $600 from social security
disability borrowed $500 to pay medical bills; after more than $2000
in interest payments over the course of a year and a half, he still owed
$612, and feared he had no choice but to let the lender take his truck.99
* One Navy household borrowed $1700 for mortgage payments: 20
months of $370 payments later ($7400), the borrower still owed the
full principal and interest. Another $2070 would be required to retire
that debt and protect the family car from repossession by the title
lender."'
* In Kentucky, payment of $1000 in fees over six months made no
progress in reducing $150 of loan principal; in Tennessee $1364 over
fifteen months paid down only $152 of a $400 loan.'0 '
* A Navy captain told the Lieberman Forum of a sailor writing $2,893
in checks to cover $2,550 in cash advances.'02
Precisely to avoid the treadmill trap, some states prohibit or limit renewals
or refinancings on payday loans, 3 but enforcement is difficult. As described
cash amount. This culminates in a snowball effect or financial death spiral they cannot recover
from.").
In economic terms, this compounding effect that feeds on itself is a "self-reinforcing
feedback loop." While the general tendency today is to think about market dynamics in terms
of moving toward "equilibrium," self-reinforcing feedback loops can have a direction. That
direction can be negative as well as positive. See infra Part VII.A.
97. Cahill, supra note 40.
98. 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 2.
99. Id.
100. That would be a total of $9470 to borrow $1700 for a little over one-and-a-half
years-for a military family for whom interest-free loans are available. Letter from Rear
Admiral K.C. Belisle, U.S. Naval Reserve, Commander, Naval Base, Jacksonville, Fla., to John
Delaney, Mayor of Jacksonville, (Nov. 3, 1998) (on file with author); John Fritz, Navy Targets
Personal Finance, FLORIDA TmEs-UNION, Oct. 9, 1998, at B-1.
101. LEGAL LOAN SHARKING, supra note 85; see also Kilborn, supra note 85
(reporting of a single mother making $25,000 per year who turned to payday lenders when her
child support stopped; in 6 months "she owed $1,900 and was paying fees at a rate of $6,006 a
year").
102. Lieberman Forum (Andersen testimony), supra note 59, at 2. Another sailor
trying to juggle biweekly interest checks to four lenders was writing $1602.94 in checks to get
$1396 in loan "income." (He had gone to the lenders in the wake of a divorce.) Juggling the
payday loan cycle and his regular expenses of $850 against his income left him $257 in the hole
a month. This is a real life example of the budget deficit analysis performed by the staff for the
Lieberman Forum, see infra Part IV.
103. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.10.1.e (West Supp.1999).
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earlier, lenders use "new loans" in a variety of forms to evade this restriction.1°4
The Iowa Banking Department has issued an interpretation informing lenders
that the prohibition on roll overs means there must be at least a day between
loans, but even that has not been a complete success. 5 Finally, even when
renewal limitations are observed by lenders, the economic impact on the
customer who borrows from Peter to pay Paul is exactly the same.
This recycling of high-rate debt makes it difficult to get a firm grip on the
renewal problem. Nonetheless, the findings of regulators in Illinois and Indiana
give credence to the concerns about roll overs. Indiana's survey found a 77%
renewal rate, with the average customer renewing ten times and a high of sixty-
six times.106 As the Department of Financial Institutions' Consumer Credit
Division supervisor explained, "There is no incentive for the lender to not
allow the customer [roll over] since it results in continuing fee income and
more repeat business."' 7 The Illinois study similarly reported that the single
use customer is rare. "[I]n fact, repeat business is the main source of
revenue."08 The Illinois DFI found an average of thirteen contracts per payday
loan customer, for an average time horizon of six months. For title loan
customers, the average time horizon is 3.5 to 4.5 months, with 2.5 roll overs. °9
An industry survey of high-rate, short-term, low-principal loans in
Oklahoma found that 82.4% of the 1994 loans were made to repeat or regular
customers. The average amount of these loans was $284, at an average APR of
142%."' These repeat customers were indeed long-term: 53% had been doing
business with the same lenders for one to five years, and 29% for more than
five years."' This was characterized in the study as a sign of "customer
104. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at 3; Lieberman Forum
(Gallagly testimony), supra note 58, at 2; DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 34 (finding Illinois's
"three roll over rule" ineffective in preventing short-term loans from turning into "long-term
headaches" because the industry thwarts the state's roll overrule withpayoffs from the proceeds
of "new loans").
105. LARRY D. KINGERY, IOWA Div. OF BANKING, DELAYED DEPOSIT SERVICES
LICENSES, INTERPRETIVEBULLETIN#1 (Sept. 16, 1997). One problem is that Iowa law, which has
a $500 maximum loan amount, permits two loans to be outstanding. Thus, one $150 loan can be
repaid by a second check and still be within the strict letter of the law. Despite this imperfection,
both the Indiana and the Illinois departments recommend cooling-offperiods between loans as
a circuit breaker for the debt treadmill. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at
6; DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 44.
106. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at exhibits B, C.
107. Id. at3.
108. DFIREPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
109. Id. at21,26.
110. Willis L Wheat, A Study on the Status of the Class 'B 'Lending Industry in the
State of Oklahoma, 50 CONSUMERFiN.L. Q. REP. 452,455 (1996). Oklahoma's laws do not really
render it a full-fledged payday loan state. Oklahoma's "Class B" small loan lenders may make
small loans under a fee structure that allows for triple-digit APRs, but they cannot make the loans
for the extremely short terms that the standard model payday lender makes. There is a minimum
term of thirty days for loans under approximately $100 and a minimum term of sixty days for
loans over $100. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 3-508B (West Supp. 2000).
111. Wheat, supra note 110, at 455.
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satisfaction," not as evidence of a debt treadmill. " 2 The survey also looked
positively at the practice of "clustering" these offices, noting the economies
realized by a common owner and the convenience to the borrower."3 However,
clustering of commonly owned shops also facilitates evasion of rules enacted
to limit the debt treadmill: limits on renewals, limits on multiple loans
outstanding at once, and prohibitions on splitting a loan into two smaller loans
to get higher fees." 4
The industry's justification of these loans as a "bridge" during "temporary
setbacks" ignores the fact that the loan terms often prolong such setbacks. As
the Illinois DFI explains:
What [the industry has] failed to mention was that the
financial strains placed on consumers were rarely short-lived.
Customers playing catch-up with their expenses do not have
the ability to overcome unexpected financial hardships
because their budgets are usually limited. The high expense
of a short term loan depletes the customer's ability to catch-
up, therefore making the customer "captive" to the lender." 5
For some, the end result of this "snowball of negative consequences" may
be bankruptcy, as borrowers are unable to continue paying renewal fees to keep
their check afloat while still meeting other obligations.
The collection tactics used by some fringe market lenders".6 may also play
a role in a consumer's decision to seek relief in the bankruptcy courts. Those
familiar with bankruptcy courts in Tennessee, a state with one of the oldest and
most concentrated payday loan industries," 7 see the industry as a contributing
factor in Tennessee's high bankruptcy rates. "' And even though the Oklahoma
survey cast long-term relationships with triple-digit lenders in terms of
"satisfied customers," it also noted the high number of bankruptcies listing
112. Id. But see infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the number of
bankruptcies involving these loans).
113. Wheat, supra note 110, at 456-57.
114. There had been allegations in Oklahoma that commonly owned shops operating
under different names were referring customers to one another for such purposes. Id. at 457.
115. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 30. The report noted that the DFI found customers
who were borrowing constantly for over a year. Id.
116. See infra Part II.B.4.
117. See infra Part IV.
118. Sheila Wissner, Thriving Loan Industry's Secrecy Worries Officials, THE
TENNESSEAN, April 18, 1999, at IA. The article provides statistics for payday lending in Chapter
13 filings: 413 out of 12,400 filings "show debts to 'payday loan' businesses."Id. That number
could well be misleadingly low, as Chapter 7 filings are much more prevalent, and payday loan
borrowers may be more likely to be Chapter 7 filers. This may account for the difference
between this quoted Tennessee figure and the Oklahoma figure cited below.
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fringe lenders as creditors-13,379 in 1994.19 Bankruptcy filings in the
Northern District of Illinois, home of the majority of Illinois' short-term
lenders, show "significant payday loan debts" on 20% to 25% of filings, and
press reports from Indiana and California also relate payday loans to
bankruptcies.'20 Though most of the recent public debates over proposed
revisions to the bankruptcy code have centered on credit card debt as a
contributing cause, the correlation between bankruptcy and fringe market debt
also warrants some objective research analysis.
4. Collection Practices of Title Lenders and Payday Lenders
The structure of most title and postdated check loans lends itself to more
than the usual array of collection abuses. The payday loan business is, in
substance, a traffic in cold checks. Default on consumer debt is not a
crime-we are past the days of Dickensian debtors' prisons. Default on a car
loan or a credit card debt rarely raises the specter of criminal prosecution. But
it is accepted knowledge that writing "cold checks" is a crime. Some payday
lenders use the threat of prosecution as a collection tactic, though the trade
associations' "best practices code" prohibits it, as do the front-office policies
of some of the major national payday lenders.' Worse, some lenders do not
limit themselves to merely threatening criminal prosecution. Payday lenders
filed over 13,000 criminal charges with law enforcement officials against their
customers in just one Dallas, Texas precinct in one year."2 Abuse of this
"criminal" aspect of writing cold checks in Kentucky was so great that the
state's payday loan statute was amended to require posted notice telling
119. Wheat, supra note 110, at 455. The study never considered whether there might
be a causal link between the 82.4% of customers who did business with these lenders for over
a year and those bankruptcies.
120. Edelman testimony, supra note 43, at 2 & nn.1 1-12.
121. The authors have seen letters threatening criminal consequences from local
offices of chains whose official policy was not to use such threats. See also Forum on Short-
Term High-InterestPaycheckAdvances, convened by Sen. Joseph Lieberman, ranking minority
member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs (Dec. 15, 1999), at 9 (written testimony
ofJean Ann Fox, Dir. of Consumer Protection, Consumer Fed'n of Am.) [hereinafter Lieberman
Forum (Fox testimony)] (describing a single mother paying $644 a month in loan fees who let
one payday loan bounce; the lender told her she would be arrested and that her daughter, who
had cerebral palsy, would be put in a foster home for Christmas); Alex Lyda, Payday Loan
Company Faces Legal Trouble as State's Attorney Files Suit, AP (Sept. 10,1999) (reporting one
company's practice of calling debtor's references, which were requested on applications
primarily for collection purposes, and telling them a warrant would be issued for the debtor's
arrest).
122. Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 2; see also Watson
v. State, 509 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the conviction of a payday lender
prosecuted for perjury in connection with statements made to law enforcement officials in
seeking warrants to have his customers arrested forbad checks).
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customers that they cannot be criminally prosecuted."r
What is not common knowledge among payday loan borrowers is that a
postdated check given to someone who knows that it will not clear rarely
supports criminal prosecution. Indeed, in some states, such postdated checks
cannot support criminal charges at all.
Absent fraudulent intent, the transaction becomes essentially
one of extending credit to the drawer. If the payee of a
postdated, worthless check indicates in some manner that his
or her acceptance of the check constitutes an extension of
credit to the maker, the transaction does not violate the bad
check statute.'24
As a federal district court in Tennessee once noted, one can assume that the
borrower does not have enough money in the bank to cover the
check-otherwise she simply would not be there."ra Certainly a lender's
exaction of a fee to "defer" deposit signifies the requisite acceptance on his part
necessary to remove the transaction from the realm of the criminal bad check
statute.
Even in the absence of criminal prosecution threats, however, civil bad
check charges can be punitive. Though default on a normal consumer credit
debt may trigger delinquency fees and collection fees, check loans are the only
type of consumer debt we know of which conceivably trigger treble-damages
penalties upon default-penalties established by the civil bad check laws of
some states.'26 Thus a lender might seek judgment for repayment of the
principal and interest, the regular bounced check fees, triple the check amount
123. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(18) (Michie 1998). Most magistrates and
prosecutors in Kentucky held the position that these transactions were not subject to bad check
laws, but a few warrants were issued, and a few borrowers were jailed. Payday lenders had also
used the "bad checek" label to argue that these loans were criminal matters for bankruptcy
purposes and sought to continue collection efforts against bankruptcy debtors. The problems
were so great that the bankruptcy trustee became the real party in interest in a class action filed
against payday lenders. Interview with Sidney White, Trustee (Nov. 19, 1998). In early debates
on payday lending, one state (Georgia) considered prohibiting the use of checks as "collateral"
for these loans. However, Georgia did not amend its Industrial Loan Act, GA. CODE ANN. § § 7-3-
1 to -29 (1997), to allow payday lending at all, so the issue became moot.
124. 32 AM. Jun. 2D False Pretenses § 73 (footnote omitted); see also Turner v. E-Z
Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (holding
that "deferred presentment" transactions are extensions ofcredit); cf. Watsonv. State, 509 S.E.2d
87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the conviction of a payday lender for perjury arising out of
statements made to law enforcement officials in seeking warrants to have customers arrested for
bad checks).
125. Turner, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. The Tennessee court held that threats of criminal
prosecution also violate the state Consumer Protection Act because criminal prosecution is the
prerogative of the state, not a private remedy. Id.
126. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/17-la (West Supp. 1999). Whether such
penalties can properly be invoked by payday lenders, however, remains undecided.
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as a penalty, and perhaps other collection fees." The Indiana Department of
Financial Institutions reported that at least three lenders filed 700 such lawsuits
in two years."
The Texas Credit Code Commissioner reports another collection abuse
arising from using a check as both a loan instrument and as loan collateral: the
lender reports the "bounced check" to a private check collection service to
which other merchants subscribe. A customer on a bad check list from such
services cannot write checks at these merchants' businesses, such as the
neighborhood grocery store, until the customerpays the debt, perhaps including
the collection fee.'2
5. Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs)
Refund anticipation lenders advance cash against the borrower's expected
income tax refund. They are available through tax preparers, such as H & R
Block, or even from used car dealers. 3° Some versions of the refund
anticipation loan, especially the early ones, were constructed as a sale or
assignment of the right to the anticipated refund. As with other fringe loan
forms, RAL lenders designed these transactions in an effort to avoid credit
regulation.'' The overwhelming majority of RAL lending is now performed
by major depository lending institutions, including bank subsidiaries of major
finance companies.3 2 Most RAL lenders do not comply with state usury laws
127. The Illinois Consumer Justice Council testimony describes a borrower who
defaulted on a $240 check loan ($200 loan, $40 fee), and was sued for the $240 plus treble
damages under the bad check law ($720), plus $300 for attorney's fees. The lender sought a
$1260judgment for default on a $200 loan. Edelman testimony, supra note 43; see also Kilborn,
supra note 85 (describing a payday loan customer who owed $1280 on payday loan of $330
(loan of $300, $30 fee): $80 in bounced check charges, treble damages of $330, $150 for the
lender's attorney fees and $60 for court costs).
128. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at 3.
129. Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 2.
130. Some used car dealers offer tax preparation services during tax season, featuring
quick refunds that the customer may credit toward the down payment on a car. The quick refund,
while sometimes simply an electronically-filed tax return, may well be a refund anticipation loan.
131. See infra Part V.
132. When banks entered the refund anticipation business, they made no effort to
deny that the transactions were loans. But that is not to say that they initially complied with the
Truth in Lending Act requirement of giving a meaningful APR price tag. Instead they used a
loophole in TILA to disclose artificially low APRs, sometimes as low as 3%.Under the system
used for RALs, the reasonably expected time the loan is outstanding is approximately two weeks,
as the lender is repaid when the IRS direct deposits the refund into the account at the lending
bank. The banks, however, constructed the note as a demand note with no explicit repayment
date. This strategy allowed the lenders to take advantage of TILA's Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.17(c)(5) (1999), a provision that lets a lender assume a one-year repayment period for a
demand note. This practice was unsuccessfully challenged in Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43
F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir. 1994). However a later amendment to the regulation's Commentary
provides that if repayment is required when the refund is received "such as by deposit into the
consumer's account," then the estimated date ofrepayment, not the one-year assumption, should
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governing small loans in the borrower's state because they were the first of the
fringe lenders to take advantage of a bank's opportunity to issue loans with
rates based exclusively on the law of the lender's home state. Not surprisingly,
many RAL lenders are located in states with low or non-existent interest rate
ceilings.'33
RAL lenders require the taxpayer to file her tax return with the IRS
electronically. Tax preparers often charge a fee for electronically filing the tax
return itself, typically $20 to $35, though the range in 1999 spanned from $0
to $68. Electronically filing the tax return alone will typically cut in half the
time a taxpayer must wait for her refund, from approximately four to six weeks
to two to three weeks (or even less). The RAL puts the refund, less fees, into
the taxpayer's hands in two to three days. Amounts withheld from the proceeds
include the loan fee, the tax preparation fee, and the tax preparer's fee for
electronically filing the return. Loan fees are typically fiat fees, set on a sliding
scale based on the amount of the expected refund.
Here is an example of how loan works: TaxxMann, in Lake Woebegon,
Minnesota, takes the application from the taxpayer and forwards it to its RAL
partner, Seventh Sixth Bank of Delaware. The paperwork signed by the
borrower authorizes the lender to open up an account at the bank in Delaware
and instructs the IRS to direct deposit the refund into that account. The
consumer picks up the loan proceeds, via the tax preparer, in two to three days.
The contract includes a right of setoff, so the lender is repaid when the IRS
directly deposits the refund into the account (generally within two weeks). The
loan is a demand note; thus even if something such as a tax intercept occurs, the
consumer is still contractually bound.
The refund anticipation loan offered in 1999 by the nation's largest RAL
program, Household National Bank 34 (offered through H & R Block) charged
a sliding scale of fees ranging from $39.95 for refunds up to $750 to $89.95 for
refunds over $2000. 35 Fees in this range translate into APRs ranging from 67%
be used in calculating the APR. Federal Reserve Board Comment 17(c)(1)-17, 1 Consumer Cred.
Guide (CCH) at 3465-66 (April 1, 1990). Today, the major RAL lenders use the more accurate
truncated repayment terms when disclosing refund anticipation loan APRs.
133. See infra Part V.
134. Beneficial National Bank was once the largest RAL lender, but it has merged
with Household, which now administers the program.
135. The 1999 scale was $39.95 for refunds up to $750; $49.95 up to $1000, $59.95
up to $1500, $79.95 up to $2000, and $89.95 for refunds over $2000. Telephone Interview with
unknown person at H & R Block, Des Moines, Iowa (Mar. 1999). For 2000, the scale ranges
from $29.95 to $59.95, plus a $35 electronic tax filing fee. Telephone Interview with unknown
person at H & R Block, Des Moines, Iowa (Jan. 2000). A phone inquiry to another tax preparer
found a sliding scale of fees from $63 to $161, with a $50 electronic filing fee. If a taxpreparer's
charge for electronic filing the tax return is the same amount, irrespective of whether customer
takes the RAL, that fee is not a finance charge under the Truth in Lending Act. Federal Reserve
Board Comment 17(c)(l)-17, 1 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) at 3465-66 (Apr. 1, 1990).
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to 768% for the anticipated two-week loan term. 136
One of the problems with RALs is that people may not understand that
they could get their refund in about two weeks or less without the loan by
electronically filing the return themselves. More critically, some do not even
understand a loan is involved because the loans may be marketed through a
misleading catchphrase such as "rapid refund" or "quick refund."'37 Though
some tax preparers discourage RALs, given the almost pointless expense
compared to electronic filing alone, other tax preparers have financial
incentives to push such loans. The used car dealer is one example; the RAL
facilitates the car sale. A recent case reinstating claims against H & R Block
identified ways in which the tax preparer allegedly profited from RALs,
including earning a fee from the lender for each loan referred and the
repurchase of a portion of RAL receivables through a subsidiary.'38
The fine print in contemporary RAL contracts contains a hidden collection
trap for users. The boilerplate language not only gives the lender a right of
setoff against the refund to collect the instant loan (and any prior RAL to the
lender that may remain unsatisfied), but also any debts owed to any affiliate of
the lender (such as an affiliated finance company's loan), and any RALs still
owed to a laundry list of unrelated RAL lenders. 39
D. Installment Purchases: Rent-to-Own
The most mature of the late twentieth century fringe credit segments is the
rent-to-own (RTO) industry. Rent-to-own businesses offer consumers the
option to acquire household goods, appliances, and electronics through
installment payments."'° The RTO industry is estimated to be worth nearly $4
billion annually.'41 Like other alternative financial services transactions, the
cost of a rent-to-own bargain is considerably higher than a mainstream retail
installment sales price. A consumer buying a $300 washing machine from an
136. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at attachment B-2, State
v. The Cash Now Store, Inc., (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (No. 98 CA 2380) (consisting ofBeneficial's
1998 disclosure form). This case involves a provider who cast the transaction as a "purchase"
of tax refunds, instead of a loan, typically for about fifty cents on the dollar. In the case of a
customer noted in the trial record, the effective APR was approximately 3055%. Id. at 17.
137. See, e.g., Joan Koonce Lewis et al., Refund Anticipation Loans and the
ConsumerInterest: A Preliminary Investigation, 42 CONSUMERINTEREsTSANN. 167,169 (1996)
(reporting that nearly half the sample did not realize "quick refunds" were actually loans).
138. See Green v. H & RBlock, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1057, 1059, 1060 (Md. 1999)
(reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent concealment, and violation of Consumer Protection Act). Developments on this issue
are followed in COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 7.5.4.
139. The list in one contract reviewed includes eight lenders, including most of the
major financial institutions making RALs. This appears to stretch the concept of the banker's
right of setoff past recognition, and certainly past its rationale.
140. AFS Overview, supra note 3.
141. Poverty, Inc., CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1998, at 29, 32.
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RTO retailer may pay something on the order of fifty-two weekly payments of
$16 (a total of $832) which means the undisclosed APR is over 250%.42
The method used by the rent-to-own industry to avoid state interest rate
caps or APR disclosure requirements involves characterizing the transaction as
a lease "terminable at will." Industry-drafted legislation, adopted for the most
part in forty-five states, has been largely successful in carving RTO
transactions out from state laws governing credit sales.43
The industry and its critics dispute the extent to which the "rent" function
dominates over the "own" function. The industry says that fewer than 25% of
its customers rent long enough to become owners, 4 while critics cite data
suggesting that 87% of customers purchase the merchandise. Documents
obtained in litigation against one major RTO company found that 66% of one
year's inventory was sold, and some analyses indicate that more than three-
fourths of revenue comes from sales. 45 Rent-to-own customers, however,
generally do not get the credit price tags that installment purchasers in the
mainstream sales finance market receive. Few exceptions exist to this rule
because only a handful of states have found these transactions to be within the
definition of credit sales.'" In Vermont consumers can view the credit price tag
because Attorney General regulations under the state unfair and deceptive acts
and practices (UDAP) law require disclosure of an effective APR (EAPR).47
Most state RTO legislation requires dealers to disclose both a "cash price"
and "total cost to own" if paid in installments. However, most of these laws
sanction a deceptive price tag: the "cash price" can be--and most often
142. For examples ofRTO prices, see id. at 32; Alix M. Freedman, PeddlingDreams:
A Market Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to Profit on Poverty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1993,
reprinted in MERCHANTS OFMISERY 153,155-57 (Michael Hudson, ed. 1996); Michael Hudson,
Rent-to-Own: The Slick Cousin of Paying on Time, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY 146, 146-47
(Michael Hudson, ed. 1996)
As a result of a New Jersey case finding RTO transactions to be credit sales, the
industry is seeking legislation in that state. The Consumers League of New Jersey opposes the
industry-backed bill, and its press release reports that even the higher priced competitors, small
inner city merchants, stay within New Jersey's 30% criminal usury cap. Consumers League of
New Jersey, All New Jersey Court Decisions Found that Rent to Own Violated the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act (visited Feb 9, 2000) <http://www.clnj.org/rtoc_t.htm>.
143. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-101 to -1001 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 559.9231 to .9241 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3601 to .3624 (West
1997); COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 7.5.3.2.
144. Association of Progressive Rental Organization (APRO), What Is Rent-to-Own?
(visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http//www.apro.rto.com/content/whatisrto.asp>.
145. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 7.5.3.2.1 n.240; see also David L. Ramp,
Renting to Own in the United States, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 797, 798 (1990) (stating that the
figures offered by the RTO industry are "either grossly misleading or simply untrue"); David L.
Ramp, From Rags Come Riches (paper presented at meeting of the Consumer Fin. Servs.
Comm., Business Law Section, ABA meeting, Aug. 6, 1995).
146. See infra Part V.
147.Subject: Consumer Fraud-Rent-to-Own Disclosures; Attorney
General-Consumer Protection Section Adopted Pursuant to 9 VS.A. § 41b: Rule CF 115
(visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http://www.state.vt.us/atg/rule%20cfl 1S.htm>.
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is-unrelated to fair market value. Consequently, the "total cost to own" may
be double the "cash price" of the goods, but effectively four times the true
market value of the goods acquired."' Other charges may be permitted, such
as security deposits, administrative fees, delivery charges, "pick-up payment"
charges, late fees, insurance charges, and liability damage waiver fees. 49
Because it is a "rental," the goods may be repossessed and all equity
forfeited. Acquiring goods through rent-to-own can be a Sisyphean task. For
example, the RTO "total to purchase" a $650 retail washer and dryer might be
$1500.'50 If the consumer misses a $19 weekly payment after a year of
payments totaling $950, she may lose the washer and dryer and have nothing
to show forher $950 investment. By contrast, she wouldhave owned the goods
if she had signed a contract to purchase them at retail price through fifty-two
weekly installments of $19 at 89.3% APR.
Even assuming that the consumer successfully completes the RTO
transaction, such successes will not her an improved ability to move into the
lower-priced mainstream credit market because credit reports do not reflect
positive RTO history.
E. Risk and Profitability
Each segment of the fringe credit market justifies its costs in part by its
higher transaction costs and in part by the higher level of risk assumed to be
associated with lending to fringe market borrowers. The transaction costs are
indeed higher,' but how much of the differential is compensatory and how
much consists of simple opportunism is unclear. The validity of the risk-
assumption rationale is likewise uncertain. First, one must consider the
possibility that default rates do not correspond with actual loss to fringe market
lenders. Second, one must ask whether these transactions in fact create risk,
rather than compensate for it.
In the Wall Street Journal and on 60 Minutes, the title loan industry cited
148. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-10-301(c) (1999) (defining "cash price" as "the
price at which a lessor in the ordinary course of business would offer the property... for cash
on the date of the execution of the rental purchase agreement"). A visit to a local RTO store in
Iowa found a posted "cash price" for a thirteen inch TV-VCR to be $764, though a comparable
model was available at a local retailer for $280. The RTO "total to purchase" the $280 TV was
$1217, four times the value of the good acquired.
149. See, e.g., IOWA CODEANN. § 537.3612 (West 1997) (permitting RTO lessors to
charge such fees).
150. At a local RTO, the "cash price" listed on the $650 retail pair was $880. The
RTO terms offered were $18.99 per week for seventy-eight weeks, or $1481.22. These figures
assume the goods are new. RTO laws may require labeling of used goods, though compliance
may not always occur.
151. See, e.g., CAsKEY, FRINGs BANKING, supra note 3, at 111-12 (finding higher
transactional costs in pawnshop loans and check cashing outlets). This study did not examine
title pawns, payday lenders, orRTO companies. Id. at I 11. See infra Part VIII for a brief account
of some efforts at providing alternatives that may provide some basis for comparison.
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a 10% delinquency and repossession rate, compared to a repo rate of less than
2% for auto sale financers.' 2 According to Mike Coniglio, president of the
Southern Association of Title Lenders, "Our past due accounts and our
repossession accounts are 10 times that of a General Motors Acceptance or
Ford Motor Credit. And our rates are not 10 times their rates."' However, the
average title lender only lends about one-third the value of the used car to begin
with, in contrast to the 90% loan-to-value ratio typically found in a prime
market used car loan.'54 Moreover, title lenders fail to account for the effect of
renewals and their retention of the surplus from any repossession sale. Take the
example ofAnnie Churchwell. Ms. Chuchwell paid $2800 over a period of six
months on a $2000 loan without reducing her debt. The payments she had
made were enough for the lender to realize a 127% return on his $2000
investment. Further, if the care were then repossessed, the lender would keep
the proceeds of the repossession sale-a gain of $6,000 in Ms. Churchwell's
case. Fortunately, Ms. Churchwell avoided becoming part of that 10% repo
figure by deciding to fight back instead of walking away.'55 One of the
customers interviewed on 60 Minutes had already paid $2000 on a $500 loan,
but felt he was going to have to let them take the truck back because he could
not keep the payments up. 56 The same factor is at play for payday loans and
RTO. 57 Because payday loans are not amortized, and because renewal or
refinancing costs descend upon borrowers so quickly, a borrower may pay the
equivalent of principal plus 217% interest and still default on the loan.
Nevertheless, a small claims collection action could seek the full principal and
interest, in addition to the NSF fees, and perhaps treble damages and additional
collection costs.'5"
For these reasons, default rates are not necessarily good indicators of
whether the high cost of most fringe market loans is justified. 59 It may be more
appropriate to look at profitability by comparing rates of return in these
industries to those ofstandardbusinesses. If higher prices are to compensate for
152. Cahill, supra note 40, at A13; 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 5-6.
153. 60 Minutes, supra note 46. Actually, Mr. Coniglio has that wrong. Their 264%
APR is more than twenty times higher than the average used car financing rate in 1998, which
was 12.64%. Financial and Business Statistics, 86 FED. Ras. BULL. Al, A36 tbl.1.56 (1999).
154. Loan-to-values on used cars in 1998 were 99%. Financial and Business
Statistics, 86 FED. REs. BULL. Al, A36 tbl.1.56 (1999). Remember, too, that surpluses from
disposition may not be returned to the consumer.
155. Cahill, supra note 40. Lynn Drysdale, one of the authors, represents Ms.
Churchwell and other title loan customers whose stories are cited here.
156. 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 8.
157. See supra Part II.D for an example in the RTO context.
158. If a consumer pays a $15 fee to renew an $85 loan every two weeks for four
months, she has paid $120 total. The lender has received enough to repay the principal plus a
217% yield on that four-month $85 loan, but if the borrower defaults, the full principal is still
owed. Lieberman Forum (Fox testimony), supra note 128, at 8; see also supra Part II.B.4.
159. See infra Part VII (discussing the issue of whether the high prices create risk,
rather than compensating for it).
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higher transaction costs and higher risk, then it stands to reason that
compensatory pricing should yield lender profitability comparable with that of
the lower risk, less costly provider. The Wall Street Journal reports a 12%
return for one title lender, whereas "[m]ost bankers, by contrast, are happy with
a 1.5% return on assets."' 60 Likewise, the Consumer Federation of America
cites an investment analyst who follows the payday loan business as reporting
a 48% unleveraged return on investment, and also cites a study from the
Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions finding that payday lenders
enjoy a 22.72% return on assets and 30.37% return on equity.'6' While these
figures raise the possibility that the standardjustifications forhigh-priced fringe
market loans are not as solid as they seem, further study and evaluation is
warranted before any final conclusions are drawn.
III. THE EARLY ANTECEDENTS TO TODAY'S FRINGE BANKING MARKET
A. The First Half of the Century
6
1. Cash Loans
As the nineteenth century phased into the twentieth, industrialization in
America gave rise to a number of social problems which triggered the reforms
of the Progressive Era. Among them, the consumer credit market began to
attract the attention of reformers. As wages increased to a point beyond that
required for basic necessities, some was left over for repayment of debt.
Likewise, the current wave of short-term, small-principal loans "thrives upon
high wages and rising standards of living and not upon abject poverty."'"
Many of the credit products offered in today's fringe market have direct
antecedents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example,
"salary lenders" advanced cash in small amounts for short terms against the
debtor's next paycheck. The "5 for 6 boys" lent five dollars at the beginning of
the week, to be repaid with six dollars on payday a week or two hence. "Salary
buyers" would "buy" the next wage packet at a discount-for example,
160. Cahill, supra note 40. This is not to assume that banks' return on assets is the
best point of comparison.
161. Fox, supra note 62, at 9. Tennessee is one of the states with a very high
concentration of payday lenders. The Tennessee study looked at the first nine months of legal
operation. Because payday lending was going on prior to its legalization, there were class actions
against lenders, and the DFI properly excluded the litigation costs from their analysis.
162. The same is true throughout the subprime market. For a discussion of the issue
in the subprime mortgage market, see Mansfield, supra note 19.
163. Portions of this section first appeared in Lieberman Forum (Fox testimony),
supra note 121; see also COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, §§ 2.2.3.1, 2.5 (discussing small loan
businesses in the first half of the century).
164. RolfNugent, The Loan-Shark Problem, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,4 (1941).
The article was part of a series published collectively in a symposium in that issue. Symposium,
Combating the Loan Shark, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1941).
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advancing $22.50 on January 15 in exchange for the "sale" of the $25 paycheck
due January 28 (an effective 311% APR).161 Some loans were secured by wage
assignments, while others involved unsecured notes backed by threats of
garnishment (which at the time could result in dismissal)." Indeed, there was
even a direct antecedent of today's postdated check loan: some early salary
lenders convinced borrowers to sign a bank check in the amount of the loan's
principal and interest, even though the borrower had no bank account. The
lender explained the check to the borrower as "security." In the event of
default, the lender deposited the check, which of course, bounced. The lender
then threatened criminal prosecution unless the debt was paid.67 Today's title
loans had their analogues during this early period, as well: borrowers "sold"
their cars, which were then "leased" back to them, and collection was
facilitated by threatened-or actual--repossession.
1 68
As now, the loans in this period were short-term, ranging from one week
to one month, with two weeks being most prevalent. 69 Price tags were
comparable as well. One study in South Carolina found interest rates for white
borrowers ranging from 270% to 559%, with black borrowers paying rates
ranging from 322% to 955%."' While such interest rates were usurious, there
was little enforcement because the borrowers had little access to the courts and
little understanding of their rights in any event. "[T]he one who suffers most
165. Compare this device to the current practice of "selling" the consumer's right to
an income tax refund. See supra Part lI.C; see also supra Part II.B.2 (describing today's Texas
schemes).
166. Jackson R. Collins, Evasion andAvoidance of UsuryLaws, 8 LAw& CONTEMI,.
PRoBs. 54, 55-58 (1941); Nugent, supra note 164, at 5. A later reform movement curtailed the
use of these devices after the abuse of them and the consequences of such abuse became
apparent. States prohibited or curtailed them by the 1960s. A series of hearings was held around
the country by the Federal Trade Commission in the mid-1970s in which problems with these
and other overreaching contract terms were documented. FEDERAL TRADE COMM., CREDIT
PRACTICES: STAFFREPORTAND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED TRADE REGULATIONRULE 16
CFRPART444: PUBLIcREcoRD 215-42 (August 1980). Based upon that record, the use of such
terms in consumer credit contracts was curtailed at the federal level by the FTC Credit Practices
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1999). Garnishment abuses and their negative effects on families were
addressedbothby state legislation and by the Federal GarnishmentAct, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1681 t
(1994), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 -1692o (1994).
167. A salary lender in Kansas City used this system, as described in the 1941
Symposium. Joe B. Birkhead, Collection Tactics ofIllegalLenders, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
78,86 (1941). Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the earliestreports of themodernpayday lender
using the post-dated check scheme to try to evade usury and credit disclosure laws came from
Kansas City. Joe Stephens, Postdated CheckFirms May Violate UsuryLaws, KANS. CITYSTAR,
Oct. 23, 1988, at IA. See supra Part ll.B.4 for a discussion of the threat of criminal prosecution
as a collection tactic in this second wave.
168. Collins, supra note 166, at 65.
169. William Hays Simpson, Cost of Loans to Borrowers Under Unregulated
Lending, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 73 (1941).
170. Id. at 74-75. This is comparable to the range for today's low-end loan amounts,
at 261% to 625%. See supra Section I.B.2. Compare Michael L. Walden, The Economics of
Rent-to-Own Contracts, 24J. CONSUMERAFF., 326,334-35 (1990) (finding RTO prices inversely
related to the income level of the census tract).
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at the hands of high-rate lenders is the borrower, yet he is almost the only
member of society who has done nothing about his plight.... The economic
condition of the loan shark victim explains much, but not all, of this
situation."' Social workers, legal aid societies, labor unions, and some well-
intentioned businessmen and professionals bore witness to the toll these high-
rate loans took on the borrowers. 72 Then, as now, real economic distress
accompanied the renewal of midget loans with giant price tags and the related
problem of trying to juggle debt-i.e., borrowing from Peter to pay Paul. '" In
sum, the stories of the borrowers on the downward spiral in this "first wave"
of fringe lending are not substantially different than those told by fringe
borrowers today. 74
The resulting efforts at "combating the loan shark,"'175 as this type of lender
was unashamedly called then, took several forms. There were, of course, efforts
to enforce the usury laws.' 76 But that approach deals with symptoms, not
causes, so there began a search for nonexploitive alternatives to fringe lending.
This effort took place over a reform period spanning approximately half a
century-up to World War II. Provident lending societies and credit unions
originated in this period, representing the "philanthropic" and "cooperative"
approaches.77 A third avenue sought to develop a framework for a viable
commercial industry that would serve the needs of the small borrower. But the
reformers recognized that the marketplace of the small borrower was an
"imperfect market," making it unlikely that deregulation (then, too, touted by
economists) would curb the abuses of the loan shark.
71
171. GeorgeL. Gisler, Organization ofPublic OpinionforEffective MeasuresAgainst
Loan Sharks, 8 LAW&CONTMP. PROBS. 182,182 (1941). This, too, has changed little. See infra
Part IV.
172. Gisler, supra note 171, at 182; see also Nugent, supra note 166, at 13; Robert
W. Kelso, Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 14, 15 (1941). One wonders if they were dismissed as "paternalistic do-gooders," as
today's critics are. See Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 14.
173. Nugent, supra note 166, at 5; cf. supra Part 11.B.3.
174. For example, one borrower, making $35 a week, borrowed a total $83 from four
different lenders as a result of family sickness. To service that $83 loan, he paid those four
lenders $16 permonth. At the end of a year, he had paid $192 in interest, but still owed the $83.
Similarly, a mill employee, with a $25 a week salary, borrowed a total of $55 from four different
loan companies. After paying $69.40 in interest for a year, he still owed the original $55.
Simpson, supra note 181, at 74-75.
175. Paul H. Sanders, Foreword to Symposium, supra note 164, at 1.
176. SeegenerallyHuBAHnK,ANmOTATONS, supra note 1, at 1-10 (describing stages
in the evolution of small loan laws); Emmet R. Field, Injunction and Receivership Proceedings
Against Illegal Lenders, 8 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 100 (1941) (explaining the need for
"vigorous and continuing policing action" to accompany usury laws); Charles S. Kelly, Legal
TechniquesforCombatingLoan Sharks, 8 LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS 88,93-99 (1941) (suggesting
remedies other than small loan laws for states that do not have adequate laws in place).
177. For a brief overview of the cooperative and philanthropic models, see CosT OF
CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 2.2.3.1 and sources cited therein. See also CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING,
supra note 3, at 23-26 (discussing "philanthropic pawnshops").
178. Nugent, supra note 166, at 12.
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The approach ultimately adopted involved the creation of a legal
framework that permitted a return high enough to attract legitimate businesses
into the small borrower market, but also included sufficient safeguards to
prevent the kind of abuses that were all too evident in the "loan shark"
market.'79 The resulting product of this approach was the first draft of a Model
Uniform Small Loan Act, which appeared in 1916.30 The Act applied to small
loans of $300 or less and allowed for ahigh rate of return, with a recommended
top rate of 42%"8' annually recommended on the smallest loan amounts (later
reduced to 36%). 82 But the trade-off for that high rate was strict regulation. To
reduce evasions, the Uniform Act had an all-inclusive definition of interest'
3
and a provision that codified the common law principle that the law applied no
matter what evasive devices were attempted.T 4 Deterrence was built into the
Act by requiring lenders to forfeit all principal and interest if they charged
excessive rates. Additionally, lenders were made subject to criminal penalties
for violations of the Act.' 5 To address the problem of indefinite payments that
never reduced the principal, roughly equal installments were required, which
effectively precluded balloon payments.'
8 6
Ultimately, every state except Arkansas enacted small loan laws.'87 By
1930, the resulting small loan industry was estimated to be a $255 million
industry, making loans averaging $140. Over half the states had adopted some
version of the Uniform Act by 1930, and there were 3,667 licensees by August
1932.'s'
179. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 1-3 (discussing the appearance of
greater regulation of small loans); see generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A CULTURAL HIsTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 124-35 (1999) (providing historical
background).
180. The act underwent periodic revisions into the early days of World War 1I. The
seventh draft, as revised June 1, 1942, appears in BARBARA CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER
CREDITREGULATION 144-57 (1965).
181. See HUBACHEK, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 119-21.
182. CURRAN, supra note 180, at 152-53 (citing the seventh draft at § 13(a)).
Consumer loans above $300 were written under Industrial Loan Acts. Id. at 52-60 (discussing
the history of industrial bank loans). Many companies obtained dual licenses. Even today there
is considerable overlap among licensees under the Iowa Regulated Loan Act (formerly the Iowa
Small Loan Act) and the Iowa Industrial Loan Act. See IOWA DEPT. OF COMMERCE Div. OF
BANKING, 1999 ANN. REP. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT 65-70 (listing both "Industrial Loan
Licensees" and "Regulated Loan Licensees").
The Russell Sage research effort concluded that a 3% per month return (36%) would
bring a 6% return to investors, but the 3.5% (42%) was the result of compromise with a segment
of the lending industry that emerged as the force for reform from within. CALDER, supra note
179, at 131-33.
183. CURRAN, supra note 180, at 144-45, 53 (citing the seventh draft at §§ I(a)(4),
2(a), 13(c)).
184. Id. at 146 (citing § 2(c)).
185. Id. at 153 (citing § 13(c)).
186. Id. at 154 (citing § 14(c)).
187. Arkansas has an interest rate ceiling in its constitution. Id. at 16, 26 n.94.
188. CALDER, supra note 179, at 147.
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2. Retail Sales and the Installment Plan
Industrialization played a more direct role in the development of
installment purchases of consumer goods. While furniture and pianos had been
brought into some nineteenth century American homes with the help of
installment buying, it was the I.M. Singer& Company's successful effort to get
sewing machines into the home that appears to have launched the modem era
of installment purchases for expensive consumer durables.'89 The Singer
Company's newsletter first suggested the concept of "renting" a sewing
machine to housewives and applying the rental fee to the purchase in 1856.190
Credit later came into its own as a mass-marketing tool with the automobile as
auto manufacturers developed financing arms that facilitated sales to
mainstream America.' 9' By 1930 most durable goods were purchased through
installment credit.1
92
A desire to evade usury laws was probably not the motivation for the
original rent-to-own contracts, 93 because installment purchase credit generally
was not subject to interest rate caps at that time. This exception was due to the
time price doctrine for the sale of goods. The higher price differential charged
to those deferring payment for the purchase over time was not considered
"interest" for purposes of usury laws.' 94 However, through the middle part of
the century, most states enacted retail installment sales acts (RISAs). Many
RISAs included rate ceilings applicable specifically to retail installment sales,
though sometimes maintaining the terminology of "time price differential."'95
Either implicitly through enactment of such legislation or through judicial
decisions, most states have now restricted the time price doctrine, bringing
most consumer installment purchases under state credit regulatory schemes.'96
Moreover, the price tag disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act upon
its enactment in 1969 made no distinction between "interest" and "time price
189. Id. at 164-65.
190. Id. at 164. The English "hire-purchase" system of installment buying, like the
rent-to-own system, leaves title in the seller's name until the contract is complete. Calder notes
that the concept apparently originated with a countess negotiating with a furniture dealer in 1830.
Id. at 158.
191. See generally MARTHAL. OLNEY, BuY Now, PAY LATER: ADVERTISING, CREDIT
AND CONSUMER DURABLES IN Tm 1920s (1991) (discussing the role of credit in marketing
automobiles). Olney believes that manufacturers' financing was not directly a retail marketing
plan, but rather a solution to dealers' financing problems.
192. CALDER, supra note 179, at 201. The percentages included 60-75% of
automobiles, 80-90% of furniture, and 65% of vacuum cleaners. Id.
193. But see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 40 S.C. 529, 532, 19 S.E.132, 134 (1894);
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Holcomb, 40 Iowa 33 (1874).
194. See generally COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, § 10.3.2.1.1, at 339 (discussing
retail installment sales acts in historical context); CURRAN, supra note 196, at 13.
195. CURRAN, supra note 180, at 83-123.
196. See generally THE COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, § 10.3.2.1.2, at 341 (citing
cases on the erosion of the time-price doctrine).
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differential;" both are a cost incident to credit and must be disclosed as part of
the credit pricetag.'9 7 By the time the modem rent-to-own industry began to
grow, credit installment sales were subject to regulation. Therefore, the second
wave of fringe lenders were confronted with a regulatory system to evade.
B. The Credit Boom: The Small Loan Lenders Move Upstream
In the 1960s, small loan licensees still made "small" loans, though the
maximum loan amount by then ranged from $200 to $5000.'9' However,
bigger-ticket loans began to take an increasing share of the small loan finance
company industry's holdings. 199 Today the adjective "personal" no longer
defines what used to be called the personal finance industry. Several factors
have led to this transformation. Business lending pulled ahead of consumer
lending in the mid-70s, and has remained ahead since then.2' Auto finance,
always an important part of the personal finance industry's market, grew from
a 23% share of consumer receivables in 1975 to 79% in 1996.201 Additionally,
consumer lending moved from smaller-dollar personal loans to larger-balance
home equity loans.20 2 The increase in borrowing against the home, as opposed
to merely borrowing to acquire the home,2°3 was fueled by (1) deregulation of
the mortgage market, including home equity loans as well as purchase money
loans;20 4 (2) new developments in the secondary market for mortgages; 205 (3)
appreciation in real estate values in many parts of the country; and (4) the 1986
tax code revision, which eliminated the interest deduction for all debt except
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(1) (1999) (stating
that finance charges include the time-price differential).
198. CURRAN, supra note 180, at 21. Mississippi had no loan amount cap. Id. at 21
n.59.
199. CALDER, supra note 179, at 148. Calder reports that among the major chain
lenders, this process of moving upstream actually began very early, when Household Finance
Corp. lowered its rates from 3.5% to 2.5% by setting a loan amount floor at $100. Id. "Since
larger loans were generally made to borrowers with larger incomes and assets, this was a sign
that the larger chains at least were going after a new kind of borrower, leaving less well off
borrowers to illegal lenders willing to take the higher risk." Id.; see also supra Part ll.D
(discussing risk and profitability).
200. James D. August et al., Survey ofFinance Companies, 1996,83 FED.REs.BuLL.
543, 544 (1997). Business lending was 44% of industry receivables in 1996, compared to 42%
for nonmortgage consumer receivables. Id. at 544 tbl.1.
201. EvelynM. Hurley, Survey ofFinance Companies, 1975,62 FED.REs. BULL. 197,
199 thl.1 (1976); August, supra note 200, at 547 tbl.4.
202. See generally OLNEY, supra note 191 (discussing the growth ofautomobile sales
financing).
203. Home-secured lending by finance companies is almost all equity lending, rather
thanpurchase money lending, though the industry does finance mobile home purchases. August,
supra note 200, at 548.
204. For a review of the deregulation of the home mortgage market, see Mansfield,
supra note 19.
205. Mortgage-backed securities appeared during this period.
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home-secured debt.2°0
Because profit margins on small sum borrowing are smaller than on larger
loans, and home-secured loans are the most secure in the consumer credit
marketplace, the small loan finance company industry moved onward and
upward. Subsequently, around the country maximum loan amounts under the
old Small Loan Acts were raised or eliminated entirely." 7 When small loan
amount ceilings were still relatively low, dual licenses under the small loan acts
and Industrial Loan Acts, along with the creation of new affiliated entities to
engage in different types of lending enabled small loan finance companies to
operate in this higher-ticket market. While finance companies had only a small
market share of the $5 trillion real estate credit market, mortgage lending still
made up 13.5% of their receivables by 1996.208 In contrast, personal consumer
loans were less than 8% of total receivables, 0 9 whereas in 1975 personal cash
loans were 17% of total receivables.210
In today's market, the finance company's small loan customer often
becomes abig loan borrower quickly, sometimes through practices which have
drawn criticism. For example, one source of personal finance loan customers
has always been the sales-finance transaction. In this type of transaction, a
seller sells an item-furniture, a washer, a computer--"on time." The retail
installment sales contract between the seller and the buyer is immediately
assigned to a finance company. Once the finance company acquires a customer
this way, it sometimes tries to turn that person into a longer-term customer by
extending new credit: refinancing the original retail installment contract into
206. Kennickell et al., Family Finances, supra note 9, at 1, 16.
207. In the course of raising maximum loan amounts, some states changed the name
of the law from "Small Loan Act' to other names, such as "Regulated Loan Act" or "Consumer
Finance Act." Commerce Clearing House's Consumer Credit Guide details the currentmaximum
loan amounts authorized by state small loan laws, by whatever name they are called today. Small
Loan Acts, 1 Consumer Credit Guide (CCH) 540 (Feb. 24, 1988).
208. August, supra note 200, at 548. Real estate lending includes both commercial
and residential. Total industry receivables were about $771 billion, of which there were $103.8
billion total real estate receivables. $71 billion (or 68%) ofthereal estate receivables represented
loans to individuals, primarily home equity loans. This is about 9% of the total $771 billion in
industry receivables. Id. at 544, 548.
209. Id. at 548. "Other" consumer receivables include personal cash loans, sales
finance (nomnotor vehicle), and mobile homes (which would be big-ticket loans). This category
comprised 19.2% of consumer receivables ($62.5 billion). Id. at 544, 547-48. In turn, consumer
receivables comprised only 42.3% of the industry's total receivables. Id. at 544. Personal cash
loans, then, would be only a portion of the $62.5 billion "other" category, and therefore probably
less than 8% of the $771 billion in total industry receivables.
210. Hurley, supra note 201, at 199 tbl.l. The 1975 survey did not include a separate
category for real estate lending, but the figures can be derived. Out of total gross receivables of
$86 billion, only $1.9 billion of the $16.7 billion in personal cash loans were secured by a second
mortgage. Id. Thus nonmortgage personal cash loans ($14.8 billion) constituted 17% of gross
receivables and home equity loans constituted 2%.
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a loan under the state small loan act.2 ' As one industry analyst described the
practice in a conversation with one of the authors, the finance company
industry's game plan is not to serve the small loan market, but rather to move
the small loan borrower up the "food chain" from the feeder merchant's sales
finance contract to a home equity loan.2"2
While the finance companies began the move towards high-dollar lending,
credit cards began to supplant (and expand) the market for small dollar credit.
As the rise in credit card debt from $287 billion at the end of 1993213 to $588.7
billion in August 1999 2 illustrates, credit cards are what most Americans now
use for short-term, small dollar credit, whether for convenience, need, or asset
acquisition.
While there are undoubtedly a complex combination of factors at play, it
seems plausible that the abandonment of the small loan marketplace by the
traditional small loan lenders on the one hand, and the adequacy of the credit
card to serve the majority of America's small-dollar credit needs on the other,
created a void that grew under the radar screen of regulators, policy makers,
and, for a time, even the mainstream industry. In this void, an industry
resurfaced that the first few decades of the century were spent trying to stamp
out. That vacuum of intangibles is matched, at least in some communities, by
a parallel physical vacuum as some low-income and minority communities
remained underserved by traditional banks, or became underserved as a result
211. Except in states that have followed this current wave of deregulation, RISA rates
are typically lower than small loan rates. Refinancing those transactions, then, often turns 18%
or 21% sales credit into loan credit that could charge small loan rates of up to 36%. See generally
COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, § 6.4.3, at 196 (discussing "flipping" of lower rate sales
financing into higher rate loans).
When moving the loan balance upstream, the rate can be lowered while the overall
cost is raised. Bigger principals mean more interest, as do longer terms. In some cases, packing
the loan principal with high fees and charges can even mean that a large part of the loan
"principal" consists of loan costs. See generally id. § 6.1 (discussing problems associated with
refinancing); Gene A. Marsh, The Hard Sell in Consumer Credit: How the Folks in Marketing
Can Put You in Court, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REp. 295, 296-97 (1998) (discussing problems
associated with loan renewals).
212. A notorious example of a small sales finance contract from a "feeder merchant"
that was moved up the "food chain" to an unconscionable home equity loan through eleven loans
in four years-with ten points charged each time-was featured in both the Wall Street Journal
and on television's PrimeTime Live. Jeff Bailey, A Man and His Loan: Why Bennie Roberts
Refinanced 10 Times, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at 1; NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
CONSUMERLAWPLEADINGS 49,49-55 (1997) (describing the specifics of this situation);see also
COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at 183, (providing an example, based on an actual case, of how
a small loan borrower can borrow $6000 at the maximum small loan rate and end up paying
either $6900 or $16,000); Michael Hudson, Loan Scams, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY 72, 72-79
(Michael Hudson, ed. 1996) (discussing targeted widespread home equity scams).
213. Financial and Business Statistics, 82 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A36 tbl.1.55 (1996).
214. Financial and Business Statistics, 85 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A36 tbl.1.55 (1999).
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of branch closings.21
IV. THE MARKET FOR FRINGE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
During periods in which the politically dominant preference is to rely more
on the market than legal constraints, it is important to understand whether a
particular industry operates under conditions necessary for the proper function
of market forces. If smoothly functioning market forces require relative
equality of bargaining power, relatively equal access to and comprehension of
relevant information, opportunities for meaningful choice, and a basic level of
good faith, then a marketplace which lacks such elements raises serious policy
questions.216 It is important, then, to understand who are the customers of the
fringe banking marketplace.
The marketplace is not homogenous. For example, the check cashers are
more likely to cater to those without bank accounts (though certainly "banked"
consumers use check cashers as well),217 while the payday lenders who take
post dated checks or debit authorizations will by definition deal with those who
have bank accounts.2"8 But the broad outlines suggest that, while some middle
class consumers may turn to the fringe banking system for convenience or
because of temporary setbacks," 9 the primary target market for the fringe
215. The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act was enacted in an effort to encourage
greater attention by banks to the needs of all of the local communities. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3)
(1994).
216. It is generally recognized that in consumer transactions, there is unequal
economic power, unequal bargaining power, and unequal "knowledge, experience, and
sophistication." CuRRAN, supra note 180, at 83. One economist has raised the point of good faith
in this manner: "There is some truth in the allegation that unregulated competition places a
premium on deceit and corruption." FRANKHYIEMANKNIGHT, THE ETHICS OF COMPETITIONAND
OTHER ESSAYS 42 (1935); see also Pinkett v. Moolah Loan Comp., No. 99C2700, 1999 WL
1080596, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1999) (looking at the gross disparity in bargaining positions
between the parties and the borrower's lack of choice when presented with unfavorable terms);
State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Investment Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Ark. 1999) (finding
unconscionability and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act by a title loan company).
217. The demographics of the noncredit AFS user (the check cashing customer) have
been more thoroughly studied, having a longer track record than payday lenders or title lenders.
CCO customers tend to have lower incomes. One industry survey, which Caskey reported would
overrepresent the more affluent customers, nonetheless found a median income of $20,400,
compared to the then national income median of $30,500. CASKEY, FRINGEBANKING, supra note
3, at 73-78; see also Jean-Paul, supra note 29, at 4 (stating that those without checking accounts
have disproportionately low income); Kennickell et al, Recent Changes 2000, supra note 9, at
9 (noting the increase in families with transaction accounts); see generally Jeanne M. Hogarth
& Kevin O'Donnell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income Families and the Governmental
Trend Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. REs. BULL. 459 (1999) (discussing the federal
government's role in expanding electronic payment systems and its potential effects on low
income families).
218. See supra Part II.B.2.
219. Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 3. Driving through
Beverly Hills a few years ago, one of the authors spotted a sleek chrome sign in a smart district
that read "Collateral Lending." It took a moment to register as an upscale pawn shop.
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banking system is one in which market forces may not work well.
The question of who best epitomizes the payday loan customer is the
subject of some dispute. Industry data indicates that payday lending is currently
concentrated in six states: 3000 of the 6000 licensees reported by the Financial
Service Centers of America (FiSCA) are found in Kentucky, Tennessee,
Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 0 All six states are
below the median income for the United States,"1 and four have above-average
poverty rates.'
The president-elect of a recently formed trade association for payday
lenders, the Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA),'
reported the following to a 1999 public forum sponsored by United States
Senator Joseph Lieberman:
The typical payday advance customer is a responsible,
hardworking middle class American. The
0 Average age is 35 years old
0 Average annual household income is $33,000.00
* Average time in current residence is 4.5 years
0 Average time in current job is 4 years
* 33% own their own home
All of them have a current checking account and a
regular source of income.
Our customer represents the heart of the working middle
class-teachers, nurses, construction workers, state and
federal employees and the like.
These are not "poor, disadvantaged" people as is often
alleged; these are good people, with a short term financial
need.'
Likewise, the representative of the check casher's trade association (newly
220. Id. at 9.
221. The 1996 to 1998 three-year average median income for the United States was
$37,779. Median income for the six states home to half of the payday lenders are: $37,640
(Missouri), $36,407 (North Carolina), $34,692 (South Carolina), $34,633 (Kentucky), $32,397
(Tennessee), $28,592 (Mississippi). U.S. CENsUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, xvi
tbl.D, xviii fig.7 (Mar. 1999).
222. The 1996 to1998 three-yearpovertyrate for the United States was 13.2%. South
Carolina's was 13.3%, Tennessee's was 14.5%, Kentucky's was 15.8%, and Mississippi's was
18.3%.U.S.CensusBureau,Poverty1998(visited Jan. 2000)
<http:llwvw.census.gov/hheslpoverty/poverty98/pv98state.htl>.
223. The trade association was formed in 1999 to be the payday loan industry's
national trade group. See infra Part VI (discussing legislative and public relations campaigns in
the fringe marketplace).
224. Lieberman Forum (Webster testimony) supra note 87, at 5-6.
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renamed the Financial Services Centers ofnAmerica (FiSCA)) 2 told the forum
that "[t]here is no 'target' market for the industry or FiSCA members who
provide this financial product," citing data indicating household incomes "from
$20,000 to $25,000 on the low side to $35,000 to $45,000 on the high side." 6
On its face, the study of the short-term loan industry conducted by the
Illinois Department of Financial Institutions at the behest of the state legislature
supports FiSCA's position. The report claims the following:
[T]he short term loan industry is not targeting areas of
specific personal income levels. We have combined data
generated from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis to verify that areas with the lowest
personal income levels are not being inundated by the
presence of these businesses. The counties with the densest
population of short term lenders are usually the counties with
the highest average personal income levels. 7
However, even a cursory examination of this statement raises questions.
Not surprisingly, Cook County, home to Chicago and over 40% of the state's
population, is the fringe-lending capital of the state. It sports 202 of the state's
455 payday lenders (44.4%) and forty-seven of the state's ninety licensed title
lenders (52%). 8 The Illinois DFI reached the above conclusion by using the
county's 1997 average personal income of $29,343-one of the higher county
averages. 2 9 But a county is a broad sample, particularly Cook County, and
averages hide the extremes. Chicago's neighborhoods run the gamut from the
South Side to the Gold Coast, with a wide range of median income levels.uo
Thus the high county-wide average income may not reflect the true
composition of Cook County's fringe banking customers.
Some studies examining the geographic distribution of the check cashing
outlet (CCO) and currency exchange (CE) providers on a narrower scale raise
a question about the weight that should be given to the Illinois DFI's location-
225. This trade association was formerly known as the National Check Cashers
Association (NaCCA). The change reflects the expansion of the CCOs into the short-term
lending business.
226. Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 12-14. Rochford also
cited the results of a focus group showing interest among households in the $25,000 to $50,000
range, though the focus group apparently did not consist of customers. Id. at 13.
227. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 10.
228. Id. at 11-12.
229. Id. at 11.
230. A 1997 study cites a $7900 median income in one of the lowest-income
communities in Chicago, compared to a median income for the city as a whole of $37,824.
WOODSTOCK INST., CURRENCY EXCHANGES, supra note 29, at 3.
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based findings."1 For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston looked at
multi-census tract areas in cities in New England where check cashers were
most densely clustered-Boston, Hartford, and Providence."s The Boston
study found that the cities with high CCO clusters tended "to have high
percentages of low- and moderate-income census tracts and households, ''2'
high percentages of households below the poverty level, and higher shares of
households on fixed incomes (either public assistance or social security). 4
More dramatic is the Woodstock Institute's study of the relative distribution of
banks and CCOs/CEs in Chicago, which examines specific census tracts. This
study found that the currency exchanges are predominately located in lower
income, minority communities. The currency exchange to bank ratio in five
predominately minority communities with median household incomes below
$22,000 exceeded ten to one. The lowest income communities, with median
incomes of $7908 and $12,570, each had twelve check cashers for every one
or two banks.s A separate rent-to-own study suggests another reason to look
carefully at fringe lender locations on a neighborhood basis, for it found that
variations in rent-to-own prices were inversely related to the average income
level of the census tract in which the rent-to-own was located: the poorest paid
the most. 6
Military officials, who are seriously concerned about the impact of fringe
banking credit on servicemen, have noted the importance of location: "These
high visibility, flashy, neon sign adorned buildings line the roadways
231. Some check cashers also provide short-term credit, directly or as conduits for
third parties. See supra Part H.A. Because one of the reasons posited for the use of CCOs/CEs
for noncredit banking services is the absence of bank locations in the neighborhood, these
studies looked at the relative distribution of the CCOs/CEs and bank branches. Generally, the
convenience of the location is not cited as a major factor for choosing CCOs overbanks fornon-
credit services. JOHN P. CASKEY, BEYOND CASH-AND-CARRY: FINANCIAL SAVINGS, FINANCIAL
SERVICES, AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN Two COMMUNITIES (1997) [hereinafter CASKEY,
CASH-AND-CARRY], but other more intangible reasons sometimes cited may relate to location.
If people (with and without bank accounts) feel "more comfortable" with CCOs, id. at 31, this
could relate to the CCO making itself more of a familiar face in the neighborhood. If 23% of
people without checking accounts "don't like dealing with banks" (rising from 15% between
1992 and 1995), Kennickell, Family Finances, supra note 10, at 7, this could relate inpart to the
way different kinds of providers try to integrate into the fabric of a neighborhood.
232. Jean-Paul & Nathan, supra note 29, at 5. The check cashing industry says that
the CCO customerbase is "somewhat different" from thepayday loan customerbase. Lieberman
Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 2. But as CCOs offer payday loan services either
directly or indirectly, their location may be increasingly important in looking at both the check
cashing sector and the cash loan sector.
233. Jean-Paul & Nathan, supra note 29, at 5.
234. Id. at 8. The study also found that those areas where not necessarily
"underbanked" in terms of physical access to depository institutions. Id. As to the type of credit
offered by AFS credit providers, of course, banks and the fringe bankers are not in competition.
235. WOODSTOCK INST., CURRENCY EXCHANGES, supra note 29, at 3.
236. Michael Walden, The Economics of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 24 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 326, 336 (1990).
41
Drysdale and Keest: The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fring
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
surrounding the military bases, obviously targeting the serviceman." 7
Testimony of the Illinois Consumer Justice Council before the Illinois State
Senate Financial Institutions Committee cites a.corporate payday lender's press
release: "'We target stores in working-class neighborhoods. All things being
equal, the higher the concentration of our target demographic in the
neighborhood, the more productive the store location will be."'"8 The
testimony also included ads specifically targeted at social security recipients. 9
Turning from the character of the neighborhoods to the characteristics of
payday and title loan borrowers, one finds more disagreement with the picture
given by the payday loan industry. Though some military personnel are
officially considered "neither as 'poor' nor as 'non-poor' for census
purposes,2' it is clear that many have little expendable income.24' For example,
a sailor, third-class rank, with a spouse and one child, has a surplus of $135 a
month afternormal bills to meet unexpected expenses. 2 The 60Minutes story
on auto title loans includes a caution from military critics of the industry who
have testified in legislative hearings that so many young sailors are worried
about their cars being repossessed that it has adversely affected military
readiness.243 The Illinois DFI also noted ads targeting college students and
young high school graduates, referencing studies indicating low levels of
financial literacy among students. The DFI also found that "[p]eople living on
fixed incomes are also targeted due to their inability to keep pace in a world of
rising costs. '
The military customers demonstrate the power of generated demand: 25
active duty military personnel can receive interest-free emergency loans to
meet financial needs,' yet they still turn to fast cash providers in enough
numbers to worry military leaders about the fringe lending industry's impact
on national defense. While a base commander recognizes that education is part
of the problem, the "powerful marketing campaigns these companies have
237. Lieberman Forum (Andersen testimony), supra note 59, at 1.
238. Edelman testimony, supra note 43, at 3 (quoting a press release from Sonoma
Holding Corporation on Business Wire, issued Feb. 3, 1998).
239. Id. at4.
240. Military personnel inbarracks are not counted forpurposes ofpoverty statistics.
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty 1998, supra note 222
241. See, e.g., Michael Singletary, Our Defenders Have Earned a Better Life, WASH.
POST, April 18, 1999, at H01.
242. Lieberman forum (Anderson testimony), supra note 59, at 2.
243. 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 8.
244. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 27.
245. As said in FIELD OF DREAMS (MCA/Universal 1989), "If you build it, they will
come."
246. For example, Army Emergency Relief (AER) provides active-duty servicemen
with emergency loans for (1) food, rent, or utilities, (2) emergency vehicle repair, (3) funeral
expenses, (4) medical expenses or (5) personal needs when pay is delayed or stolen. See Army
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which make them sound 'too good to be true"' is also a big contributor. 7
Whether there is targeting or not, either through location or advertising, the
actual customer profile drawn by the payday loan industry's trade association
does not match the profile found in the Illinois DFI survey. The average salary
in Illinois is $25,131 for payday loan customers and $19,808 for title loan
customers.24 This puts the payday customer at 60% of Illinois' median income
of $42,065 and the title loan borrower at less than half (47%) of median
income.249 Given the concentration of the state's industry in Cook County,
presumably the majority ofIllinois' fringe-loan customers are also there, where
the payday borrower would be at 66% of the county's median income, and the
title loan borrower at 52%.25 People on fixed incomes also comprise part of the
payday demographic, at least in California, supporting the Illinois DFI's
finding on targeting that group?2' The results of a Consumers Union analysis
of occupational data for payday loan customers was consistent with the Illinois
findings both as to income and as to the apparent targeting of people on fixed
incomes. 2 Of the 83% of the payday loan customers in the paid work force in
the population reviewed, Consumers Union found an average annual income
of $25,417. 3 Two of the top five categories of occupations listed on the self-
reported data reviewed were fixed income:
247. Letter from Rear Admiral K.C. Belisle to Mayor John Delaney (Nov. 3, 1998)
(on file with authors).
248. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 26.
249. U.S. Census Bureau, Income 1998 (last modified Sept. 30, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income98/in98med.html> (reporting that the Illinois
median income of $42,065 is the three year average, 1996 to 1998). Low to moderate income is
generally considered to be 80% of median income. Hogarth & O'Donnell, supra note 217, at
460. The second highest concentration of title lenders in Illinois (five) is in St. Clair County,
home to East St. Louis. DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. That county's median income is more
than $9500 below the state median income.
250. U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, model-based
estimates for Cook County in 1995 (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/saipe/estimate/cty/cty 17031 .htm> (estimating median income at
$37,824). The Illinois DFI Report used average income. An evaluation of the data released as
this article was going to press placed the median income payday loan borrower at only 40% of
the 1998 median family income for the Chicago-metro area. WOODSTOCKINSTITUTE, CURRENCY
EXCHANGES, supra note 29, at 6.
251. Data analyzed by Consumers Union, San Francisco, Calif., (Nov. 1999) (on file
with authors). When abill relating to payday lending was introduced in the California legislature,
S.B. 834, payday lenders gave their patrons form letters to send to the legislators. The forms
included a space for the patrons to list their occupations. Consumers Union divided these letters
into geographic regions of California, selected 1741 random letters from within those regions,
and used Bureau of Labor statistics to derive income data. The largest category of occupations
represented (28.37%) was administrative support, including clerks. Though the "professional,
technical and related"category, with mean weekly earnings of $831, comprised 12.4% of the
sample, 60.1% of those in the pool were in occupations with mean earnings of less than $500 per
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1 - retired (6%),
2 - sales/retail (6%),
3 - disability/SSI (5%),
4 - clerks (5%), and
5 - managers/supervisors (5%)."4
The survey of customers of Oklahoma's version of the payday loan industry
found the following demographic data:
Education: 73/o-12 years or less





Additional income in the form of "Social Security, Social Security Disability,
welfare, Aid to Dependent Children, Oklahoma National Guard, and for
students, grants and scholarships" was reported by 18% of the survey
respondents. 6
Though these loans are in theory "tide over" advances designed to take the
customer to the next payday, these income levels point out a fundamental
fallacy in that characterization. A budget analysis helps explain how and why
these short-term loans so often lead to the debt treadmill. 7 Senator
Lieberman's staff prepared an "Ability to Repay" budget analysis based on
both the $25,000 and $35,000 average income levels." Subtracting only
"essential" expenditures from the net two-week paycheck-food, housing,
utilities, transportation, and healthcare-left a $28 deficit at the $25,000
income level, and a $134 surplus at the $35,000.'-' Factoring in the average
payday loan debt (with full pay off, not a renewal fee) due at the end of the pay
period, there was a $196 deficit at the $25,000 and a $34 deficit at the $35,000
level. a Doing the same for the maximum allowable payday loans, the bottom
line deficits would be $407 and $396, respectively.26' This analysis
demonstrates how the short time frames on these loans leave no time to
254. Id.
255. Wheat, supra note 110, at 454-55. See supra note 110 for an explanation of
Oklahoma's "quasi-payday" lenders.
256. Id. at 455.
257. See supra Part lI.B.3.
258. Forum on Short-Term High-Interest Paycheck Advances, convened by Sen.
Joseph Lieberman, ranking minority member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs






South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss3/5
2000 THE TWo-TIERED FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKETPLACE 633
accumulate any surplus from which to repay a debt, which in turn leads to the
insidious downward spiral of renewals.2 6
The Illinois DFI study found that title loan borrowers were equally divided
between men and women, but that 60% of the payday loan borrowers were
women, and both types of borrowers were on average in their mid-thirties.263
Amongpayday loan customers, 75% were renters, 15% homeowners, and 10%
"other."2" For title loan borrowers, 80% were renters, 10% homeowners, and
10% "other. ' 26 As noted earlier, these customers are not one-time users, but
rather renewing customers. In Indiana, for example, the customers average
about 4.5 to 5 months.2" A report of an informal survey indicates the average
payday loan customer is a twenty-eight-year-old white female with an annual
income of $14,500 to $20,000, employed in a service industry.
The Illinois DFI study collected no data on household size, nor did it
examine the racial composition of the payday loan borrower.267 Without the
information on the former, it is impossible to determine where the average
payday loan borrower falls on the poverty scale.26' However, the age and
gender findings of the Illinois DFI study and the informal survey cited raise the
question of whether single mothers are turning to payday lenders to meet
262. See supra Part II.B.3; Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at
3; Lieberman Forum (Gallagly testimony), supra note 59, at 1; Lieberman Forum (Andersen
testimony), supra note 59, at 2.
263. DFIREPORT, supra note 33, at 26.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at exhibits B, C. (revealing
that the average term was two weeks and the average number of renewals was ten).
267. Current law forbids taking racial data on borrowers in nomnortgage credit. Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (1999). The theory was that if the lender
did not know the race of the borrower, the lender could not discriminate on the basis of race. At
the time, the primary concern was that credit would be improperly denied as a result of
discrimination. But wherever there is in-person contact between a borrower and lender or
lender's agent, race generally will be known. Given the increasing concern in the past decade
about "reverse redlining," or discriminatory pricing of credit that is granted, there is currently
a proposed amendment to allow the gathering of race information to make it possible to monitor
any discriminatory pricing. 64 Fed. Reg. 44,596 (1999).
Redlining refers to the old practice of insurance companies and banks of literally
drawing a red line around certain neighborhoods in which they would not do business. In recent
years, there has been increasing focus on a kind of market pathology in which, in the absence
of lending from mainstream lenders in some neighborhoods, "predatory" lenders move into the
vacuum with very high-priced credit-which to some degree may be the result of discriminatory
pricing, rather than the "risk pricing" that is used to justify it. See generally DANIEL
IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE
MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1999);
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION §§ 4.2.10-11 (2d. ed. 1998).
268. For example, the average title loan borrower in Illinois makes $19,808. DFI
REPORT, supra note 33, at 26. This income would be at the approximate poverty level if for a
five-person household, but at 143% ofpoverty level if from a three-person household. 1999 HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,428 (1999).
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financial needs.269 And the specter of "reverse redlining"--high-priced
financial services providing most credit and banking services in minority
communities-raises much deeper policy concerns.27
Refund anticipation loans (RALs) have a marketing and distribution
system significantly different from the other fringe market products. Obviously
RALs are a once-a-year opportunity, and they are not directly available from
the lenders. Instead, tax preparers typically market the RALs.2 ' Given that a
major concern about fringe market lending is the debt treadmill, not the one-
shot usage, it would seem at first blush that the one-shot RAL would engender
less concern. However, the fact that the high-priced RAL can substantially
reduce the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) offsets complacency about the
natural annual limitation.272
The recent RAL practice of including a boilerplate right to set off the
refund against debts owed to other lenders is also troublesome because the
consumer can lose her entire refund without having the right to a court hearing
to present any defenses. Thus this practice amounts to a private prejudgment
garnishment without an opportunity for notice and hearing.
23
A Georgia study identified users of refund anticipation loans as primarily
"low-income, nonwhite and female."'274 The authors of the study point out that
"[i]ncome is of special note; over half of the sample was in the lowest quintile
of income distribution." Median income for the sample was below the poverty
line for a family of three."' s The authors believed that "[t]he most striking
269. Seesupranotes 263-65 and accompanying text; note 251 and accompanying text
(showing that two of the top five occupational categories among California payday loan
borrowers in one review were sales/retail and clerks).
270. See, e.g., IMMERGLUCK &WILEs, supra note 267.
271. See supra Part 11.5, at 63-66 (regarding the tax preparers' incentives to sell the
RALs).
272. See I.R.C. § 32 (1994). The EITC is a tax program to benefit the working poor.
If the credit exceeds the tax obligation, the excess is added to the taxpayers refund. The EITC
is one of the antipoverty programs that has generally enjoyed bipartisan support.
273. See supra Part 11.5.
274. JoanKoonceLewis et al., RefundAnticipation Loans and the ConsumerInterest:
A Preliminary Investigation, 42 CONSUMER INTERESTS ANN. 167, 168 (1996) [hereinafter RAL
Investigation]. (The authors caution that this was a nonrandom, small-sample survey.) In a case
currently pending in Colorado, the state sued a "tax-refund buyer" that the state alleges to be
engaging in lending. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 12, n.28, State v.
The CashNow Store, Inc. (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (No. 98 CV 6898). The state argues, inpart, that
the company's marketing targets people "strapped for cash." See Amicus Brief at 12, note 28,
Colorado v. Cash Now, see also Jason DeParle, On a Once Forlorn Avenue, Tax Preparers Now
Flourish, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1, 20 (noting the influx of the business to serve first-
time filers as part of its "life after welfare" series and discussing the availability of RALs,
reporting that "[d]esparate to pay the rent, clients occasionally surrendered nearly $200 in
interest and preparation fees on a $500 refund"); Beth Kobliner, Tax Giant's Loan Deals Stir
Dispute, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at § 3, at 9 (quoting a spokesman for the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities who noted that RALs are "attractive to lower-income folks ... [who] are
certainly less likely to afford the high interest rates").
275. RAL Investigation, supra note 274, at 168.
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finding from the study concerned consumer misinformation. 7 Nearly half the
sample did not realize that 'quick' refunds were actually loans, although all
applicants presumably had to complete truth-in-lending forms.""7 7 If this kind
of correlation between RAL usage and low income levels is representative, a
relatively high portion of RAL users may also be eligible for the EITC: over
half of those in the Georgia survey were eligible. 8 The study further notes that
The insidious nature of RALs was emphasized by a financial
counselor who works with public housing tenants. She noted
that the annual federal income tax refund was the only chance
many low-income families had to accumulate cash. This is
especially significant for families receiving the Earned
Income Credit (EIC). With a refund, the family simply gets
its own money back, but the EIC represents a net gain. The
RAL fee erodes any benefit the family may gain from the
EIC.
279
An ethnographic study of the financial practices of low-income households
reinforces concerns over diverting big chunks of the tax refund and EITC to
triple-digit (or quadruple-digit, as the case may be) APR loan fees.28 The study
found that the reliance on the EITC to stabilize these families' finances was
"striking."281
As with the payday loan customer, there are competing profiles of the rent-
to-own (RTO) customer. The RTO trade association's website provides this






However, a 1994 study of Rent-A-Center's customers shows a different
profile. At the time, Rent-A-Center held 25% of the RTO market share in the
276. Id.
277. Id. at 169 (citation omitted). The authors of the study may have been generous
in their assumption about whether the lenders gave TILA disclosures.
278. Id. The survey found that EIC recipients were more aware that the RAL was a
loan than non-EIC recipients.
279. Id. at 168 (citation omitted).
280. CASKEY, CASH-AND-CARRY, supra note 231, at 21.
281. Id.
282. Association ofProgressive Rental Organizations (APRO), WhatIsRent-to-Own?
(statistics of 1999) (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http:l/www.apro-rto-com/content/whatisrto.asp>.
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United States. Following an unflattering expose' in the Wall Street Journal,283
Rent-A-Center retained former Senator Warren Rudman, who commissioned
a survey of Rent-A-Center's customers.2 The survey found income figures for
Rent-A-Center's customers "well below median household income for the US
population" and concluded that demographically "[t]his sample might best be
described as representative of the working poor, whose incomes are on the
margin of economic stability.""5
Existing data about the fringe banking cash credit market can be
interpreted in different lights. While a marketing professor interprets long-term
relationships with high-rate lenders as a sign of "customer satisfaction," others
may view it as evidence of customers becoming captive to the debt treadmill.28
Industry spokespersons point to an absence of complaints to regulators as a sign
that there is no need for further regulation.2"7 But those who have worked with
low and moderate income clients believe the absence of complaints is
misleading.28 Myriad complex reasons may inspire customers not to take
affirmative action. First, complaining to regulators-particularly financial
services regulators-is a relatively rare response by consumers generally, and
an extremely rare response among low and moderate income consumers. A far
more common reaction is simple resignation.289 Second, in states in which the
high rates are legal, customer calls indicating dissatisfaction with fringe
lenders may not even be recorded as complaints or may be deemed
"unfounded"because ofpermissive legislation. Therefore, debt counselors, the
bankruptcy system, and small claims filings are more appropriate sources to
look to for signs of problems. Large numbers of default judgments against
283. Freedman, supra note 142.
284. Carl C. Hoffnann & Robert L. Lovler, Rent-A-Center: Final Report, at 14, 15
(February 9, 1994).
285. Id. Additional demographics from the sample were noted: 67% have a high
school education or less, and 44% have a high school diploma; the sample contained
"substantially more minorities than are present in our general population. Thirty-one percent
(31%) of our sample was receiving some form of public assistance .... Finally, 25% of our
sample reported that they were currently unemployed." Id. at 15.
286. See supra Part II.B.3.
287. See, e.g., Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 18.
288. The silence is comparable to that noted in the first wave of fringe banking, and
no doubt attributable to the same factors. See supra Part III.A.
289. The authors' combined experience of over forty years working with low- and
moderate-income consumers suggests that this is the case. Cf. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A
Investment Co., 985 S.W.2d 299,303 (Ark. 1999) (finding the attorney general had standing to
challenge title lender's usurious, unconscionable, and deceptive practices and noting that the
state could invoke its UDAP statute to make the law's provisions "effective for consumers who
are not likely to have the financial means to obtain legal assistance to bring individual actions,
who are unlikely to be aware oftheirlegal rights, and who have no choice but to continue paying
illegal rates"); DFI REPORT, supra note 33, at 32 (stating that complaints may be low because
customers are unaware of the Department's regulatory responsibilities, unaware of the process
for complaining, or may "lack the proper understanding of the consumer lending laws and [do]
not realize that violations have occurred").
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payday loan borrowers (particularly judgments enlarged with collection fees
and treble bad check damages) are probably more realistic sources for
information about the depth and breadth of problems.
V. LITIGATION CHALLENGING FRINGE CREDIT PRODUCTS
As previously noted, fringe credit products were generally designed with
the goal of enabling providers to argue that credit laws do not apply to them.
Not surprisingly, this approach has generated both private litigation and public
enforcement efforts. The weight of authority involving the cash-loan sector
rejects the industry's efforts to recharacterize these credit products as
something else.29 In contrast, the weight of judicial authority has favored the
rent-to-own industry's efforts at recharacterization.29'
It is a long-standing judicial principle that substance, not form, dictates
whether a transaction is a loan subject to usury laws.' Courts follow this
principle in an attempt to prevent "the betrayal ofjustice by the cloak of words,
the contrivances of form, or the paper tigers of the crafty."'293 As a Kentucky
district court stated:
The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers
290. See infra Part V.
291. In part, the difference might be an unconscious legacy both of earlier attitudes
and earlier laws. Installment sales were viewed more positively than cash loans, as they more
clearly relate to asset acquisition, and generally are thought to be more discretionary. However,
the perception of what "discretionary" may vary: how discretionary are a washer and dryer in
a household with kids in a neighborhood with no laundromat. See generally CALDER, supra note
179, at 156 (discussing how merchants making installment sales were proud instigators of this
"mass consumption society"). And, as noted above, installment sales were previously treated as
creatures apart under usury statutes. See supra Part III.A.
Courts in Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, have found RTO transactions to be
credit sales under their respective statutes. See Fogie v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 654
(8th Cir. 1996); Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Minn. 1994); Green v.
Continental Rentals, 678 A.2d 759,761-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994); LeBakkenRent-to-
Ownv. Wamell, 589 N.W.2d 425,430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); Rent-A-Centerv. Hall, 510 N.W.2d
789, 792-93 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). But cf. Ortiz v. Rental Management, Inc., 65 F.3d 335, 341
(3rd Cir. 1995) (declining to follow Green regarding the applicability of TILA). Additionally,
the Vermont Attorney General promulgated regulations under its state UDAP statute requiring
disclosure of the effective APR, Vt. Rule CF § 115, a rule which survived an industry challenge.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Moore, 93 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Mich. 1958) (stating "a court
must look squarely at the real nature of the transaction"); Floyer v. Edwards, 98 Eng. Rep. 995,
997 (K.B. 1774) ("[W]here the real truth is a loan of money, the wit of a man cannot find a shift
to take it out of the statute."); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 88 (1999) (stating that usury
is not necessarily what the parties represent); 47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury § 100(c) (1982)
(explaining that courts will look to circumstances of whole transactions); see also Adams v.
Plaza Finance Co., Inc., 168 F.3d 932,936-37 (7thCir. 1999); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148
F.3d 427,436-37 (5th Cir.1998) (both cases stating that substance, not form, dictates whether
purported "non-filing" insurance is a hidden finance charge under TILA).
293. Wilcox, 93 N.W.2d at 291.
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to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise
whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary relief
from financial embarrassment, as would naturally be
expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to evade
the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the courts have
been compelled to look beyond the form of a transaction to its
substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible rule that
the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance which
must be considered. No case is to be judged by what the
parties appear to be or represent themselves to be doing, but
by the transaction as disclosed by the whole evidence; and, if
from that it is in substance a receiving or contracting for the
receiving of usurious interest for a loan or forbearance of
money the parties are subject to the statutory consequences,
no matter what device they may have employed to conceal
the true character of their dealings.294
Moreover, most consumer protection statutes invoked in challenges to
fringe lenders must be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes,2 95
among which is the protection of less sophisticated borrowers from more
sophisticated lenders. 6 Underpinning these principles is the recognition that
294. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997), quoting Hurt v.
Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1056-57 (Ky. 1926).
295. See, e.g., Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e
liberally construe its [TILA's] language in favor of the consumer."); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 5-1-102(1) (1999) (providing that the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code "shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies"); Mourning V.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363-65 (1973) (noting the "divergent and at times
fraudulent practices by which consumers were informed of the cost of their credit" as the reason
for TILA, and giving the FRB discretion to address the "myriad forms" of credit extant and
which would be devised in the future); Yazzie v. Ray Vicker's Special Cars, 12 F.Supp. 3d 1230,
1233 (D.N.M. 1998) (explaining the New Mexico Pawnbrokers Act's protection of customers
from "exploitation, abuseor [their] own improvidence"); Brownv. Courtesy Consumer Discount
Co., 134 B.R. 134, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (laws must be interpreted with flexibility
necessary to preserve their spirit due to the "fertility of the minds of those who would devise
schemes to circumvent remedial consumer protection laws"); Valley Acceptance Corp. v.
Glasby, 337 S.E.2d 291,295 (Va. 1985) (maintaining that the Virginia Small Loan Act, because
"remedial in nature," should be "liberally construed").
There is a tension in courts' treatment of usury laws as either remedial consumer
protection laws to be read broadly, or as "penal" statutes to be construed strictly. The latter
approach, to some extent, is based upon a misreading of the history of usury laws and the aspects
of such laws that are in "derogation of common law." The common law was that taking interest
was not permitted at all, so the portion of usury statutes that are in derogation of common law
is the part thatpermits interest, not the part that restricts interest. A discussion of relevant case
law and these colliding principles is found in COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at §9.3.1.1.
296. See Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286, 1293 (Colo. 1996) (discussing the UCCC
limitations); see also Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699,705 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that TILA was designed to protect borrowers who are at an inherent disadvantage
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the central premise of standard contract doctrine-that enforceable contracts
are mutual, freely negotiated agreements between parties on a level playing
field of understanding-do not reflect reality in the complex consumer credit
marketplace.
Following these principles, most courts and regulators find the payday and
title lenders subject to credit regulation except where specific authorizing
legislation has been enacted.
4. Title Loans
Litigation over title pawns has been concentrated in the South, where the
industry seems to have first taken hold. In the absence of specific legislation (or
in Georgia's case, even in the presence of it for a while), efforts to invoke
pawnbroker exceptions to usury ceilings and licensing laws have not been
successful for title lenders.297 The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the state's
challenge to auto-title lending based on the unconscionability doctrine. The
court also upheld the state's usury and UDAP claims.298 Likewise, an Alabama
federal court concluded in January 1991 that a title pawn/leaseback
arrangement was an extension of credit under both TILA and state law.299 On
the pendent state claim under Alabama's Small Loan Act the court held that
the pawnbroker exception to the Act did not apply: a true pawn requires that
physical possession of the pawned item be taken; thus a transaction in which
in credit transactions); Equity Plus Consumer Fin. & Mortgage Co., Ltd. v. Howes, 861 P.2d214,
216 (N.M. 1993) (stating that TILA is designed to protect borrowers who are not on an equal
footing with creditors, either in bargaining power or with respect to knowledge of credit terms).
297. See, e.g., Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 860,864 (S.D.
Ala. 1991) (finding that the "practice of leasing the automobile back to the client is contrary to
the traditional practice of pawnbroking"); Lynn v. Financial Solutions Corp. (In re Lynn), 173
B.R. 894, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that a title loan was not a "pawn transaction"
because the broker did not obtain possession of the car); State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co.,
985 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Ark. 1999) (holding that the title lender violated the state usury
prohibition, the state Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the common law rules against
unconscionability); State ex rel. McGraw v. Pawn Am., 518 S.E.2d 859, 862 (W. Va. 1998)
(holding that a title pawn was a not true pawn and thus was not entitled to a pawnbroker
exception to the state consumer credit act); Neb. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 98027, 1998 WL 344508,
at *1 (June 19, 1998) ("[W]e believe that a pawnbroker is required to have actual posession of
the automobile in order for the lending arrangement to constitute a pawnbroking transaction
under Nebraska law."); Quick Cash v. Department of Ag., 605 So. 2d 898,902-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (finding that unusual automobile loan/lease agreement was not exempt from usury
laws and remanding to permit agency to proceed against pawnshop). But see Nev. Op. Att'y.
Gen. No. 95-20 (Nov. 17,1995), Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 95,348, at 95,348 (finding that
title pawns are pawnbroking transactions and thus one who makes them is "exempt from
licensing as an installment lender).
298. State ex rel Bryant v. R & A Investment Co., Inc, 985 S.W.2d 299,302-03 (Ark.
1999).
299. Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, 754 F. Supp. 860, 864 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
300. ALA. CODE §§ 5-18-1 to -24 (1996).
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possession of only the title is taken does not qualify.30' The Alabama legislature
subsequently enacted the Alabama Pawnshop Act, 2 which became effective
in May 1992.303 Regulators in Alabama believed that title pawns still did not
qualify for the pawnbroker exception under the new Act, leading a title lender
to sue the Banking Department for a declaratory ruling.3°4 In a five-to-two
decision that the majority admitted was a close question, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that an auto-title pawn fell within the 1992 pawnbroker statute. °S
Even when the issue of whether a title loan is a legitimate "pawn" is not in
question, some courts have found charges to violate state law. For example, in
1992 the Georgia title loan industry obtained legislative approval to place title
pawns within the state pawnbroker statute,3" but a subsequent federal court
decision held that the state's 60% criminal usury statute37 applied to pawn
transactions.3° Moreover, charges allowable under pawnbroker statutes may
themselves include a limit, including a reasonableness standard, that an auto
pawn or auto-title pawn may violate.30 9
The applicability of the Truth in Lending Act to these transactions is, of
course, not altered by changes in state pawnbroker laws. Pawn transactions are
generally held subject to TILA credit disclosures, as both case law310 and a
1996 clarifying amendment to the Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z
301. Pendleton, 754 F. Supp. at 864.
302. ALA. CODE §§ 5-19A-I to -20 (1996).
303. 1992 Ala. Acts 92-597. A bankruptcy court in Alabama noted that "growth of
the title pawn industry was a precipitating factor for passage of Alabama's new pawnshop act."
Mattheiss v. Title Loan Express (In Re Mattheiss) 214 B.R. 20,29 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997).
304. Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576, 577 (Ala. 1993).
305. Id. at 579.
306. Act No. 1426, 1992 Ga. Laws 3245 (codified as amended in part at GA. CODE
ANN. § 44-12-130(5) (Supp. 1999)).
307. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-18 (1997).
308. Fryer v. Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc., 183 B.R. 322, 326-27 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1995). However, the Georgia Supreme Court recentlyrejected this position overa strong dissent,
holding that the pawnbroker statute alone governed. Glinton v. And R, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 481, 482-
83 (1999).
309. See Yazzie v. Ray Vicker's Special Cars, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1234
(D.N.M. 1998) (finding that when a vehicle was pawned and a storage fee was charged, the
storage fee constituted statutorily limited pawn "service charges," and that the charges in
question exceeded the limit); Fryer, 183 B.R. at 326-27 (finding that the charges at issue were
not "actually incurred" and were thus not classified as "pawnshop charges" under the pawnshop
statute; however, when the service charges were added to the "interest" charged, the total interest
exceeded the criminal usury ceiling); Lynn v. Financial Solutions Corp. (In re Lynn), 173 B.R.
894 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994) (finding that even if the title pawn were a true pawn, the charges
violated the reasonableness limit under the pawnbroker statute); see also Fla. Op. Att'y. Gen. No.
99-38 (June 14,1999), discussed below. See infra notes 319-320 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, 3 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993);
Barlow v. Evans, 992 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jewelry,
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1108, 1112-13 (S.D. Ala. 1997); Dennis v. Handley 453 F. Supp. 833, 836
(N.D. Ala. 1978); cf Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 860, 863-64 (S.D.
Ala. 1991) (holding that a title pawn/leaseback transaction was subject to TILA, and that the
transaction was not a true pawn).
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make clear.3" '
On the back end of an auto pawn or title loan, lenders are beginning to see
some constriction in their ability to use advantages sought by resorting to the
pawn model. Traditional pawns give pawnbrokers the right to sell the collateral
if it is not redeemed without following Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Article 9 procedures."' Even where pawnbroker statutes require return of any
surplus, such requirements are rarely followed.313 However, a bankruptcy court
in Alabama noted that neither the state's 1992 Pawnbroker Act nor the
appellate decisions interpreting it mentioned the UCC."4 In the absence of an
exclusion, the bankruptcy court applied the UCC to the transaction and held
that the title lender had not perfected its security interest.3 15 This ruling may
inspire arguments regarding the applicability of other UCC Article 9
provisions.
In 1995 Florida enacted a specific title lending statute to authorize that
business.3 6 The statute allows a 22%-a-month "fee" (264% APR), but specifies
that "no other charges" are allowed.3 7 The title lending legislation also refers
to "repossession" of the collateral instead of the traditional pawn language
vesting title to the pledged property in the pawnbroker upon default.31 The
Florida Attorney General issued an opinion interpreting the "no other charges"
language as precluding title lenders from imposing repossession charges and
mandating return of the surplus.319 According to the opinion, title lenders
violating that provision can be prosecuted not only for violating the title loan
statute, but also for usury, theft, and racketeering.
32 °
B. Payday Loans32'
The argument originally advancedbypayday lenders-that they are simply
"check cashers," not lenders, and that their fees were not interest but simply
311. Federal Reserve Board Official Staffommentary, § 226.17(c) cmts. 17(c)(1)-18
[1981-1999 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 3363 at 3465-66 -67 (Apr. 1,
1996). The commentary demonstrates how to calculate the finance charges on a pawn. See
generallyNATloNALCONSUMERLAwCTR., TRUTHINLENDING §§ 2.2.4.3.2,3.6.4 (4th ed. 1999).
312. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 539.001(10) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
313. CASKEY, FRiNGE BANKING, supra note 3, at 41.
314. Mattheiss v. Title Loan Express (In re Mattheiss), 214 B.R. 20, 24-25 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1997)
315. Id. at 24-31 (applying UCC to title pawn for purposes of attachment and
perfection). But cf In re Walker, 204 B.R. 812, 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (considering the
postrepossession redemption right in bankruptcy).
316. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-287, § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 538.06 (West
1997)). See infra Part VI (discussing this legislative effort).
317. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 538.06(5)(e)(t) (West 1997).
318. Id. § 538.06(d).
319. Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 99-38 (June 14, 1999).
320. Id.
321. See supra Part II.B.4 (examining cases involving collection abuses).
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check cashing charges-has not met with universal success. The first
appearance of these transactions in the modem era of fringe lending seems to
have been in Kansas City. Soon after their arrival, state regulators sought to
shut the operators down for illegal lending." Law enforcement authorities in
Virginia and West Virginia also took action against payday lenders, alleging
they were making unlicensed and usurious small loans.3" A federal court in
Kentucky had no trouble finding the transactions to be loans subject to both the
Truth in Lending Act and state usury laws.3" Subsequently, the Kentucky
Supreme Court agreed.32 Trying to collect a usurious debt at twice the
enforceable rate is a predicate act under RICO, which led one court to grant
summary judgment on a treble damages RICO claim against payday lenders
operating in Kentucky.
3 26
Indiana's Attorney General has issued an opinion that payday loans violate
state usury law and the criminal loansharking law.327 Indiana payday lenders
had been operating under the assumption that a provision of the Indiana
Consumer Credit Code authorizing a $33 finance charge sanctioned their rates,
but the Attorney General's opinion harmonized that provision with Indiana's
36% rate ceiling rather than viewing it as an exception. Payday loans that
charge rates more than twice that amount may implicate the loansharking
statute as well.328 In Illinois, a deregulated state, a class has been certified in a
case that alleges both TILA and unconscionability claims.329 The defendant had
argued that the unconscionability claim defeated the requirements of
322. See Stephens, supra note 84, at IA. The Missouri legislature subsequently
enacted a payday loan act in 1990. See Mo. REv. ANN. STAT. § 408.500 (West Supp. 2000).
323. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bar D Fin. Servs., 1994 WL 1031102 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 21, 1994).
324. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953,955-58 (E.D. Ky. 1997); cf. In re Brigance,
219 B.R. 486,492-93 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998) (involving loans made prior to enactment date
of Tennessee payday loan act; the court held that the check loan cannot simultaneously be
secured by the check as collateral, so the loans were unsecured; one debtor had paid $1,026 in
interest on a $600 advance), aft'd, 234 B.R. 401 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
325. White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Ky. 1999). Violation of
these provisions conceivably could trigger the statutory remedy of forfeiture of interest. See KY.
REv. STAT. AN. § 360.020(1) (Michie 1996).
326. Burden v. York, Civ. No. 98-268 (E.D. Ky, Sept. 29, 1999), applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1994) to payday loans. Butsee State v. Roderick, 704 So. 2d 49,53-55 (Miss. 1997)
(refusing to apply RICO to a payday lender because usury is not a crime under state law, and the
lender's prior contact with the Attorney General's office may have given it grounds to believe
its business was legal).
327. Ind. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-1 (Jan. 19, 2000) (interpreting IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 24-4.5-3-508(2),-508(7) (Michie 1996) (Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code);Id. §§ 35-
45-7-2, -4). The opinion notes that the loansharking statute cannot be avoided by labeling the
charge as something other than interest. The New York Banking Department also has taken the
position that New York's 25% criminal usury ceiling applies to payday loans. Letter from New
York State Banking Dept. to Financial Inst. (June 29, 1999) (on file with authors).
328. Id.
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commonality and typicality, an argument the court rejected:
[T]he plaintiff, and other putative class members, took out
payday loans at astoundingly high interest rates from the
defendants. The defendants have not argued, nor in this
Court's opinion can they argue, that the plaintiffand the other
potential members were sophisticated consumers. Without a
doubt, there is gross disparity in the bargaining positions of
the parties. Likewise, the commercial experience of the
plaintiff dictates that he was not faced with a meaningful
choice when faced with the unreasonable and unfavorable
terms of the promissory note. It is the very nature of "payday
loans" that members of the population with no other means of
securing credit seek out these loans with exorbitant, extreme,
and untenable interest rates in excess of 300%. It is because
the plaintiffand otherputative class members were "forced to
swallow unpalatable terms" . . . that the inference of
unconscionability may be made.33°
As with title pawns and title loans, courts have held payday loans to be
credit transactions requiring TILA disclosures.331 The Federal Reserve Board
has issued an amendment to TILA's Official Staff Commentary that clarifies
that deferred payment checks are loans subject to TILA.332
Litigation has challenged the "new" payday loan dodges such as "cash
back ad," "catalogue," and "gift certificate" sales.333 Regulators in Texas,
Virginia, and Alabama have successfully challenged these dodges,334 and class
330. Id. at *5 (citation omitted) (quoting Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie
v. River Valley, 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992)).
331. Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn.
1999); Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 957 (E.D. Ky 1997).
A series of cases in the Northern District of Illinois challenging the adequacy of the
TILA disclosures is meeting with more mixed success. See, e.g., Smith v. Cash Store
Management, 195 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving security interest disclosure under TILA);
Laws v. Payday Loan Corp. of Ill., No. 98-C5562, 1999 WL 966964 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1999)
(discussing the conspicuousness of finance charges and APR).
332. 65 Fed. Reg. 17129 (2000).
333. See supra Part I.B.2. Older cases deal with such devices, as well. See, e.g.,
Willis v. Buchman, 199 So. 886, 895 (Ala. Ct. App. 1940), rev'don other grounds, 199 So. 892
(Ala. 1940) (addressing merchandise coupons as aschemeto evade usury laws). Collateral sales
agreements have also been used as a device to evade credit requirements. See, e.g., Ransom v.
S & S Food Ctr., Inc., 700 F.2d 670, 673-74 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Berryhill v. Rich Plan, 578 F.2d
1092, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1978); Carney v. Worthmore Furniture, 561 F.2d 1100, 1103 (4th Cir.
1977); T.J. Oliver, Annotation, Payments Under (Ostensibly) Independent Contract as Usury,
81 A.L.R.2d 1280, 1283-86 (1962).
334. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Express Checking, No. HD-44-1 (Cir. Ct.,
Richmond, Va., Oct. 20, 1995) (involving the use of gift certificates), cited in Commonwealth
v. Greenburg, No. HE-12-3, 1997 WL 1070573, at *1 (Cir. Ct. Va., Apr. 15, 1997). In the wake
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actions are pending in Texas and Alabama.3
C. Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs)
Between 1982 and 1992, three judicial and regulatory decisions addressed
the question of whether the "assignment" or "sale" of the right to an anticipated
tax refund constituted a disguised loan subject to credit regulation. Two found
such transactions to be loans, while one found them to be sales. The latter
decision was a 1986 Georgia Court of Appeals case, interpreting the Georgia
Industrial Loan Act and Truth in Lending Act, and concluding that such
transactions were not credit under either statute.336 However, an earlier
Kentucky Attorney General's opinion had held that "assigned" tax refunds
were in fact loans subject to the usury law. 37 Similarly, rejecting and
distinguishing Cullen, a South Carolina court upheld a state regulator's
enforcement action against a tax refund "buyer" for violations of the state credit
code in 1992.38 In the intervening years, there has been little litigation about
tax refund "sales" as disguised loans, as the majority of RAL cash advances
have been extended as loans in name as well as substance. However, some
independent small lenders apparently continue to use the tax refund "sale" or
"assignment" format to try to avoid credit laws. The Colorado Attorney
of the Alabama Banking division taking enforcement action, the trade association filed an action
for declaratory judgment in Alabama Check Cashers Ass 'n v. State Banking Dep 't, No. CV-98-
1555 (Mar. 1, 1999) (issuing an order granting consumers the right to intervene). See also Texas
v. Cash Today, No. 99-02673 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 17,1999); Susanne Pagano, Texas Lender Will
Pay $1 Million to Settle Claims by Attorney General, 74 Banking Report (BNA) 76 (January 10,
2000).
335. See, e.g., Memorandum in support of Plaintiff's motion for class certification,
Rodriquez v. Cash Today, Inc., No. C-99-305 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (cash back ads); complaint,
Harris v. Montgomery Catalog Sales, (Cir. Ala. Ct. filed Dec. 29, 1998).
336. Cullen v. Bragg, 350 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. App. 1986). In reaching its decision, the
Cullen court chose to construe the Georgia Industrial Loan Act narrowly against borrowers,
stating that usury statutes are in derogation of common law. As discussed in note 295, supra,
this is a misconception, though a common one. Common law prohibited the charging ofinterest,
see, e.g., Dennis v. Bradbury, 236 F. Supp. 683, 689 (D.Colo. 1964), aff'd, 368 F.2d 905 (10th
Cir. 1966), and those statutes allowing interest, beginning with 37 Hen. VIII, C.9 (1545), are the
ones in derogation of common law. Benjamin S. Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws,
8 LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS. 36,37 n.11 (1941). The Cullen court, though not alone in doing so,
thus applied this statutory construction principle backwards.
In what was perhaps the earliest case involving RALs, Beneficial Corporation was
sued by a man claiming to have conceived of the idea of assigning tax refunds as a form of
"collateral security" for "loans." See Freedman v. Beneficial Corp., 406 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D.
Del. 1975).
337. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 2-260 (1982). For discussion of some of the early cases on
this type of "sale" or "assignment" as a device to evade usury laws, see H.D. Warren,
Annotation, Usury as Predicable upon Transaction in Form a [sic] Sale or Exchange of
Commercial Paper or other Choices in Action, 165 A.L.R 626 (1946).
338. See Income Tax Buyers, Inc. v. Haem, C/A No. 91-CP-403193 (S.C. Ct.
Common Pleas, Jan. 14, 1992).
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General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code
brought an action for a preliminary injunction against a firm casting its cash
advances against anticipated tax refunds in the old style--"purchasing" the
refund for about fifty cents on the dollar. The Colorado Court of Appeals
recently ruled against the state in Colorado v. The Cash Now Store, Inc.,
relying on Cullen and one other non-RAL case.339 Its analysis seems to put the
cart before the horse, concluding first that there was no loan, so that it was "not
necessary to conduct an extended disguised loan analysis."3"
The facts in the Cash Now case highlight the importance of vigorous
enforcement of existing credit regulation in assuring the integrity of the
marketplace and protecting honest competitors, as well as consumers. In
substance, there was no meaningful distinction between the admitted refund
anticipation loans on the market and Cash Now's "assignment" of anticipated
tax refunds. Had the Cash Now customer discussed in the trial record gone to
one of CashNow's competitors instead, she would have paid a $59.95 finance
charge out of her $1099 refund and been entitled to a Truth in Lending
disclosure telling her that the transaction carried an APR of 159%. While that
may not seem like a bargain, her cost from Cash Now was $525 withheld from
the $1099 refund-a whopping (but undisclosed) 3055% APR. 4 This situation
demonstrates why it is imperative that courts look to substance, not form, to
339. Colorado v. The Cash Now Store, Inc., No. 98 CA 2380, 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS
374 (Colo. Ct. App., March 17,2000), motionfor rehearingpending (The authors were counsel
of record on an amicus brief filed in support of Colorado's position in this case).
340. Id. at* 16. The court held that there was no "unconditional obligation to repay,"
and hence there was no need to evaluate the extensive body of law on disguised loans. The
decision seems to take the position that the distinct elements of a "loan or forbearance"--in this
case the element of an "unconditional obligation to repay"---cannot themselves be disguised,
which is contrary to long-standing precedent. "If the express stipulation for the repayment of
the sum advanced be indispensable to the existence of usury, he must be a bungler indeed, who
frames his contract on such terms as to expose himself to the penalties of the law." Scott v.
Lloyd, 34 U.S. 418, 447 (1835).
A motion for rehearing has been filed in Cash Now. Whether Cash Nowbegins a trend
toward reduced scrutiny of disguised loans, or stands in isolation remains to be seen. What is
clear is that it is counter to the trend of other courts which have been fairly vigorous in looking
at form, not substance in the current cash advance segments of the fringe lending market.
Indeed, it is instructive to compare the Colorado Court of Appeals analysis with that of a federal
district court decision issued just three days later in Georgia, finding an "obligation to repay" in
the context of a fringe lender "selling" delayed deposit cashing services, along with gift
certificates for catalog merchandise. That "seller," too, denied that he was in the loan business.
The Georgia court recognized that a loan can be express or implied, and held that agreeing to
defer deposit of a check constitutes forbearance, and hence was a "loan requiring repayment."
Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Prince, CV199-120 (S.D. Ga., order denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgement on the legitimacy'of its "gift certificate sales" was also denied.)
Interestingly, both Cash Now and Cashback Catalog Sales advertised in the yellow pages under
"loans." The Georgia court noted that in its description of the factual background of the case,
while the Colorado court did not mention it.
341. Brief of Amicus at 16-17, Colorado v. The Cash Now Store, Inc., No. 98 CA
2380, 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS 374 (Colo. Ct. App., March 17,2000).
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assure a level playing field in the marketplace for ethical businesses, as well as
the protection of consumers.
The status of transactions like these as credit under the Truth in Lending
Act is determined independently of state law characterizations. In 1990, the
Federal Reserve Board noted in its Official Staff Commentary that RALs are
subject to Truth in Lending; hence the TIL litigation has focused more on how
to make the disclosures than on contesting whether any disclosures must be
made at all.342 Similarly, in the absence of the disguised loan issue in the
majority of RAL lending, the non-TIL litigation in recent years in this segment
of the alternate financial services marketplace has focused more on the
marketing of RALs and allegations that some of the tax preparers who sell
them act improperly. 3
D. Exportation
A significant area of litigation relates to the right of lenders holding certain
kinds of charters to "export" the law of their home state. Because these lenders
choose home states with little or no regulation, if such exportations are
successful they and their local partners may extend credit without regard to the
laws of the borrower's home state. If lenders can make exportation work, there
is no need for them to design products that can evade state usury laws; they can
simply offer their products openly under the banner of federal preemption.
Under the National Bank Act, a national bank is permitted to export the
law of its home state nationwide, preempting any state laws restricting
"interest" (defined very broadly) in the borrower's state.3" The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)34 put
federally insured depositories, including those chartered by states, on a "level
playing field" with national banks. Consequently, state chartered institutions
assert exportation rights along with the national banks.346 The RAL lenders
were the first fringe lenders to successfully use this vehicle to get around state
342. Federal Reserve Board Official StaffCommentary, § 226.17(c)(l)-17,published
in 55 Fed. Reg. 13,103, 13106 (1990). Cullen's precedential value, at least with respect to its
TIL ruling, is dubious, given the subsequent Commentary amendment and the deference that
courts are to give the FRB's interpretation of TILA under Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980). See supra Part ll.B.5 for a discussion of TILA ruies for calculating
the APR on RALs.
343. See supra Part II.B.5.
344. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994); 12 C.F.R. §7.4001 (1999) (Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency regulation defining interest);see Smiley v. Citibank (SouthDakota), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 739 (1996).
345. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 164 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1994)).
346. Unlike the National Bank Act, states were given a right to opt out of DIDMCA,
and Iowa and Puerto Rico did so. While there is no case law on the topic, the opt out presumably
protects citizens in those jurisdictions from exportation by nonnational banks. See generally
COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 3.55; Mansfield, supra note 19.
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usury laws, using tax preparers in the borrowers' states as their local
distribution partners. 7
Some payday lenders have followed, obtaining charters in states with no
payday loan regulation and teaming up with local distribution partners in states
in which their terms would otherwise be illegal."' Banks or other institutions
holding these "privileged" charters reportedly immediately sell these accounts
receivable back to the local partner, taking the accounts off their books.349 An
action pending in California is challenging this "rent-a-bank" payday loan
structure. °
VI. LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGNS SURROUNDING FRINGE CREDIT PRODUCTS
Efforts to evade consumerprotection and credit regulation invite litigation.
Consequently, legislative and regulatory bodies are in the center of the
controversy surrounding fringe lending. Fringe lenders have organized
nationwide legislative and public relations campaigns, as well as support and
advocacy groups, to influence the debate over fringe lending.
A. Rent-to-Own (RTO)
In this regard, the RTO segment is the most mature among the credit
poviders in the fiinge market. The Association of Progressive Rental
Organizations (APRO) is the "national non-profit trade association for the
rental-purchase... (RTO) industry."35 According to APRO literature:
During the past 15 years, APRO has actively worked to help
shape public policy in state legislatures and the U.S.
Congress. To date, 46 state laws have passed with APRO's
support and input. Since its organization by a handful of
company owners in 1980, APRO has become the voice of the
industry before government and the public around the
347. See Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1994); Christiansen
v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 972 F. Supp. 681, 684 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
348. See, e.g., Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 3-4 (noting
that payday lenders can avoid regulation); Fox, supra note 62, at 8-9.
349. Under Utah law, Utah Industrial Loan licensees purport to qualify for the right
to export Utah law under § 521 of DIDMCA. These lenders presumably take the portfolio off
their books immediately in order to remove any "safety and soundness" red flags it might raise
to their examiners, as these exporters are federally insured depository institutions.
350. Josh R. Phanco v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc., No. CV99-128 IDDP (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 5, 1999).
351. APRO-Association of Progressive Rental Organizations, Government Affairs
(visited Mar. 19, 2000) <http://www.apro-rto.com>.
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country.
3 5 2
Most of the state laws were enacted in the late 1980s, and "through mid-
1987 ... state legislative efforts cost between $25,000 and $40,000 each, not
including campaign contributions by individual dealers to legislators running
for office. 353
Minnesota, in many respects, has been ground zero for RTO clashes. Both
judicial and legislative battles have been hard fought. APRO participated as
amicus in Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., a case in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted rent-to-own transactions as credit sales subject to the
Minnesota Consumer Credit Sales Act and state usury laws.3" Following the
loss, the trade association's corporate counsel reported to members that "if the
industry can be successful this year or next in D.C., it may be able to get
Congress to overrule this one aberrant state whose supreme court has refused
to acknowledge the true nature of the rental-purchase transaction."3"5
While the Miller case was proceeding, efforts were ongoing in Congress
to reform the rent-to-own laws nationwide. Congressman Gonzalez and Senator
Metzenbaum introduced legislation which would have applied to RTO
transactions important federal consumer protection laws like the federal Truth
in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.3"6 This result would have been
achieved by treating the RTO transaction as a credit transaction with all of the
attendant protections.37 Also, the bill contained a provision that would have
required the lender to disclose to consumers the "cash price" of an item,
defined as the "bona fide retail price" that an RTO dealer charged someone in
an outright (non-RTO) sale; for dealers who do not make such sales, the "cash
price" was defined as "the average cash price of the item or a similar item in
352. Id. ("At the federal level, APRO led a proactive dealer grassroots campaign that
resulted in an Internal Revenue Service 1995 ruling that defined the RTO transaction as a lease,
not a sale, for tax purposes. This saved rental-purchase dealers an estimated $1 billion in
additional taxes per year.").
353. James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation ofRent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
751, 821 n.304 (1991). Nehf also notes that "[b]usiness interests often prevail in [legislative]
confrontations, in large part because industry trade associations generally have greater financial
resources, better organized political action groups, and more powerful lobbyists." Id. Prior to
joining academia, Nehf was a member of a law firm that represented APRO and a major RTO
company and had been involved in drafting industry bills. See COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22,
at § 7.5.3.2.3.
354. 518 N.W.2d 544, 548, 550 (Minn. 1994).
355. ED WNN I, APRO, REVERSAL IN PENNSYLVANIA, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS 4
(June/July 1996) (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.apro
rto.com/contents/publications/june962.asp>.
356. H.R. 3136, 103d Cong. § 1005 (1993); S. 1566, 103d Cong. §1005 (1993). See
also Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. the Rent-to-Own
Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L. J. 385, 392-93 (1997)
(discussing the proposed legislation).
357. H.R. 3136, 103d Cong. §1003(4); S. 1566, §1003(4).
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the community."9)
358
The RTO industry supported an alternative proposal introduced by
Congressman LaRocco and Senator Shelby.359 The LaRocco/Shelby proposals
differed from the Gonzalez/Metzenbaum bills in that they did not contain a
requirement to disclose the APR.2 It was the industry's position that it should
not be subject to rules binding banks because RTO dealers provide no "banking
services."'36
RTO may be on the agenda in Washington again in the near future. The
Federal Trade Commission is conducting a study of the industry and "the
Clinton-Gore Plan for Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century" anticipates supporting a legislative response.362
B. Payday Lenders
1. National Legislative and Regulatory Efforts
The National Check Cashers Association ("NaCCA"), now renamed the
Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA), is the "professional
organization representing the ever expanding growth industry of check cashing
which provides financial services for America's local communities. '33 The
NaCCA engages in a campaign of public relations and legislative advocacy
through its deferred deposit services.364 A second payday loan trade association
was formed in 1999, the Community Financial Services Association of
America (CFSA).' 65 Additionally, the industry has hired highly influential
people to aid in its political efforts.366 The CFSA has developed a "best
358. H.R. 3136, 103d Cong. §1003(1); S. 1566, §1003(l). See supra Part II.D for a
discussion of the significance of that provision.
359. H.R. 2803, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1956, 103d Cong. (1994).
360. H.R. 2803 (1993); S. 1956 (1994).
361. In distinguishing RTO dealers from the other "predatory" "fringe banking"
resources, APRO corporate counsel Ed Winn argues that RTO dealers "do nothing that banks
do." ED WiNN III, APRO, FRINGE BANKING, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS 3 (June/July 1996) (visited
Apr. 7,2000) <http://www.apro-rto.com/content/publications/june961.asp>.
362. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Clinton-Gore Plan for
Financial Pfrivacy and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Detailed Proposal Summary,
4 (May 4, 1999) (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/retreive-
documents.htmn>.
363. NaCCA: National Check Cashers Ass'n, Inc. (visited April 7, 2000)
<http://www.nacca.org/about.htm>.
364. NaCCA: National Check Cashers Ass'n, Inc. (visited May 8, 2000)
<http://www.nacca.orgdefdep.htm>.
365. Representatives of both groups testified at the recent congressional forum on
payday lending. See Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 29; Lieberman
forum (Webster testimony), supra note 87, at 17.
366. One such influential person is the 1999-2000 President-elect of the American
Bar Association, Martha W. Barnett. See Helen Huntley, Payday Lenders Seek Protection in
Tallahassee, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at 1E.
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practices" code and released a model law in early 2000.367 This proposed
legislation does not address the price issue, however, and authorizes a'
maximum fee of 20% of the loan amount, which "shall not be deemed interest
for any purpose of law.' 36 For a typical two-week loan of $165, that would be
a $33 finance charge, for an APR of 520%. The model law's answer to the debt
treadmill problem is to require a disclosure to consumers stating that payday
loans should be used for short-term, not long-term needs, and that "renewing
a deferred presentment service transaction is not advisable and may cause
financial hardship for the maker."369 The law would allow attorneys' fees and
court costs, authorize criminal cold check penalties if the account was closed
before the due date,37' and limit extensions on a single transaction to three
consecutive renewals, still leaving the "touch-and-go" loophole in place.37' It
would authorize a one-day rescission right, which would seem to preclude the
7300% one-day loans found in Indiana; however, there is no requirement that
the consumer be notified of this right.37
The bill does not clearly address the problem of debts to multiple payday
lenders. It limits aggregate loans to $500, but is ambiguous as to whether the
limit applies to a single lender or to all of a borrower's loans with all payday
lenders.373 In any event, the bill places no underwriting duties on the lender to
use the existing technology to learn of outstanding payday loans elsewhere.374
367. This model law may have been released to provide a counterproposal to the
consumer protection-oriented model bill, discussed below, that was released in 1998 by the
Consumer Federation of America and the National Consumer Law Center.
368. CFSA,DEFERREDPRESENTMENTSERViCESACr§ 113(b) (2000) (ProposedModel
Legislation).
369. Id. § 113(a)(4).
370. Id.§ 113(i)-().
371. Id. § 113(n). This section permits a licensee to make a new agreement after a
transaction is "completed," which occurs "when a check is presented for payment, deposited, or
redeemed by the maker by payment in full in cash to the licensee." Id. Payment in cash that is
immediately re-lent with a new agreement is the "touch-and-go" practice used to circumvent
existing limits on renewals. See supra Part II.B.3.
372. CFSA, DEFERREDPRESENTMENTSERVICESACT§ 113(q) (2000) (proposed model
legislation).
373. Id. § 113 (d).
374. See id. § 113(d),(p) (stating that a lender is simply required to notify the
borrower of the prohibition against having outstanding deferred payment transactions totaling
more than $500 at any one time). Some existing laws prohibit any licensee from having checks
from a borrower that, in the aggregate, exceed the maximum loan amount allowable under the
statute. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.10(1)(b) (West 1999) (prohibiting a lender from
holding from any one maker a check(s) in an aggregate face amount greater than $500). The
model bill has a maximum loan amount of $500, and one could interpret the proposed legislation
as providing the same effect as the Iowa law. CFSA, DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICEs Acr
§ 113(d) (2000) (Proposed Model Legislation). But one could interpret other references in the
proposed legislation as meaning that the $500 limit is per borrower, not per lender. Id. § 113(p).
Applying the $500 limit per borrower would more directly address the problem. Furthermore,
failing to place any underwriting duties on the lender, relying instead on "written
representations," creates the risk of having the restriction become meaningless, as the
representation may simply become boilerplate on the documents. The technology is available
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Finally, the model bill does not provide for a private right of action, which
would limit the enforceability of the law.
While the trade associations have begun to express support for Truth in
Lending disclosures on payday loans, whether this will translate into
meaningful disclosure at the point of contact with consumers is hard to predict.
Those within the.industry think of the cost of payday loans as a "fee," not as
"interest, 3 76 and believe that applying APRs to payday loans is actually
misleading because of the short terms involved.37 7 Even if accurate written
disclosures are given, such paper disclosures may be useless to promote
consumer understanding and comparison shopping if accompanied by on-site
explanations to the customer that the rate" isn't really that high, because you
don't have the loan for a year," or "it's like taking a cab across town instead of
cross-country. '3 7 Furthermore, the ads for these lenders focus only on quick
and easy cash; they generally do not employ any of the "trigger terms" that
would require advertising the APR. 
7 9
Consumer advocates have been active as well. The Consumer Federation
of America (CFA) and the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) released
model federal legislation in 1998 that would provide for minimum loan terms,
maximum fees and charges, enhanced disclosure, and consumer protections in
states that allow payday lending. 8 This legislation would also require a check
to be branded as a deferred deposit loan check subject to claims and
to tell a lender almost instantly whether other payday loans are outstanding. See DFI REPORT,
supra note 33, at 28. The report notes that not all lenders subscribe-some wanting to avoid the
cost, and others "so as not to lose the added volume." Id. at 28. It is certainly not a radical
concept for lenders to undertake some underwriting steps, including checking for excessive
indebtednes.
375. Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 33; Lieberman Forum
(Webster testimony), supra note 87, at 17; see also CFSA DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICES
ACT § 113(f) (2000) (proposed model legislation) (proposing the required disclosure of the total
amount of fees charged, expressed as both dollar amount and as an annual percentage rate).
376. See Lieberman Forum (Pettijohn testimony), supra note 30, at 2 (addressing this
"wordplay" as clouding the definition of a loan).
377. See supra Part II.B.2.
378. See Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 15 ("One could
flag a taxi in New York City and ask what the cab fare would be for a ride to San Francisco.
There is a theoretical fare, but it would never be paid because no consumer would be stupid
enough to use this short distance service for a long distance trip.") This, of course, was the point
of enacting a standard price system. See supra Part II.B.2. This problem of undermining the
validity of the APR as a standardized and fully-loaded price tag is not limited to payday lenders.
One of the authors was told that the APR on a car loan was "not really the rate. It's just
something the government makes us put down." The "real" rate he then quoted was totally
fictitious, and was half of the APR.
379. Only if the ad states a rate of charge does TILA require that the rate be stated as
an APR. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.16 (1999).
380. MODEL DEFERRED DEPOSIT LOAN AT (1998) (CFA & NCLC, Proposed
Legislation). A copy of the model act may be obtained from Consumer Federation of America,
1424 16th St., N.W., Suite 604, Washington, D.C. 20036 or from the National Consumer Law
Center, 18 Tremont Street, Suite 400, Boston, MA 02108.
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defenses.38 Such branding should prevent small claims courts or prosecutors
from treating defaulted payday loans under bad check laws,382 as would the
model act's requirement of a posted notice saying that the criminal process
cannot be used to collect the debt. 83 The act would also permit no-cost
extensions for thirty days, but inserts a thirty-day interregnum to assure that the
"new loan" device is not used to evade the renewal limits.'" The legislation
clearly caps the maximum payday loan amount per borrower, rather than per
lender, and requires the lender to ask affirmatively about other outstanding
loans. 85 The model act also closes the exportation loophole by making all
provisions except licensing applicable to depository institutions making payday
loans, and the act also authorizes private remedies to facilitate enforcement.386
Consumer advocates hoped that the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) would be responsive to consumer advocates' concerns that
national banks were avoiding compliance with the Community Reinvestment
Act by exporting payday loan interest rates through subsidiaries or partners. A
coalition of consumer groups jointly challenged the Comptroller's
"satisfactory" Community Reinvestment Act rating of Eagle National Bank,
which engages in a $31 million exportation payday loan business. However,
the OCC's response indicates that it views any responsibility to stop
exportation to be in Congress's hands. 87
President Clinton also addressed the issue of payday lending in announcing
The Clinton-Gore Plan for Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection in the
21st Century."8 This agenda, in combination with Senator Lieberman's
December 1999 forum, the controversy over the use of bank charters to
circumvent state laws, and the military's concern over fringe lending, may set
the stage to move the legislative debate from the states to Congress during the
381. Id. § 6(g).
382. Another possible remedy is to prohibit the use of checks entirely and requiring
written contracts would also address such a problem. Lenders would be permitted to sue only on
the note, not under bad check laws. Lieberman Forum (Tarpey testimony), supra note 59, at 6.
383. CFA &NCLC, MODELDEFERREDDEPOSITLOANACT § 7(c)(1) (1998) (Proposed
Legislation). See supra Part ll.B.4.
384. CFA & NCLC, MODEL DEFERRED DEPOSIT LOAN AcT § 9(1) (1998) (Proposed
Legislation).
385. Id. § 9(k).
386. Id. § 2(c), 10. In 1999 Congressman Bobby Rush introduced House Bill number
1684, which also addressed exportation and provided for a number of important consumer
protections. H.I. 1684, 106th Cong. §§ 2(e)(2), 4.
387. Letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to the Consumer's
Union, the Consumer Federation of America, the United States Public Interest Group, & the
National Consumer Law Center (on file with authors).
388. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Clinton-Gore Plan for
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next few years.389
2. State Efforts
As with the RTO industry, the payday loan industry sought state legislation
sanctioning its business following early adverse actions by courts and
regulators treating payday transactions as disguised loans.3 An Associated
Press wire story reports that Tennessee's early legislative effort brought out a
"Noah's Ark" of industry lobbyists and at least $105,750 in campaign
donations between 1996 and 1998, not counting soft money contributions.39'
The state trade association in Kentucky spent over $102,000 on lobbying inthe
eight-month period before to the enactment of that state's pro-lender law.
Among the lobbyists hired in those two states and in Louisiana were former
politicians or those with political connections.3  Currently nearly half the states
now have specific legislation addressing payday loans.393
The industry's regulatory efforts in a few states have resulted in favorable
treatment of payday lenders. Check cashers in Florida, for example, have
adroitly utilized the state administrative process to carve a niche within which
it can operate outside of traditional lenders' constraints. 39' In Florida check
cashers operate under the Florida Money Transmitters' Code.395 This Code was
intended to apply to businesses that electronically transmit funds from one
location to another, or "payment instrument sellers," as well as those that cash
389. This issue places Defense Department concerns about the well-being of enlisted
military personnel at odds with the Treasury Department's concerns (through the OCC) about
the well-being of those holding national bank charters.
390. Kansas and Nebraska enacted payday loan laws in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §16a-2-404 (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §45-901-929 (Michie 1994).
391. John Hendren, Lobbying, Money Helping to Persuade Legislators to Legalize
Payday Loans, J. REc. (Okla. City), Feb. 23, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9843431, at 1.
392. Id. A Tennessee state senator sunmed up the problem this way: "Legislatures
work pretty well if you have good lobbyists on both sides .... Where the system breaks down
is where you have a crew of highly effective and capable lobbyists on one side and only five-
and-a-half million silent Tennesseans on the other side. Then the result is not always justice."
Id. at2.
393. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.33 (West 1999); COLO. REv. STAT., §§ 5-3-501 to -605
(1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-4701 to -4712 (Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 560.301-.310
(West Supp. 1999); IOWACODE §§ 533D.1 to 533D.16 (Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-
404 (1999); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 368.010 to -.991 (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:3577.1-.8 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.60-.605 (West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 408.500 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-901 to -929 (1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 604.010 -.170 (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-275 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§1315.35-.44 (West Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-10 to -260 (West Supp. 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-101 to -119 (Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 31.45.010 -
.900 (Supp. 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN §§ 40-14-362 to -364 (Michie 1999).
394. See supra Part V (discussing the contrary weight of authority in courts, and other
regulators).
395. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 560-560.310 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
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checks and immediately deposit them.396 Under the Money Transmitters' Code,
check cashers may charge a flat fee that cannot exceed 10% of the check's face
value.397
C. Automobile Title Loans
Legislative efforts in the title pawn arena followed quickly after adverse
court decisions against title lenders. For example, hard on the heels of a
Tennessee court's 1994 holding that title pawns were not true pawns,3 9 the
Tennessee legislature passed its Title Pledge Act in 1995.399 Rather than
maintaining a single strong industry advocacy group, the title loan or title pawn
industry's legislative efforts have been predominately maintained by a private
nationwide title lending company based in Atlanta, Georgia called Title Loans
of America, Inc. (TLOA). Public political campaign contributions, lobbyist's
lists, and other reports reveal this company has been active in the legislative
process all over the country.4"0 States in which TLOA has successfully
supported triple-digit title loan legislation include Georgia, Florida, and
Tennessee. °' However, TLOA's legislative efforts have not always been
successful. In Oklahoma, California, West Virginia, and Kentucky state
legislators and officials have refused, limited, or repealed laws allowing high-
interest, fully-secured title loans.402 Presently, TLOA lobbyists are active in
states including California 43 and Florida in supporting legislation that will
allow high interest title loans." 4
Since their efforts began, TLOA has lost the support of some of the
legislators who previously supported the business. For example, Florida
396. Id. §§ 560.102 to-.103.
397. Id. § 506.309(4)(c).
398. See Henley v. Cameron Auto Pawn, 228 B.R. 425,426 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1998) (discussing Lynn v. Financial Solutions Corp. (In re Lynn), 173 B.R. 894 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1994)).
399. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-101 to -120 (Supp. 1999).
400. See, e.g., Poverty, Inc., supra note 141, at 29, 31; Mick Hinton, House Mulls
Rates, Car Title Rule for Lenders, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (City Edition), Mar. 10, 1998, at 5;
Capitol Media Services, Loans at 25% Monthly Interest Find Earnest Foe in Key Senator
Howard Fischer, THE ARIZONA DA LY STAR, Mar. 22, 1998; Adam C. Smith, Price of Fast Car
Cash Can Put Unwary on Foot, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at IA; Wissner, supra
note 123, at IA; see also 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 6-7 (discussing TLOA and interviewing
its President, Bob Reich).
401. Cahill, supra note 40, at Al.
402. West VirginiaexrelMc Grawv. Pawn Am., 518 S.E.2d 859, 862 (V. Va. 1998);
Cahill, supra note 40, at Al; Capitol Bureau, Car Title, Loan Plan Withdrawn, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN (City Edition), Mar. 11,1998, at 3; 60 Minutes, supra note 46; Smith, supra note
401, at IA.
403. California Sec. of State Bill Jones, 1999-2000 Directory ofLobbyists, Lobbying
Firms, and Lobbyist Employees (visited Apr. 7,2000) <http://www.ss.ca.gov>.
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Representative Ed Healey, who sponsored the Florida title loan law, said of his
participation in the introduction and passage of the law: "It's the only blemish
I have after 24 years.""° State officials and lobbyists are also distancing
themselves from TLOA as a result of rumors relating to Alvin Malnik's alleged
Mafia connections. 4°6 Florida legislators have admitted error in passing title
loan laws in the confusion of the last hour of the 1995 session. They thought
the 22% interest rate was an annual, not monthly, rate.407 A legislatively-created
study commission recommended a repeal of the title loan laws completely."S
Nevertheless, after a substantial infusion of cash into individual and party
campaign accounts, efforts to enact curative legislation stalled in the following
four legislative sessions." 9
As a result of this inaction, Florida counties and cities began to consider
and pass legislation providing much needed reform.41° Florida's local
governments have the authority to consider their own ordinances because the
title loan laws were incorporated into the pawnbrokers statute, which allows
local government to enact "more restrictive legislation.,
41
The City Council of Jacksonville, Florida first introduced a proposed
ordinance that contained many reforms, such as requiring lender licensing and
oversight, the return of surpluses after repossession and sale, and an
18%--rather than 2640/o--annual percentage rate. A year of committee
405. Marcia Gelbart, MeyerLansky, LawyerNow Title Loan King, PALMBEACHPOST,
Mar. 3, 1999, at lA (describing how an old friend and former House Speaker Donald Tucker,
as TLOA's lobbyist, ran up to Rep. Healey as he walked into the Senate on the last day of the
session and asked Healy to submit a bill; Healy said he knew the subject matter but never read
the details).
406. Tom Humphrey, Top LobbyistDrops Car Title Loan Firm AfterMob Ties Story,
KNOXVILLENEWS-SENTNEL, Mar. 19, 1999, at A3; Pat Kossan, Bill Flirted With Accused Mob
Figures, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1999, at Al; Poverty, Inc., supra note 141, at 30 (noting
that Mr. Malnik has never been convicted of a crime); Wissner, supra note 123, at IA.
(discussing organized crime connections to pay day lending); 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 6-7
(highlighting an interview with TLOA president, Robert Reich, describing Alvin Malnik as a
silent investor).
407. See, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 46, at 7-8 (interviewing Florida Representative
William Sublete, who commented that the title loan bill was one of 145 votes taken on the last
day ofsession: "I think I speak for the entire Florida House at the time. And universally, without
exception, each of those members had said that they had no idea what they were voting on, or
what was being pushed through that day.").
408. Letter from Craig A. Meyer, Vehicle Title Loan Task Force to Toni Jennings,
President, Florida Senate and Daniel Webster, Speaker, Florida House of Representatives (Feb.
28, 1997) (on file with authors).
409. H. 299, 1st Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1999); S. 898, Ist Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1999); S. 868, 1st
Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1999); H. 795, 2d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); H. 3955, 2d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); S.
194, 2d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); S. 258, 2d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); H. 431, 1st Leg. Sess. (Fla.
1997); H. 659, 1st Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1997); S. 1176, 2d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 1996); H. 1027, 2d Leg.
Sess. (Fla. 1996).
410. Authority to pass these laws derives from FLA. STAT. ANN. § 538.17 (West 1997)
(allowing the licensing of pawnbrokers at the municipal level).
411. Id. § 538.17.
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meetings, public hearings, negotiations, and standard industry stalling
techniques ensued. The same industry representatives who can be found in the
legislative halls of state legislative bodies in Florida, Mississippi, Illinois,
Kentucky, and Tennessee came to Jacksonville to take part in local legislative
efforts and to contribute to local political campaigns. Advocating better local
controls, Florida's Attorney General and the Florida Comptroller even came
and spoke to the Jacksonville City Council, urging the council members to act
where the state legislators had failed. Again, consumer advocates and the
industry agreed on the reforms but failed to come close to reaching agreement
regarding the interest rate. In the end, despite the industry's consistent claim it
could not make a profit with less than triple-digit annual interest rates, the
Jacksonville City Council passed its title loan reform ordinance.41
While the state legislature wrangled for the fourth year in a row with the
title loan question, the three beach cities adjoining Jacksonville-Jacksonville
Beach, Atlantic Beach, andNeptune Beach-eachproposed and quicklypassed
similar reform ordinances with an annual interest rate cap of 30%."3 Next, the
adjoining counties-Clay and St. John's-passed reform ordinances limiting
the interest rate to 30%.414 The title loan reform movement then headed to south
Florida where Palm Beach and Broward Counties passed ordinances with 30%
interest rate caps, while Miami-Dade County reduced the rate to 18% per
annum. Hillsborough, Orange, Seminole, Volusia, Osceola, and Martin
Counties later enacted similar consumer legislation; to date, a large percentage
of Florida's sixty-seven counties have done what the state has refused to do by
reducing title loan interest rates to 30% or less per annum and enacting other
consumer protection reforms.41 s
D. Public Relations
In addition to legislative efforts, fringe credit trade groups also engage in
nationwide public relations campaigns.4 16 As a part of this effort, some fringe
lenders seek to distinguish themselves from other players in the fringe
market.417 The APRO argues that the rent-to-own industry does not fall into the
category with other fiinge lenders because it provides no banking services.1 8
Similarly, the pawnbrokers lobby strongly opposed the inclusion of automobile
title pawns in the "pawn" category for fear it would give pawnbrokers a bad
412. One ofthe authors was continuously involved in these processes and participated
in legislative committee meetings and legislative and judicial hearings, working directly with the
city and the industry on the compromise legislation.
413. One of the authors was continually involved in these processes.
414. One of the authors was continually involved in the Clay county process.
415. Our Views, Fleeced in Florida, ORLANDo SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 1999.
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name.419 In Florida, when the legislature was adding title pawns to the
pawnbrokers chapter, the pawnbrokers association insisted on including a
provision that title pawn lenders could not use the term "pawn" in connection
with their loan transactions.42 ° The industry threatened to sue a television
station that refused to "correct" a story referring to the transactions as
"automobile title pawns." Representatives of some parts of the fringe
marketplace fear the use of these labels will "draw exponentially more attention
to the plight of the poor." '42 As one commentator has put it:
[I]f the picture can be painted that there is an orchestrated
effort to impale the working poor on the prongs of a gigantic
evil complex of fringe banking services and there is nowhere
for them to turn and no escape, then suddenly there is a story
to tell and a bigger enemy to attack.4'
VII. USURY POLICY AND THE TWO-TIERED SYSTEM
A. The Multiple Purposes for Usury Laws
There are many good reasons unrelated to the usury debate to subject the
two-tiered financial services system to public scrutiny. However, for the
purposes of this focus edition on usury law, it is appropriate to consider the
fringe marketplace in that context.4"
1. The Moral Predicate
Usury laws are, at core, the earliest form of consumer protection law. They
have been observed over millennia and across a wide variety of cultures-in
order, it may be said, to protect the needy from the greedy.424 Arguably,
419. Id.
420. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 538.15(5) (West Supp. 2000).
421. WINN, supra note 362, at 3.
422. Id.
423. While some second-tier lending is regulated, including some price restrictions,
the allowable price tags are such that the policy issues presented do not differ significantly from
those presented by a deregulated market.
424. See, for example, Whitworth & Yancy v. Adams, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 333 (1827),
in which the court noted
These statutes were made to protect needy and
necessitous persons from the oppression of usurers
and monied men, who are eager to take advantage of
the distress of others; while they, on the other hand,
from the pressure of their distress, are ready to come
to any terms; and with their eyes open, not only break
the law, but complete their ruin.
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however, the more a population uses credit for convenience, lifestyle, and
"wants," the more public concern over borrowers who go into debt as a result
of necessity wanes.' This result, in turn, erodes agreement among the majority
about the moral purpose underlying usury laws. Moreover, in a society with
standards of living among the top tier of the world's nations, the distinction
between wants and needs can itself become a point of dispute; beyond the
unquestionable basics, the concept of need--even poverty itself-may be
relative.426 Finally, at different times, a culture places different levels of
emphasis on the balance between "individualism" or "individual responsibility"
and a more shared vision of common purpose and responsibility. Here, too,
twentieth-century America arguably resembles nineteenth-century Americajust
Id. at 416. Likewise, in Schneider v. Phelps, 359 N.E.2d 1361 (N.Y. 1977), the court explained
that
The purpose of usury laws, from time immemorial,
has been to protect desperately poor people from the
consequences of their own desperation. Law-making
authorities in almost all civilizations have recognized
that the crush of financial burdens causes people to
agree to almost any conditions of the lender and to
consent to even the most improvident loans. Lenders,
with the money, have all the leverage; borrowers, in
dire need of money, have none.
Id. at 1365. In commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1933), the court noted
We think a better comparison or analogy is to look
upon the offense [of usury] as fraud, deceit, cheating
and kindred wrongs are viewed. Many courts, if not
the economists, still feel that the debtor is held in
financial peonage and that general usury laws are
necessary to protect him from the greed of the
oppressive lender and still think of the creditor who
willfully attempts to take more than the law allows as
a Shylock exacting his pound of flesh.
Id. at 9, quoted in Benj. S. Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 36,40 (1941) (discussing moral versus legal usury); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Jose
Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest
Restrictions and UsuryLaws, 41 J.L. &ECoN. 1, 1 (1998) (noting that Dante put usurers "in the
same area of hell as denizens of Sodom'); George J. Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate
Ceilings Reexamined, 56 B.U. L. REv. 451 (1976) (discussing the advantages of and providing
ethical support for low consumer rate ceilings); Pope John Paul II, Address to the National
Council of Anti-Usury Foundations (Apr. 14, 1999), quoted in Dorothy Day, Peter Maurin and
the Catholic WorkerMovement: John Paul II Calls for an End to Usury, Hous. CAm. WORKER
NEWSPAPER (visited April 9, 2000) <http://www.cjd.org/paper/usury.html> (encouraging
members to combat usury); see generally Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra, at 19 (providing a brief
overview of some of the historical and cross-cultural treatments of usury); COST OF CREDIT,
supra note 22 (supplying references to more detailed historical treatments).
425. The challenges created by this dual nature of the credit marketplace were noted
in the first wave of reform. See Hubachek, Development, supra note 1, at 129-131.
426. "Low-to-moderate" income, for example, is defined in relation to the median
income--a relative measure. See Hogarth & O'Donnell, supra note 217, at 460. A brief news
report on the current debate is found in Laura Maggi, Devil in the Details: The Poor Count, AM.
PROSPEcT, Feb. 14, 2000, at 1.
ol. 51: 589
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before the first wave of reform. In describing the strategy of one segment of the
small loan reform movement during the early twentieth century, Lendol Calder
explains that "[d]uring the Progressive Era, ideals of social harmony became
popular as many Americans turned away from the excessive individualism of
late nineteenth-century Social Darwinism," and those ideals were invoked in
the reform campaign.427 While the moral basis for usury regulation may be out




2. The Economic Predicate(s)
The most frequently articulated view of usury laws from today's dominant
economic perspective posits a negative role for usury laws-they interfere with
matters best left to "The Market. '429 Thomas A. Durkin, a staff economist from
the Federal Reserve Board presented "An Economic Perspective on Interest
Rate Limitations" at a conference a few years ago in which he catalogues the
427. CALDER, supra note 179, at 141. Similarly, the current climate is described
(admittedly by one of the authors) as one of "economic Darwinism." Poverty, Inc., supra note
141, at 29 (quoting Kathleen Keest). Though there is a distinction between the concepts of
"individual responsibility" and "every man for himself," at times the former is used to rationalize
the latter.
As a practical matter, the degree of individualism that a society as a whole believes
in may depend on how widespread socioeconomic comfort is. Those who articulate an
"individual responsibility" view in the abstract feel differently when the consumer in question
is an elderly relative or an inexperienced twenty-year-old offspring. If this is the case, the
relative weight given to the moral purpose of usury laws will vary as well, depending on overall
conditions in the economy.
428. Navy Captain Robert Andersen's concluding remarks at the Lieberman Forum
reflect this fact: "It is disturbing... that there are companies feeding off the poor. The people
who can least afford these loans are the ones falling prey. It is critical that we focus on making
ethical decisions based on what['s] best for America and not what is best for lining our pockets."
Lieberman Forum (Andersen testimony), supra note 59, at 3.
The consequences of the current wave of deregulation led some courts to allude to the
earlier experiments with deregulation; these experiments were short-lived because abuses arose
in the absence of usury laws. See, e.g., In re Coxson, 43 F.3d 189, 191 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995)
(noting that Texas's abandonment of usury laws during Reconstruction was reversed because of
the resulting credit abuses); Paulman v. Filtercorp, 899 P.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Wash. 1995)
(Talmadge, J., concurring) (calling on the legislature to revisitwhether the exemption from usury
laws for small business loans is "just" in view of a loan that "would have made a loan shark
proud").
429. One theologian, seemingly only partially tongue-in-cheek, detects distinct
theological overtones in our view of "The Market" today---"omnipotent... omniscient.., and
omnipresent." Harvey Cox, The Market As God, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1999, at 19.
Even economists are beginning to discuss whether the discipline is currently too
divorced from ethics. See, for example, a work by the 1998 Nobel Prize winner in economics,
AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHics AND ECONOMICS 7 (1988) ("[T]he nature of modem economics has
been substantially impoverishedby the distance thathas grownbetween economics and ethics.").
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ways economists believe interest rate ceilings distort financial markets.4 0
However, some of the same outcomes Durkin attributes to price regulation
have arguably come to pass in the current, largely deregulated, consumer credit
market.43' One statement in particular is strikingly ironic. Though speaking of
credit sales rather than loans, Durkin predicts that "[t]he likely result of the rate
ceiling would be development of a class of stores which sell credit goods
largely to poor risks but at higher prices.... [M]arket segmentation would
increase and competitive forces decline." '432 In more areas than just credit sales,
this is precisely what is happening to credit even in the presence of
deregulation.433 Further, increasedbusiness within each segment of this second-
tier marketplace has not resulted in the kind of competition that genuinely
lowers the prices of these products.434
430. Thomas A. Durkdn,An EconomicPerspective on lnterestRate Limitations, 9 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 821 (1993).
431. For example, in discussing the argument that ceilings restrict the availability of
credit, thus acting as a rationing device, Durkin argues that "[c]reditors might... impose fees
and raise uncontrolled aspects of the price and eliminate or reduce grace periods." Id. at 825.But
the overwhelming majority of credit card business in this country has been deregulated for a
decade ormore--and these events have happened to a greater degree than when it was regulated.
Several explanations exist for this, one of which is that by increasing revenues on the back end
of a transaction (e.g., overuse fees, underuse fees, late fees, and "we deem ourselves insecure"
penalty rates), the advertising can focus on "competitive" front-end pricing, such as low teaser
rates.
Another argument Durkin posits is that ceilings have a negative macroeconomic
impact. By keeping interest rates below the "free market equilibrium rate," rate ceilings reduce
savings. Id. at 829. But our savings rate is low despite deregulation of the largest sectors of the
consumer credit market. (Spending, spurred in part by the availability of credit, may well also
reduce savings, as people "buy now, pay later" instead of saving for the purchase or for the
"rainy day.")
A third adverse effect of ceilings Durkin advances is that they waste resources, as
business resources are devoted to "the 3 Ls-lawyers, litigation, and legislation."Id at 828. But
deregulation can also lead to deceptive and unfair practices in efforts to gain competitive
advantage, and overreaching occurs in a deregulated market. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text. As long as fundamental concepts of fairness arepart ofourbody politic, the
"3 Ls" are as likely to be consequences of deregulation as they are of regulation. Indeed, a
society that becomes too one-sided in terms of access to lawyers, courts, and legislatures is not
likely to be a truly democratic society for long. For an extensive examination of the economic
perspective on usury, see Wallace, supra note 425
432. Durkin, supra note 431, at 836.
433. As noted earlier, this segmentation has likewise developed in the deregulated
mortgage market as well. See Mansfield, supra note 19. These outcomes invite speculation as
to whether deregulation in fact encourages segmentation.
434. One of the trade association spokesmen told the Lieberman Forum that because
the payday loan industry is highly competitive,
[t]his has reduced prices and it will continue to drive
down the cost of this financial product to marginal
cost, in accordance with standard economic theory.
Ultimately, the best consumer protection is full
disclosure of interest charges under TILA and the
operation of the well tested American free enterprise
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In fairness to market theorists, market forces work better in some parts of
the consumer credit marketplace than in others. But the basic threshold
question must always be whether the particular marketplace under scrutiny is
one in which market forces work well, and the fringe market raises serious
questions in this regard.43 s During the first wave of small loan reform, one
author described the limited benefits in terms of lower prices that competition
brings in this kind of marketplace as follows:
A time came when there were too many licensed lenders and
too many dollars seeking to be lent. Competition so far had
been effective only to a very limited extent in reducing the
rates of charge. Instead, it took the form of excessive
solicitation and overlending. This in turn led to the
borrower's delinquency which fostered collection abuses.436
Juxtaposing this commentator's analysis against the contemporary marketplace
described in Part II, one suspects the author would repeat those words today.
One overview of the deregulatory efforts in the 1980s surveys both sides
of the usury law debate.437 Regarding the argument that rate caps restrict the
availability of credit, the overview notes that the number of borrowers cut out
of the credit market by any "rationing" may not be large.438 Further, this
outcome should be balanced against the number of people who would pay
higher rates in the absence of reasonable ceilings.439 Greater risk and higher
transaction costs are reasons generally advanced for high prices in the fringe
market, and to some extent, both are present." However, the question is how
much of the higher price is compensation and how much instead may be
opportunistic pricing. Opportunism may distort the market process because of
unequal bargaining power, "information asymmetries" (unequal information
system, in which the most efficient business survive
to provideproducts to consumers at the least expense.
Lieberman Forum (Rochford testimony), supra note 30, at 19. This view is disputed. Others see
little sign that user costs have declined in the AFS marketplace, even as it has grown. RTO and
check cashing costs have not declined noticeably despite growth. See supra note 29 as to the rise
in the cost of cashing a social security check even as competition increased. See also Lieberman
Forum (Fox testimony), supra note 121, at 7 (explaining why competition between lenders will
not provide consumers with lower prices). It is critical to look at the actual track record before
taking this rationale on faith in the AFS marketplace.
435. See supra Part IV.
436. Hubachek, Development, supra note 1, at 121-22.
437. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 2.4.1.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 56; see also Wallace, supra note 425 (discussing how low ceilings protect
consumers).
440. Regarding traditional pawnbrokers and standard check cashers, see CASKEY,
FRINGE BANKING, supra note 3, at 111. (Note that Caskey conducted this study before the boom
in auto title loans and payday loans and thus did not examine those providers.)
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and understanding), and actual or perceived absence of choice."'
The fringe market presents a tension regarding the issue of choices. One
justification offered for these products is that the targeted customers are facing
financial emergencies and have nowhere else to go. 2 On the other hand, that
need is precisely what gives the lender greater leverage." 3 These justifications
can backfire, because they implicate the moral justification for usury laws and
undermine the economic justification for "leaving it to the market."4"
Risk-based pricing as a rationale also begs a chicken-and-egg question: to
what extent does high cost create the risk, rather than compensate for it?
Advocates have seen many individual credit transactions in which the
consumer's budget could have supported a reasonably priced loan, but the high
fringe credit price tag stretched this capacity too far." On an aggregate basis,
segmentation would seem to exacerbate the problem. The industry may
respond that overall default rates require them to raise the costs for their whole
customer base: "It's a shame, but the 80% of our customers who do pay have
441. One complication of relying on disclosure rather than substance is that creditors
can choose either to exploit or bridge information asymmetries. See, e.g., Emery v. American
Gen. Fin. Co., 71 F.3d 1343,1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (reciting facts ofa case in which a woman was
not told that borrowing $300 would result in about $1200 in fees; the court said, "[s]o much for
the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers"). Apart from the distortions that
misleading oral "explanations" ofdisclosures create (or perhaps because they are more prevalent
than we know), one study found that only 37% of consumers understood the concept of the APR
as the primary indicator of credit price, although over 70% knew what the letters stood for.
EDUC. TESTING SERV. FOR THE CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & TRW, U.S. KNOWLEDGE: THE
RESULTS OF A NAnONWIDE TEST (1990).
442. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 40 (reporting that "[t]itle lenders say critics
misunderstand their mission. They say they serve people with nowhere else to turn.").
443. See Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 466 F. Supp. 379 (S.D. Iowa 1979). InAldens, the
court noted that within "the power of the lender to relieve the wants of the borrower lies the germ
of oppression." Alders, 466 F. Supp. at 384 (quoting 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 4
(1969)).
444. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (explaining that "absence of meaningful choice" is a element of unconscionability,
not an explanation for it); Craig Horowitz, Comment, Reviving the Law of Substantive
Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to
Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 944-45 (1986)
(discussing oppressive contracts). Pawnbrokers understand the double-edged force of this
argument. See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 3 at 71 n.1.
445. In the subprime mortgage area, the prevalence of the problem led to the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) prohibition against engaging in a pattern and
practice of making high-cost mortgages without regard to the ability to pay from current and
expected income. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) (1994); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(e)(1) (1999);
Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444,456 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that "[t]he
mere existence of some set of guidelines does not make a lender in compliance if the guidelines
are in fact deficient"). In the AFS midget loan area, see the Lieberman Forum's "ability to pay"
charts. Lieberman Forum Charts, supra note 258; see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.5108(4)(a)
(West 1997) (codifying the unconscionability principle that it is unconscionable to sell, lend, or
lease to someone believing that "there is no reasonable probability of payment in full," except
for an RTO total sales price, an amendment enacted when Iowa's RTO statute was passed).
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to pay for the 20% of our customers who do not." However, when an entire
customer base is drawn from a comparatively narrow economic base,
particularly one in the lower quintiles, is it possible that higher prices create a
higher failure rate, thus creating a negative feedback loop that ensnares
customers-ones who might have otherwise been on the performing side of the
divide? Could usury ceilings conceivably play the role of a circuit breaker if
such negative feedback loops are the operative economic forces in this
marketplace?"'
Usury ceilings can play preventive roles. While some economists argue
that such ceilings create entry barriers, thus discouraging competition,"' there
may be a positive side to this coin. It is good to discourage the entry of the
unscrupulous lender likely to become a profiteering predatory lender. Reverse
redlining, or discriminatory pricing, raises another potential preventive role for
ceilings. Discretionary pricing can also be discriminatory pricing; ceilings can
at least help indirectly by placing an outside limit on discriminatory harm.
The argument that ceilings restrict credit availability may have a positive
bent as well.'6 Prevention is not necessarily a bad policy when unfettered
freedom of choice presents potentially serious negative consequences. Any
number of laws that people routinely accept fall into this category (e.g., seat
belt laws, helmet laws, vaccination requirements, speed limits, and anti-
pollution laws). The fact that financial and consequent family worries flowing
from fringe debt has been viewed as a threat to military readiness" 9 suggests
that such debt problems are more than a matter of simply making individuals
pay the consequences for bad choices in good times. And good times ebb and
flow. Regarding the rise in consumer installment debt during one of the
recessions in the past two decades, Robin Morris has noted that overleveraged
households suffer most in a recession, and that usury ceilings can mitigate the
446. To the best of our knowledge, no economists studying feedback loops have
examined the fringe consumer credit marketplace; this may be an interesting case study for an
interdisciplinary examination.
A related question is how well a market specializing in products with higher
transaction costs (to whatever degree they truly are higher) that markets those products to a
comparatively narrowbase serves the low-to-moderate income creditmarket. Today's orthodoxy
is that cross-subsidization is a bad thing, yet it has some benefits, one of which might be that it
drags the negative loop, if indeed this is the model at work. The benefits of permitting lower-
margin transactions to cross-subsidize higher margin transactions were noted in the first wave
of reform: "in commercial banking for generations $1,000 and $5,000 business loans at
reasonable rates have been made possible because loans of $50,000 and $100,000 were being
made." HUBACHEK, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 131.
447. See, e.g., Durkin, supra note 431, at 827 (stating that "[i]nterest rate
ceilings.., produce a barrier to entry and reduce the likelihood of competitive conditions.")
448. See generally Wallace, supra note 425 (discussing benefits of low consumer
credit rate ceilings).
449. See supra note 241-243 and accompanying text.
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problems consumers and society suffer in a recession.450 Two economists
looking at the historical and cross-cultural roles of usury laws may be speaking
of a related concept when they posit ceilings as a "primitive" form of social
insurance for those who suffer from temporary "negative income shocks. 45'
They also suggest that limiting the degree to which a person could become
over-indebted may serve the interests of the larger community, such as the
interest in avoiding an enhanced risk of bankruptcy.452 Though we do not foist
the "care of the bankrupt" on society today, bankruptcy risks created by
indebtedness to high-rate lenders arguably hurt other creditors, such as medical
care providers. Even in the absence of the debtor's bankruptcy, other
businesses may suffer. The money a household spends servicing high-cost debt
in the second-tier marketplace is not available for spending at the neighborhood
grocery stores, service stations, pharmacies, or other local businesses.453
B. Potential Social and Economic Costs of a Two-Tiered System
The beginning of this Article noted that the two-tiered system runs the
gamut from one-day small loans to mortgage loans. The limitations of current
market theory may be most visible in the consumer credit marketplace because
the forces of distortion are prevalent and are exacerbated in the second-tier
450. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15
PEPP. L. REv. 151, 177-78 (1988). This observation suggests another unexplored connection for
a possible macroeconomic preventive function for usury laws in limiting excessive debt. The
debt deflation theory suggests that excessive debt burdens can restrict demand in a recession,
which, in turn, can trigger deflation-worsening the recession. The fringe credit volume is a drop
in the bucket of America's economy, and even the entire $5.6 trillion in household debt may be
too small to pose a threat. However, today we speak of "consumer spending" driving this period
of record growth, suggesting it is large enough to have a macroeconomic impact. One economic
historian has speculated whether the fact that consumer debt became a household phenomenon
for the first time in the 1920s contributed to the 1930 consumption collapse. See OLNEY, supra
note 191, at 187-89. A contemporary look suggests that more study of the debt deflation theory
is warranted because there is at least a possibility that it is "not just a theoretical curiosity,
nor ... a relic of the Great Depression." John P. Caskey & Steven M. Fazzari, Debt, Price
Flexibility and Aggregate Stability, 102 REv. D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 519, 540 (1992).
451. Glaeser & Scheinlnan, supra note 425, at 3, 26. Although Glaeser and
Scheinkman purport to look at consumer finance laws in the United States on pages 12-13, the
rate ceilings they actually used appear to be the general usury ceilings (see page 14), not the
higher rates applicable to most consumer finance. For a discussion of general and special usury
ceilings, see COST OF CREDIT, supra note 22, at § 2.2. It is unknown whether using the rates
applicable to consumer credit transactions would have changed their analysis.
452. Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra note 425, at 27.
453. Place the fringe credit marketplace in the context of the following examination
of industries that "create" wealth by exploiting "sociological disequilibriums": "Entrepreneurs
see sociological opportunities to change human habits .... [examples used are Starbucks coffee
and the cruise industry].... The problem with wealth generated this way is that sociological
disequilibriums usually reflect a transfer of existing wealth rather than the generation of new
wealth." Lester C. Thurow, Building Wealth, ATLANIc MONTHLY, June 1999, at 57, 60. The
fringe credit marketplace seems to fit well within this analysis.
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market.
Though the expansion of credit in the fringe marketplace is sometimes
euphemistically cast as the "democratization of credit," it is imperative to
examine whether too much of this is destructive debt rather than productive
credit. According to one overview, "[c]onsumers who pay the high [fringe]
rates have such a hard time simply keeping up payments that getting ahead
becomes almost impossible. As a result, the status quo is perpetuated and it
becomes more difficult for lower income consumers to improve their status."'
If these consumers fail, they never get a chance to prove that they may have
been able to manage affordable credit. And participation in multiple sectors of
the second-tier marketplace exposes them to a greater risk of failure. For
example, distortions in fringe auto financing results in these customers paying
seriously inflated prices for second-rate cars at high interest rates. Because
those payments (often due weekly or biweekly) take a chunk out of the budget,
when the car breaks down, customers who turn to a payday lender for the repair
funds face an enhanced likelihood of failure on both debts. Meanwhile the
household's capacity to meet other expenses is further strained, perpetuating
the feedback loop to which this Article has previously alluded. Equally
insidious is the fact that borrowers who successfully pay off their fringe
loans-unlike consumers in the prime market-may not get the benefit of a
positive credit report. Successfully completed fringe credit transactions often
do not become part of the consumer's credit history, and thus cannot be used
to help establish the creditworthiness that would allow access to the
mainstream financial marketplace."5 Indeed, one Internet site for a specialized
reporting service explains to its prospective fringe credit industry customers
that "[u]nlike traditional consumer reporting companies, our database contains
only negative information."4 6
In recent years, there has been concern about the widening income and
wealth disparities in this country457 and about the troubling role of race in those
disparities.4"' Credit can be a part of the solution or part of the problem. One
454. AFS Overview, supra note 3, at 9.
455. Id. at 9.
456. The Difference in Sub-prime Consumer Information from Tele-Track (visited
Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.tele-track.com/differen.htm>.
457. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, In a Time of Plenty, The Poor Are Still Poor,
N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2000, at Wk-3 (reporting that the "[a]verage income for families in the
bottom fifth of the income scale fell 5 percent between the late 1970's and the late 1990's" while
"income among the top fifth of families rose 33 percent," and noting that "the median value of
assets owned by families with incomes less than $25,000 ... fell between 1995 and 1998").
In 1998 the share of aggregate household income coming into the lowest quintile was
3.6%, and 49.2% went into the top quintile. The lowest three quintiles received only 27.6%. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CuRRENT POPULATION SURVEY, Fig. 5 (Mar. 1999).
458. A study on low-income households done for the credit unions begins with the
following data on "net worth" (defined as assets less liabilities) and "financial wealth" (defined
as net worth minus net equity in the home):
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title lender is quoted earlier as saying he views his business as a ladder: people
can use it to go up or go down." 9 But in the fringe market the challenge is to
explore whether the forces at play make such loans more like trying to go up
a descending escalator-the fringe customer has to fight hard just to stay in
place, and stopping for breath means a ride to the bottom.'
VIII. ALTERNATIVES BEING EXPLORED
Considering alternatives for the small-dollar end of the fringe market has
the advantage of including savings options as well as alternative credit options.
Certainly there are cultural barriers to savings beyond the reach of politics and
law."' But if there are institutional barriers, it is appropriate to consider
whether they can be reduced. The minimum deposit, minimum balances, and
high maintenance fees of retail banks are one institutional barrier to savings. It
can be difficult to save in small increments with minimum opening balances;
moreover, monthly service fees on small accounts can not only exceed the
interest payable, but can actually cost the saver. Once again, credit unions are
turning their attention to this market. Their policies typically do not pose such
financial hurdles to small, incremental savings, and they can offer programs to
make savings more attractive to the fringe banking customer.
A Florida credit union is developing a package of the kind of services
Net Worth Financial Wealth
Median of
all households $45,630 $9,950
Non-Hispanic
white households $61,000 $18,100
Non-hispanic
black households $7,400 $200
Mean net worth
of all households
in bottom 40% of
households by net
worth $900 ($10,600)
JOHNP. CASKEY&DAVID B. HUMPHREY, CREDITUNIONSANDASSETACCUMULATIONBYLOWER-
INcOME HOUSEHOLDS 7 (1999).
459. See supra note 91.
460. Cf Kelly, supra note 176, at 90-91 (explaining that "[iln view of these
consequences [to families and communities], it is not possible to conclude that such lenders
justify their existence by contributing a valuable service; to the contrary their excesses add to
rather than subtract from the sum total of economic maladjustment").
461. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT
WHAT WE DON'T NEED (1998) (reporting on the middle class); CASKEY, CASH-AND-CARRY,
supra note 231 (reporting on lower income households).
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typically offered by fringe providers, including payday loans. The Florida
credit union believes that rates between 20% and 45% should be adequate,
which will test the payday loan industry's justification for its prices. 2 It will
avoid the roll-over problem on the payday loan product by offering reasonable
repayment terms at the outset.463 The Florida Central Credit Union making this
effort is one of a number of credit unions whose efforts to reach low-to-
moderate income communities are described in a recent survey. The Florida
Central Credit Union approach tracks the study's recommendations, including
partnering with well-managed nonprofit agencies with close ties to the
community to facilitate outreach, education, and trust, while offering products
and services geared to the needs and desires of those communities.'"
One commentator suggests a way of reducing institutional barriers to
savings by welfare households as an alternative to RTO. Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) are restricted-use savings accounts that are
designed to encourage accumulation of assets by welfare households. By
expanding the list of permissible uses of IDAs to include acquiring consumer
durables, welfare households may be encouraged (or at leastnot penalized) for
saving to buy a washing machine and dryer instead of patronizing the RTO
store."
Depending on the purpose of the borrowing, some philanthropic models
may be considered or public policy decisions revisited. If people are turning to
400% payday lenders to pay utility bills (one of the financial emergencies
sometimes cited by the industry), might that suggest that it is time to revisit the
cutbacks to the Low-Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)? Without
adequate funding for this program, some utilities offer their own charitable
programs for help. The McKnight Foundation has developed a revolving low-
interest small loan fund to help meet needs such as auto repairs or other
transportation-related needs, child care, education, and similar investment
purposes for its home base in Minnesota in 1985, and expansion pilots have
been established in other communities through Family Service America, a
Milwaukee-based nonprofit agency. 6
Finally, this year will determine where the government will go on a
controversial policy decision that touches some portions of the fringe banking
marketplace. Over a decade ago, the decision was made to move toward the
electronic delivery of government benefits, now called EBT (Electronic
Benefits Transfer). These benefits cover a broad economic spectrum, from
462. See Lieberman Forum (Gallagly testimony), supra note 58, at 5.
463. Id.
464. See CASKEY &HUMPHREY, supra note 459, at 30-35; see also id. at 14-20,61-65
(providing suggestions for serving this market).
465. Creola Johnson, Intersection ofRent-To-Own and Welfare Reform: A Missing
Component-The Acquisition of the Basic Household Durables at Affordable Prices (June 19,
1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
466. A very brief overview of this program and other suggestions for fringe banking
alternatives appear in HUDSON, supra note 19, at 41-45.
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pensions for retired presidents and senators to payments for VA benefits, social
security, social security disability, and supplemental security income (SSI)-a
needs-based program. The primary purpose of EBT was to save money-to
reduce operational costs by utilizing the efficiency of new technologies. But
EBT was also conceived as an opportunity to move some of the "unbanked"
into the mainstream financial system. If one of the factors that make people
turn to fringe providers is a greater sense of familiarity (and hence comfort)
with the fringe system, then making EBT available through widely-used ATM
networks may serve as a bridge to the financial mainstream. Banks, in turn,
benefit from bulk deposits under the program and are given the added prospect
of an expanded customer base.
But perversely, some banks have instead formed partnerships with fringe
providers, so that the fringe provider has become the distribution point. These
agreements have not only impeded the goal of "mainstreaming" recipients by
making the fringe provider the point of contact with the recipient, but these
arrangements also add an extra layer of expensive fees payable to the fiinge
provider by the recipient. In what would seem to be a classic illustration of
exploiting "sociological disequilibriums," the extra layer of fees reduces the
recipients' benefits and transfers them instead to this new middleman.467
Further, with fringe providers as the contact point the products and services
cross-marketed to recipients are not mainstream banking services (including
savings opportunities), but rather payday loans and high-priced payment
services."8 The Department of Treasury has issued an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) for public comment on whether such
"conduit" systems should be permitted, and, ifso, whether and how they should
be restricted." 9
IX. CONCLUSION
When the current wave of deregulation began there was little thought of
where it would end, other than the expressed faith that "the Market" would
work. But with the benefit of experience, a look back at some of the economic
arguments against rate ceilings suggests that they have more to do with theory
than empirical evidence. Nor is there any evidence that the data will change
anytime soon. Indeed, the similarity of the currently developing fringe banking
market to the one that proved dysfunctional at the beginning of this century
467. See Comments of Attorneys General of Arizona, California, Iowa, Maryland,
Oklahoma, and Rhode Island on Dept. of the Treas. Fisc. Serv. ANPRM, RIN 15055-AA74
(Apr., 1999); NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CrR., POSSIBLE REGULATION REGARDING ACCESS TO
ACCOUNTS ATFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGHPAYMENTSERVICE PROVIDERS (1999); see also
Thurow, supra note 482, at 60 (discussing "sociological disequilibriums').
468. One such proposal was to offer advances at a mere 200% on the security of the
next social security check. Fox, supra note 66, at 9. What a deal!
469. Possible Regulation Regarding Access to Accounts at Financial Institutions
Through Payment Service Providers, 64 Fed. Reg. 1149 (1999).
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gives little reason to believe that anything will be different this time. Our
experience shows that a two-tiered marketplace simply runs the risk of
becoming a second-class marketplace in too many respects-value, pricing,
and even legal protections-to warrant the freedom from scrutiny that marks
today's regulatory environment. And in giving it such scrutiny, it is necessary
to explore the larger question of whether the two-tier marketplace also runs the
risk of contributing to a widening gap between "haves" and "have-nots."
In 1963 David Caplovitz studied sales and credit markets around low-
income housing projects and observed that the system "is in many respects a
deviant one, in which unethical and illegal practices abound. Nevertheless, it
can persist because it fulfills social functions that are presently not fulfilled by
more legitimate institutions.""47 An obvious need for more attention to positive
alternatives exists. In this regard, it is encouraging that some credit unions are
showing an interest in offering alternatives, including savings opportunities,
that are targeted to fringe banking customers. With some effort, perhaps the
abuses of the fringe banking sector will not be seen as a "contemporary social
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